

1 academic studies do show that most firms tend to finance short-
2 term assets from short-term sources and long-term assets from
3 long-term sources.¹⁷⁰

4 Whereas short-term debt has a maturity of one year or less, long-term debt
5 may have maturities of 30 years or longer. Although there are practical financing
6 constraints, such as the need to “stagger” long-term debt maturities, the general
7 objective is to extend the average life of long-term debt. Still, long-term debt has
8 a finite life, which is likely to be less than the life of the assets included in rate
9 base. Common equity, on the other hand, is perpetual.

10 The perpetual nature of common equity makes it an important component
11 of the capital structure. Because long-term debt has a duration shorter than the
12 average life of the rate base, common equity is needed to extend the capital
13 structure’s duration to more closely match that of the rate base. Short-term debt,
14 on the other hand, will shorten the capital structure’s average life, contrary to the
15 practice of maturity matching. It would be unusual, therefore, for an electric
16 utility to fund its long-lived assets with short-term debt.

17 **Q. TURNING NOW TO THE COMPANY’S PROPOSED CAPITAL**
18 **STRUCTURE, DOES SWEPCO’S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE**
19 **COMPRISE LESS RISK THAN THAT OF THE PROXY GROUP?**

20 A. No, it does not. As shown on Schedule DWD-14R, the Company’s proposed
21 common equity ratio of 49.37% falls within the range of common equity ratios in
22 place at the operating utility subsidiary level for Dr. Woolridge’s proxy group.
23 Looking to the average and median common equity ratios for the operating utility

¹⁷⁰ Eugene F. Brigham and Joel F. Houston, Fundamentals of Financial Management, Concise 4th Ed., Thomson South-Western, 2004, p. 574.

1 subsidiaries indicates that SWEPCO is slightly more leveraged than the operating
2 utility subsidiaries of Dr. Woolridge's proxy group.

3 **Q. DR. WOOLRIDGE DISCUSSES AEP'S USE OF DEBT TO DRIVE**
4 **RETURNS AT THE EXPENSE OF ITS OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES**
5 **SUCH AS SWEPCO.¹⁷¹ WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE?**

6 A. Dr. Woolridge's position appears to suggest the Company is engaging in double
7 leverage, to the detriment of customers.¹⁷² My primary concern is that Dr.
8 Woolridge's position runs counter to the widely accepted "stand-alone" regulatory
9 principle, which treats each utility subsidiary as its own company. Under the
10 stand-alone approach, the cost of capital is determined using the subsidiary's
11 capital structure and cost of debt and equity. The cost of common equity is
12 generally estimated by reference to a proxy group of firms of comparable risk.

13 Consistent with the stand-alone principle as discussed previously, the
14 ownership structure does not affect the operating utility's capital structure or cost
15 of capital. Parent entities, like other investors, have capital constraints and must
16 consider the attractiveness of the expected risk-adjusted return of each investment
17 alternative as part of their capital budgeting process. This opportunity cost
18 concept applies regardless of the source of the funding. When funding is provided
19 by a parent entity, the return on that financing must still be sufficient to provide an
20 incentive to the parent entity to allocate equity capital to the subsidiary or business
21 unit rather than other internal or external investment opportunities. That is, the

¹⁷¹ Woolridge Direct Testimony , at 19-20.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

1 regulated subsidiary must compete for capital with its affiliates and with other
2 similarly situated utility companies.

3 From an external investor's perspective, the combined company must
4 provide a return reflecting the risks of the company's constituent parts. Investors
5 therefore value combined entities on a sum-of-the-parts basis, expecting each
6 operating segment to provide its appropriate risk-adjusted return. That practical
7 financial principle is consistent with the regulatory principle of treating utilities as
8 stand-alone entities. From both perspectives, it is the utility's operating risk that
9 defines the capital structure and cost of capital, not investors' sources of funds.

10 Contrary to those basic principles, Dr. Woolridge's double leverage
11 argument assumes the required return depends on the source of financing, not on
12 the risks of the underlying utility operations. The position that a company would
13 have different cost rates depending on how its investors fund their equity
14 investments violates the widely acknowledged economic "law of one price,"
15 which states that in an efficient market, identical assets would have the same
16 value. In other words, two utilities, identical in all respects but for their form of
17 ownership, should have the same common equity cost rates.

18 Moreover, if the common equity of a subsidiary were held by both the
19 parent and an external investor, the equity held by the parent would have one
20 required return, and the equity held by outside investors would have another. To
21 the extent the required returns differ, so would the value of the equity. But in an
22 efficient market, identical assets must have the same price (value). If not, the
23 difference quickly would be arbitrated away. As Morin noted in New Regulatory
24 Finance:

1 Carrying the double leverage standard to its logical conclusion
2 leads to even more unreasonable prescriptions. If the common
3 shares of a subsidiary were held by both the parent and by
4 individual investors, the equity contributed by the parent would
5 have one cost under the double leverage computation while the
6 equity contributed by the public would have another.¹⁷³

7 The double leverage argument also requires every affiliate within the
8 corporate family to have the same cost of capital, regardless of differences in risk.
9 AEP reports four operating segments: vertically integrated utilities, transmission
10 and distribution utilities, AEP Transmission Holdco, and generation and
11 marketing.¹⁷⁴ Because they are separately reported, we reasonably can assume
12 those segments face different risks.¹⁷⁵ And because they face different risks, we
13 reasonably may assume they require different returns. Morin further noted:

14 Just as individual investors require different returns from different
15 assets in managing their personal affairs, why should regulation
16 cause parent companies making investment decisions on behalf of
17 their shareholders to act any differently? A parent company
18 normally invests money in many operating companies of varying
19 sizes and varying risks. These operating subsidiaries pay different
20 rates for the use of investor capital, such as long-term debt capital,
21 because investors recognize the differences in capital structure,
22 risk, and prospects between the subsidiaries. Yet, the double
23 leverage calculation would assign the same return to each activity,
24 based on the parent's cost of capital. Investors recognize that
25 different subsidiaries are exposed to different risks, as evidenced
26 by the different bond ratings and cost rates of operating
27 subsidiaries. The same argument carries over to common equity.
28 If the cost rate for debt is different because the risk is different, the
29 cost rate for common equity is also different, and the double
30 leverage adjustment shouldn't obscure this fact.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Morin, at 523.

¹⁷⁴ See, American Electric Power, SEC Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2020, at 17.

¹⁷⁵ On page 15 of his direct testimony Dr. Woolridge notes the presence of a small premium of five basis points for the authorized ROEs of vertically-integrated electric utilities compared to transmission and distribution-only electric utilities.

¹⁷⁶ Morin, at 524-525.

1 Longstanding academic literature has thoroughly discussed the flaws
2 associated with the double leverage approach. For example:

- 3 1. Pettway and Jordan (1983), and Beranek and Miles (1988) point out the
4 flaws in the double leverage argument, particularly the excess return
5 argument, and also demonstrate that the “stand-alone” method is the
6 superior approach.¹⁷⁷
- 7 2. Rozeff (1983) discusses the ratepayer cross-subsidies of one subsidiary by
8 another when employing double leverage.¹⁷⁸
- 9 3. Lerner (1973) concludes that the returns granted to equity investors must
10 be based on the risks to which the investors’ capital is exposed and not the
11 investors’ source of funds.¹⁷⁹

12 Basic finance texts reach the same conclusions. In Principles of Corporate
13 Finance, 8th edition, Brealey, Myers, and Allen state:

14 In principle, each project should be evaluated at its own
15 opportunity cost of capital; the true cost of capital depends on the
16 use to which the capital is put. If we wish to estimate the cost of
17 capital for a particular project, it is project risk that counts.¹⁸⁰

18 Likewise, in Modern Corporate Finance, 1st edition, Shapiro states:

19 Each project has its own required return, reflecting three basic
20 elements: (1) the real or inflation-adjusted risk-free interest rate;

¹⁷⁷ Richard H. Pettway and Bradford D. Jordan, *Diversification, Double Leverage, and the Cost of Capital*, The Journal of Financial Research, Vol. VI, No. 4, Winter 1983; William Beranek and James A. Miles, *The Excess Return Argument and Double Leverage*, The Financial Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, May 1988.

¹⁷⁸ Michael S. Rozeff, *Modified Double Leverage – A New Approach*, Public Utilities Fortnightly, March 31, 1983.

¹⁷⁹ Eugene M. Lerner, *What are the Real Double Leverage Problems?* Public Utilities Fortnightly, June 7, 1973.

¹⁸⁰ Richard A. Brealey, Steward C. Meyers, Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 8th Ed., 2006, at 234.

1 (2) an inflation premium approximately equal to the amount of
2 expected inflation; and (3) a premium for risk. The first two cost
3 elements are shared by all projects and reflect the time value of
4 money, whereas the third component varies according to the risks
5 borne by investors in the different projects. For a project to be
6 acceptable to the firm's shareholders, its return must be sufficient
7 to compensate them for all three cost components. This minimum
8 or required return is the project's cost of capital and is sometimes
9 referred to as a hurdle rate.¹⁸¹

10 The preceding paragraph bears a crucial message: The cost of capital for a
11 project depends on the riskiness of the assets being financed, not on the identity of
12 the firm undertaking the project. Simply put, the notion of double leverage runs
13 counter to both financial and regulatory principles.

14 Lastly, double leverage arguments have been rejected by several regulatory
15 commissions, including the Maryland Public Service Commission:

16 We reject People's Counsel's proposed capital structure [reflecting
17 a double leverage adjustment] because it suffers from numerous
18 flaws. First, it assumes that the rate of return depends on the
19 source of capital rather than the risks faced by the capital.¹⁸²

20 In 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") reiterated
21 its previous position on "double leveraging,"¹⁸³ stating that "the motivations of a
22 parent company are irrelevant"¹⁸⁴ so long as the operating company passes the
23 FERC's three-part test: (1) it issues its own debt without guarantees; (2) it has its
24 own bond rating; and (3) it has a capital structure within the range of capital

¹⁸¹ Alan C. Shapiro, *Modern Corporate Finance*, Wiley, 1st Ed., 1990, at 276.

¹⁸² Maryland Public Service Commission, Order No. 81517, Case No. 9092, *In the Matter of the Application of Potomac Electric Power Company for Authority to Revise its Rate and Charges for Electric Service and for Certain Rate Design Changes*, July 19, 2007, at 73. [Clarification added]
¹⁸³ See, *Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.*, 80 FERC ¶ 61,157, 61,657 (1997) ("Opinion No. 414").

¹⁸⁴ See, 154 FERC ¶ 61,004, Docket No. ER15-945-001, at 15.

1 structures approved by the commission.¹⁸⁵ Under FERC guidance, the capital
2 structure of AEP is not applicable to SWEPCO.

3 The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission has cited to
4 FERC's position on the use of double leverage in support of its decision in Docket
5 No. UE 050684:

6 The FERC does not embrace the concept of double leverage. For
7 purposes of calculating rate of return for wholly owned
8 subsidiaries, FERC uses the stand-alone capital structure and return
9 on equity of the subsidiary so long as the subsidiary issues its own
10 debt, maintains its own credit ratings and meets other standards
11 related to equity ratio. The courts have upheld this policy. *See*
12 *Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n v Federal Energy Reg Comm'n*, 215
13 *F.3d 1*, 342 U. S. App. DC. 1 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2000).¹⁸⁶

14 **B. Sole Reliance on and Application of the Discounted Cash Flow Model**

15 **Q. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES DR. WOOLRIDGE'S RECOMMENDED ROE**
16 **RELY ON HIS DCF MODEL?**

17 A. As previously stated, Dr. Woolridge relies exclusively on his constant growth
18 DCF model results to determine his recommended ROE. As discussed in my
19 Direct Testimony,¹⁸⁷ the use of multiple models adds reliability to the estimation
20 of the common equity cost rate, with the prudence of using multiple cost of
21 common equity models supported in both the financial literature and regulatory
22 precedent.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.* See also, *Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.*, 80 FERC ¶ 61,157, 61,657 (1997) ("Opinion No. 414").

¹⁸⁶ Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Docket No. UE 050684, Order No. 4, at 117.

¹⁸⁷ D'Ascendis Direct Testimony, at 14.

1 early pioneering article on regulatory finance, stated^(footnote omitted).

2 Use more than one model when you can. Because
3 estimating the opportunity cost of capital is difficult, **only a**
4 **fool throws away useful information**. That means you
5 should not use any one model or measure mechanically and
6 exclusively. Beta is helpful as one tool in a kit, to be used
7 in parallel with DCF models or other techniques for
8 interpreting capital market data. (emphasis added)

9 Reliance on multiple tests recognizes that no single methodology
10 produces a precise definitive estimate of the cost of equity. As
11 stated in Bonbright, Danielsen, and Kamerschen (1988), '*no single*
12 *or group test or technique is conclusive*.' Only a fool discards
13 relevant evidence. (italics in original) (emphasis added)

14 * * *

15 While it is certainly appropriate to use the DCF methodology to
16 estimate the cost of equity, there is no proof that the DCF produces
17 a more accurate estimate of the cost of equity than other
18 methodologies. Sole reliance on the DCF model ignores the
19 capital market evidence and financial theory formalized in the
20 CAPM and other risk premium methods. **The DCF model is one**
21 **of many tools to be employed in conjunction with other**
22 **methods to estimate the cost of equity**. It is not a superior
23 methodology that supplants other financial theory and market
24 evidence. The broad usage of the DCF methodology in regulatory
25 proceedings in contrast to its virtual disappearance in academic
26 textbooks does not make it superior to other methods. The same is
27 true of the Risk Premium and CAPM methodologies. (emphasis
28 added)¹⁸⁸

29 Finally, Brigham and Gapenski note:

30 In practical work, *it is often best to use all three methods* – CAPM,
31 bond yield plus risk premium, and DCF – and then apply judgment
32 when the methods produce different results. People experienced in
33 estimating equity capital costs recognize that both careful analysis
34 and some very fine judgments are required. It would be nice to
35 pretend that these judgments are unnecessary and to specify an
36 easy, precise way of determining the exact cost of equity capital.
37 Unfortunately, this is not possible. Finance is in large part a matter
38 of judgment, and we simply must face this fact. (italics in

¹⁸⁸ Morin, at 428-431.

1 original)¹⁸⁹

2 In the academic literature cited above, three methods are consistently
3 mentioned: the DCF, CAPM, and the RPM, all of which I used in my analyses.

4 **Q. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, WHY IS SOLE RELIANCE ON THE**
5 **DCF MODEL PROBLEMATIC AT THIS TIME?**

6 A. Traditional rate base/rate of return regulation, where a market-based common
7 equity cost rate is applied to a book value rate base, presumes that M/B ratios are
8 at unity or 1.00. However, that is rarely the case. Morin states:

9 The third and perhaps most important reason for caution and
10 skepticism is that application of the DCF model produces estimates
11 of common equity cost that are consistent with investors' expected
12 return only when stock price and book value are reasonably
13 similar, that is, when the M/B is close to unity. As shown below,
14 application of the standard DCF model to utility stocks understates
15 the investor's expected return when the market-to-book (M/B) ratio
16 of a given stock exceeds unity. This was particularly relevant in
17 the capital market environment of the 1990s and 2000s where
18 utility stocks were trading at M/B ratios well above unity and have
19 been for nearly two decades. The converse is also true, that is, the
20 DCF model overstates that investor's return when the stock's M/B
21 ratio is less than unity. The reason for the distortion is that the
22 DCF market return is applied to a book value rate base by the
23 regulator, that is, a utility's earnings are limited to earnings on a
24 book value rate base.¹⁹⁰

25 As he explains, DCF models assume an M/B ratio of 1.0 and therefore
26 under- or over-states investors' required return when market value exceeds or is
27 less than book value, respectively. It does so because equity investors evaluate
28 and receive their returns on the market value of a utility's common equity,
29 whereas regulators authorize returns on the book value of common equity. This

¹⁸⁹ Eugene F. Brigham and Louis C. Gapenski, Financial Management – Theory and Practice, 4th Ed. (The Dryden Press, 1985) at 256.

1 means that the market-based DCF will produce the total annual dollar return
2 expected by investors only when market and book values of common equity are
3 equal, a very rare and unlikely situation.

4 **Q. WHY DO MARKET AND BOOK VALUES DIVERGE?**

5 A. As discussed previously, market values can diverge from book values for a myriad
6 of reasons as noted by Phillips¹⁹¹ and Bonbright.¹⁹²

7 **Q. CAN THE UNDER- OR OVER-STATEMENT OF INVESTORS'**
8 **REQUIRED RETURN BY THE DCF MODEL BE DEMONSTRATED**
9 **MATHEMATICALLY?**

10 A. Yes. Schedule DWD-15R demonstrates how a market-based DCF cost rate of
11 9.00%, when applied to a book value substantially below market value, will
12 understate investors' required return on market value. As shown, there is no
13 realistic opportunity to earn the expected market-based rate of return on book
14 value. In Column [A], investors expect a 9.00% return on an average market price
15 of \$66.86 for Dr. Woolridge's proxy group. Column [B] shows that when Dr.
16 Woolridge's 9.00% return rate is applied to a book value of \$36.56,¹⁹³ the total
17 annual return opportunity is \$3.290. After subtracting dividends of \$2.541, the
18 investor only has the opportunity for \$0.749 in market appreciation, or 1.12%.
19 The magnitude of the understatement of investors' required return on market
20 value using Dr. Woolridge's 9.00% cost rate is 4.08%, which is calculated by

¹⁹⁰ Morin, at 434.

¹⁹¹ Phillips, at 395.

¹⁹² Bonbright, at 334.


¹⁹³ Representing a market-to-book ratio of 182.90%.

1 subtracting the market appreciation based on book value of 1.12% from Dr.
2 Woolridge's expected growth rate of 5.20%.

3 **Q. HOW DO M/B RATIOS OF DR. WOOLRIDGE'S PROXY GROUP**
4 **COMPARE TO THEIR TEN-YEAR AVERAGE?**

5 A. The M/B ratio of Dr. Woolridge's proxy group is currently close to its ten-year
6 average. As shown in Chart 13, below, with the exception of early 2020, since
7 early 2016, the M/B ratios of the Dr. Woolridge's proxy group have exceeded its
8 ten-year average M/B ratio of approximately 1.84 times.

9 **Chart 13: M/B Ratios of Dr. Woolridge's Electric Proxy Group Compared**
10 **with Ten-Year Average¹⁹⁴**



11 The significance of this is that the ten-year average M/B ratio has always
12 been higher than 1.0x, which means that DCF model results have consistently
13 understated the investor-required return.
14

¹⁹⁴ Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

1 **Q. IS THERE ANOTHER WAY TO QUANTIFY THE INACCURACY OF**
2 **THE DCF MODEL WHEN M/B RATIOS ARE DIFFERENT THAN**
3 **UNITY?**

4 A. Yes. One can quantify the inaccuracy of the DCF model when M/B ratios are not
5 at unity by estimating the implied DCF model results (based on a market-value
6 capital structure) to reflect a book-value capital structure. This can be measured
7 by first calculating the market value of each proxy company's capital structure,
8 which consists of the market value of the company's common equity (shares
9 outstanding multiplied by price) and the fair value of the company's long-term
10 debt and preferred stock. All of these measures, except for price, are available in
11 each company's SEC Form 10-K.

12 Second, one must de-leverage the implied cost of common equity based on
13 the DCF. This is derived using the Modigliani / Miller equation¹⁹⁵ as illustrated
14 in Schedule DWD-16R and shown below:

15
$$k_u = k_e - (((k_u - i)(1 - t)) D/E) - (k_u - d) P/E \text{ [Equation 1]}$$

16 Where:

17	k_u	=	Unlevered (i.e., 100% equity) cost of common equity;
18	k_e	=	Market determined cost of common equity;
19	i	=	Cost of debt;
20	t	=	Income tax rate;
21	D	=	Debt ratio;
22	E	=	Equity ratio;
23	d	=	Cost of preferred stock; and
24	P	=	Preferred equity ratio.

¹⁹⁵ The Modigliani / Miller theorem is an influential element of economic theory and forms the basis for modern theory on capital structure. See, F. Modigliani, and M. Miller, *The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment*, The American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, (June 1958), at 261-297.

1 For example, using Dr. Woolridge's average proxy group-specific data, the
2 equation becomes:

$$3 \quad k_u = 9.00\% - (((k_u - 4.14\%)(1 - 21\%)) 36.36\% / 63.20\%) - (k_u - 5.33\%) 0.44\% / 63.20\%$$

4 Solving for k_u results in an unlevered cost of common equity of 7.47%.
5 Next, one must re-lever those costs of common equity by relating them to each
6 proxy group's average book capital structure as shown below:

$$7 \quad k_e = k_u + (((k_u - i)(1 - t)) D/E) + (k_u - d) P/E \text{ [Equation 2]}$$

8 Once again, using Dr. Woolridge's average proxy group-specific data, the
9 equation becomes:

$$10 \quad k_e = 7.47\% + (((7.47\% - 4.14\%)(1 - 21\%)) 53.32\% / 46.01\%) + (7.47\% - 5.33\%) 0.67\% / 46.01\%$$

11 Solving for k_e results in a 10.55% indicated cost of common equity
12 relative to the book capital structure of the proxy group, which is an increase of
13 1.55% over Dr. Woolridge's indicated DCF result of 9.00%. The leverage-
14 adjusted DCF result 10.55% is still not applicable to the Company, as it does not
15 reflect the higher risk that SWEPCO faces relative to the proxy group given its
16 smaller size, nor does it reflect the higher risk due to the Company's relative
17 riskier bond rating.

1 **Q. ARE YOU ADVOCATING A SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENT TO THE DCF**
2 **RESULTS TO CORRECT FOR ITS MIS-SPECIFICATION OF THE**
3 **INVESTOR-REQUIRED RETURN?**

4 A. No. The purpose of this discussion was to demonstrate that like all cost of
5 common equity models, the DCF has its limitations, and that the use of multiple
6 cost of common equity models, in conjunction with informed expert judgment,
7 provides a more accurate and reliable picture of the investor-required ROE than
8 does a narrow evaluation of the results of one model.

9 **C. Constant Growth DCF Model**

10 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE DR. WOOLRIDGE’S APPLICATION OF THE**
11 **CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL.**

12 A. For the dividend yield, Dr. Woolridge uses a current annual dividend and then
13 divides that by the 30-, 90-, and 180-trading day average stock prices to derive a
14 range of dividend yields between 3.7% and 3.9% and 3.8% to 4.0% using his and
15 my proxy groups, respectively.¹⁹⁶ Dr. Woolridge reviewed a number of growth
16 rates, including historical and projected DPS, book value per share (“BVPS”), and
17 EPS growth rates as reported by *Value Line*; analysts’ consensus EPS growth rate
18 projections from Yahoo!, Zacks, and S&P Capital IQ; and an estimate of
19 “Sustainable Growth” derived from data provided by *Value Line*.¹⁹⁷ Dr.
20 Woolridge states that in arriving at his 9.15% and 9.00% DCF estimates for his

¹⁹⁶ Woolridge Direct Testimony, Exhibit JRW-7, page 2 of 6.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, at 39-40.

1 and my proxy groups, respectively, he gave more weight to projected EPS growth
2 rates¹⁹⁸ despite stating that analysts' projected growth rates in EPS are biased.¹⁹⁹

3 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH DR. WOOLRIDGE'S POSITION THAT**
4 **ANALYSTS' EARNINGS GROWTH PROJECTIONS ARE**
5 **CONSISTENTLY BIASED?**

6 A. No, I do not. Dr. Woolridge argues analysts' earnings growth estimates are
7 "overly optimistic and upwardly biased"²⁰⁰ and asserts that "the DCF growth rate
8 needs to be adjusted downward from the projected EPS growth rate"²⁰¹ as a result
9 of that bias. Dr. Woolridge's position, however, is based on observations of the
10 broad market; he has provided no evidence that any of the growth rates used in my
11 (or his) DCF analyses are the result of a consistent and pervasive bias on the part
12 of the analysts providing those projections. Notably, despite his view that they are
13 biased, it was by "[g]iving primary weight to the projected EPS growth rate of
14 Wall Street analysts" that Dr. Woolridge arrived at his assumed growth rates.²⁰²

15 Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS.
16 Earnings expectations have a more significant, but not sole, influence on market
17 prices than dividend expectations. Thus, the use of earnings growth rates in a
18 DCF analysis provides a better match between investors' market appreciation
19 expectations implicit in market prices and the growth rate component of the DCF.
20 Consequently, earnings expectations have a significant influence on market prices
21 which affect market price appreciation, and hence, the "growth" experienced by

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, at 40.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, at 36-38.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, at 36.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, at 38.

1 investors. This should be evident even to relatively unsophisticated investors just
2 by listening to financial news reports on radio, TV, or reading newspapers. In
3 fact, Morin states:

4 Because of the dominance of institutional investors and their
5 influence on individual investors, analysts' forecasts of long-run
6 growth rates provide a sound basis for estimating required returns.
7 Financial analysts exert a strong influence on the expectations of
8 many investors who do not possess the resources to make their
9 own forecasts, that is, they are a cause of g. The accuracy of these
10 forecasts in the sense of whether they turn out to be correct is not at
11 issue here, as long as they reflect widely held expectations. As
12 long as the forecasts are typical and/or influential in that they are
13 consistent with current stock price levels, they are relevant. The
14 use of analysts' forecasts in the DCF model is sometimes
15 denounced on the grounds that it is difficult to forecast earnings
16 and dividends for only one year, let alone for longer time periods.
17 This objection is unfounded, however, because it is present
18 investor expectations that are being priced; it is the consensus
19 forecast that is embedded in price and therefore in required return,
20 and not the future as it will turn out to be.

21 * * *

22 Published studies in the academic literature demonstrate that
23 growth forecasts made by security analysts represent an appropriate
24 source of DCF growth rates, are reasonable indicators of investor
25 expectations and are more accurate than forecasts based on
26 historical growth. These studies show that investors rely on
27 analysts' forecasts to a greater extent than on historic data only.²⁰³

28 However, while EPS is a significant factor influencing market prices, it is
29 by no means the only factor that affects market prices, a fact recognized by
30 Bonbright with regard to public utilities as discussed previously. In addition,
31 studies performed by Cragg and Malkiel demonstrate that analysts' forecasts are
32 superior to historical growth rate extrapolations. They state:

²⁰² *Ibid.*, at 40.
²⁰³ Morin, at 298.

1 Efficient market hypotheses suggest that valuation should reflect
2 the information available to investors. Insofar as analysts' forecasts
3 are more precise than other types we should therefore expect their
4 differences from other measures to be reflected in the market. It is
5 therefore noteworthy that our regression results do support the
6 hypothesis that analysts' forecasts are needed even when calculated
7 growth rates are available. As we noted when we described the
8 data, security analysts do not use simple mechanical methods to
9 obtain their evaluations of companies. The growth-rate figures we
10 obtained were distilled from careful examination of all aspects of
11 the companies' records, evaluation of contingencies to which they
12 might be subject, and whatever information about their prospects
13 the analysts could glean from the companies themselves or from
14 other sources. It is therefore notable that the results of their efforts
15 are found to be so much more relevant to the valuation than the
16 various simpler and more "objective" alternatives that we tried.²⁰⁴

17 In addition, Vander Weide and Carleton conclude:

18 . . . our studies affirm the superiority of analyst's forecasts over
19 simple historical growth extrapolations in the stock price formation
20 process. Indirectly, this finding lends support to the use of
21 valuation models whose input includes expected growth rates.²⁰⁵

22 Additionally, it does not really matter what the level of accuracy of those
23 analysts' forecasts. What is important is that they influence investors and hence
24 the market prices they pay. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence that
25 investors, consistent with the EMH, would discount or disregard analysts'
26 estimates of growth in EPS. Since investors are aware of the accuracy of such
27 projections, as well as the literature supporting the superiority of such projection,
28 security analysts' earnings growth projections should be used exclusively in a cost
29 of common equity analysis.

²⁰⁴ John G. Cragg and Burton G. Malkiel, Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices (University of Chicago Press, 1982) Chapter 4.

²⁰⁵ James H. Vander Weide and Willard T. Carleton, *Investor Growth Expectations: Analysts vs. History* (The Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 1988) 78-82.

1 In addition to the empirical and academic support discussed previously in
2 this Rebuttal Testimony regarding the superiority of analysts' EPS growth
3 forecasts, there should be no concern about the use of analysts' forecasts in 2021.
4 Burton G. Malkiel, the Chemical Bank Chairman's Professor of Economics at
5 Princeton University is the author of the widely read national bestseller book on
6 investing entitled, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (2011). In testimony
7 before the Public Service Commission of South Carolina, in November 2002,
8 Malkiel affirmed his belief in the superiority of analysts' earnings forecasts when
9 he testified:

10 With all the publicity given to tainted analysts' forecasts and
11 investigations instituted by the New York Attorney General, the
12 National Association of Securities Dealers, and the Securities &
13 Exchange Commission, I believe the upward bias that existed in
14 the late 1990s has indeed diminished. In summary, I believe that
15 current analysts' forecasts are more reliable than they were during
16 the late 1990s. *Therefore, analysts' forecasts remain the proper*
17 *tool to use in performing a Gordon Model DCF analysis.*
18 (Rebuttal testimony, South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., pp. 16-
19 17, Docket No. 2002-223-E) (italics added)

20 As a practical matter, the October 2003 Global Research Analyst
21 Settlement required financial institutions to insulate investment banking from
22 analysis, prohibited analysts from participating in "road shows," and required the
23 settling financial institutions to fund independent third-party research.²⁰⁶ I have
24 reviewed the Letters of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent signed by financial

²⁰⁶ The 2002 Global Financial Settlement resolved an investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York Attorney General's Office of a number of investment banks related to concerns about conflicts of interest that might influence the independence of investment research provided by equity analysts.

1 institutions that were party to the Global Settlement, and found no reference to
2 misconduct by analysts following the utility sector.

3 Moreover, pursuant to Regulation AC, which became effective in April
4 2003, analysts must certify that "...the views expressed in the report accurately
5 reflect his or her personal views, and disclose whether or not the analyst received
6 compensation or other payments in connection with his or her specific
7 recommendations or views."²⁰⁷ I further understand industry practice is to avoid
8 conflicts of interest by ensuring that compensation is not directly or indirectly
9 linked to the opinions contained in those reports. Dr. Woolridge has not
10 explained why any of the analysts covering our respective proxy companies or the
11 S&P 500 companies used in my market DCF would bias their projections despite
12 those certification requirements. Considering that The Regulation Fair Disclosure
13 and Global Analysts Research Settlements were more than 15 years ago, investors
14 have been fully aware since then of the steps that have been taken to eliminate and
15 prevent analysts' bias.

16 In addition, there is no empirical evidence that investors would disregard
17 analysts' estimates of growth in earnings per share. *Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?*
18 *Evidence from Stock Recommendations* examines whether conflicts of interest
19 with investment banking [IB] and brokerage businesses induced sell-side analysts
20 to issue optimistic stock recommendations and whether investors were misled by
21 such biases. They conclude:

22 Overall, our findings do not support the view that conflicted
23 analysts are able to systematically mislead investors with

²⁰⁷ Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR PART 242 [Release Nos. 33-8193; 34-47384; File No. S7-30-02], RIN 3235-A160 Regulation Analyst Certification.

1 optimistic stock recommendations.

2 Agrawal and Anup state:

3 Overall, our empirical findings suggest that while analysts do
4 respond to IB and brokerage conflicts by inflating their stock
5 recommendations, the market discounts these recommendations
6 after taking analysts' conflicts into account. These findings are
7 reminiscent of the story of the nail soup told by Brealey and Myers
8 (1991), except that here analysts (rather than accountants) are the
9 ones who put the nail in the soup and investors (rather than
10 analysts) are the ones to take it out. Our finding that the market is
11 not fooled by biases stemming from conflicts of interest echoes
12 similar findings in the literature on conflicts of interest in universal
13 banking (for example, Kroszner and Rajan, 1994, 1997; Gompers
14 and Lerner 1999) and on bias in the financial media (for examples,
15 Bhattacharya et al. forthcoming; Reuter and Zitzewitz 2006).
16 Finally, while we cannot rule out the possibility that some
17 investors may have been naïve, our findings do not support the
18 notion that the marginal investor was systematically misled over
19 the last decade by analysts' recommendations.²⁰⁸

20 Finally, while Easton and Sommers' article, *Effect of Analysts' Optimism on*
21 *Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts* does state
22 that, on average, the difference between the estimate of the expected rate of return
23 based on analysts' earnings forecasts and the estimates based on current earnings
24 realizations is 2.84%, they also state that analysts' accuracy²⁰⁹ and optimism²¹⁰ in the
25 implied estimates of the expected rate of return differs with firm size:

26 ...the mean scaled absolute forecast error, a measure of the
27 accuracy of the forecasts, declines monotonically from 0.102 for
28 the decile of smallest firms to 0.012 for the decile of largest firms.
29 Similarly, the median absolute scaled forecast error declines
30 monotonically from 0.042 to 0.006.

31 Analysts' optimism, measured as the mean (median) scaled
32 forecast error, declines monotonically from -0.075 (-0.023) for the

²⁰⁸ Anup Agrawal and Mark A. Chen, *Do Analysts' Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations*, *Journal of Law and Economics*, August 2008, Vol. 51.

²⁰⁹ As measured by the mean (median) absolute forecast error.

²¹⁰ As measured by the mean (median) forecast error.

1 decile of the smallest firms to -0.005 (-0.002) for the decile of the
2 largest firms.²¹¹

3 In plain language, as firm size increases, analyst accuracy increases and
4 analyst optimism (*i.e.*, bias) diminishes.

5 **Q. HAVE YOU DETERMINED THE LEVELS OF FORECAST ERROR AND**
6 **BIAS IN ANALYST PROJECTED EPS GROWTH RATES FOR**
7 **COMPANIES COMPARABLE IN SIZE TO THE UTILITY PROXY**
8 **GROUP?**

9 A. Yes, I have. Using market capitalizations as of March 31, 2021, Dr. Woolridge's
10 and my proxy group both fall into the eighth decile of market capitalizations as
11 shown on Table 3, Panel A of the Easton and Sommers article.²¹² Mean and
12 median measures of forecast error (*i.e.*, accuracy) of 0.017 and 0.008, respectively,
13 indicates a high level of analyst accuracy. The bias of analyst projected EPS
14 growth rates for companies comparable in size to the average company in our
15 proxy groups are -0.009 (mean) and -0.003 (median), indicating a low level of
16 bias in analyst projected EPS growth rates.

17 Furthermore, two of my MRPs used in my CAPM use projected market
18 returns which are derived by calculating a weighted DCF for the component
19 companies of the S&P 500. The component companies of the S&P 500 are larger
20 than the average company in the Utility Proxy Group, having an average market
21 capitalization that corresponds with the ninth decile as provided by Table 3, Panel

²¹¹ Peter D. Easton and Gregory A. Sommers, *Effect of Analysts' Optimism on Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts*, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 45 No. 5 (December 2007), at 1007.

²¹² *Ibid*, at 1004. Table 3, Panel A: Descriptive statistics. Market capitalization deciles are assumed to be equivalent to the Duff & Phelps Cost of Capital Navigator.

1 A of the Easton and Sommers article.²¹³ Mean and median forecast errors for
2 analyst projected EPS growth rates for the average company in the S&P 500 are
3 0.015, and 0.007, respectively, which are more accurate than even the small
4 forecast errors which coincide with companies in the Utility Proxy Group.
5 Likewise, mean and median measures of bias for companies in the S&P 500 are -
6 0.007 and -0.002, respectively.

7 The analyst projected EPS growth rates I used to derive my DCF results
8 for my proxy group and my projected return on the market are confirmed to have
9 high accuracy and limited bias.

10 In view of the foregoing, the use of analysts' forecasts of EPS growth
11 should be used exclusively when estimating the cost rate of common equity
12 capital. Note that notwithstanding Dr. Woolridge's lengthy discussion about the
13 bias and inaccuracy of security analysts' forecasts of EPS growth, he himself gave
14 "primary weight" to them in arriving at his conclusion of a DCF-derived cost
15 rate.²¹⁴

16 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH DR. WOOLRIDGE THAT HISTORICAL**
17 **GROWTH RATES, OR DIVIDEND AND BOOK VALUE GROWTH**
18 **RATES ARE APPROPRIATE MEASURES OF EXPECTED GROWTH**
19 **FOR THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?**²¹⁵

20 A. No. I have already discussed the superiority of projected EPS growth rates for use
21 in the DCF and will not repeat that discussion here. As to the applicability of
22 historical growth rates, Dr. Woolridge points out himself that "to best estimate the

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ Woolridge Direct Testimony, at 40.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, at 38-39.

1 cost of common-equity capital using the conventional DCF model, one must look
2 to long-term growth rate expectations”,²¹⁶ and I agree. The growth component of
3 the Constant Growth DCF model is a forward-looking measure. To the extent
4 historical growth influences investors’ expectations of future growth, it already
5 will be reflected in analysts’ consensus earnings estimates. Professors Carleton
6 and Vander Weide found “overwhelming evidence that consensus analysts’
7 forecast of future growth is superior to historically oriented growth measures in
8 predicting the firm’s stock price.”²¹⁷ Consequently, historical growth rates are not
9 appropriate for the Constant Growth DCF model.

10 Regarding the applicability of DPS and BVPS growth rates in a DCF
11 model analysis, Dr. Woolridge did not provide any empirical or academic support
12 that investors indeed rely on those measures when calculating their required ROE.
13 The lack of empirical and academic support for those growth rates are evidenced
14 in the paucity of projected DPS and BVPS growth rates available to investors.
15 Conversely, projected EPS growth rates are widely available from several
16 reputable sources.

17 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH DR. WOOLRIDGE’S USE OF A RETENTION**
18 **GROWTH RATE?**

19 A. No, I do not. My critiques and analyses dismissing the use of retention growth
20 rates were presented in my response to Mr. Gorman. Those critiques apply
21 equally to Dr. Woolridge’s use of retention growth rates.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, at 34.

²¹⁷ Vander Weide and Carleton, *Investor Growth Expectations: Analysts vs. History*, The Journal of Portfolio Management (Spring 1988).

1 **Q. DO DR. WOOLRIDGE’S DCF RESULTS CORRECTLY REFLECT THE**
2 **USE OF PROJECTED EPS GROWTH RATES?**

3 A. No, they do not. In his DCF analysis Dr. Woolridge uses projected growth rates
4 of 5.25% and 5.00%, based on an acceptable range of 5.00% to 5.50%, for his and
5 my proxy groups, respectively. When we look to the range of growth rates based
6 on the projected EPS growth rates from *Value Line*, Yahoo!, Zacks, and S&P
7 Capital IQ, from pages 4 and 5 of Exhibit JRW-7, we find the ranges to be 5.2%
8 to 6.0%, and 4.8% to 5.9%, for Dr. Woolridge and my proxy groups, respectively
9 (*see also*, page 2 of Schedule DWD-17R.)²¹⁸ Taking the midpoint of those
10 respective ranges results in corrected DCF results for Dr. Woolridge’s and my
11 proxy groups of 9.53% and 9.37%, respectively (see page 1 of Schedule DWD-
12 17R).

13 **Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING DR. WOOLRIDGE’S**
14 **DCF ANALYSIS?**

15 A. As shown on Schedule DWD-17R, had Dr. Woolridge correctly relied on the
16 projected EPS growth rates as shown in Exhibit JRW-7, DCF results of 9.53%
17 and 9.37% would be indicated, which are similar to my updated DCF model
18 results.

²¹⁸ Please note, Dr. Woolridge considers both the mean and median figures as noted in footnote 22, page 40 of his direct testimony.

1 **D. Capital Asset Pricing Model**

2 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE DR. WOOLRIDGE’S CAPM ANALYSIS AND**
3 **RESULTS.**

4 A. Dr. Woolridge combines a “normalized” risk-free rate of 2.50% and an MRP of
5 6.00% to the average Beta coefficient in his proxy group (0.85). In estimating his
6 MRP of 6.00%, Dr. Woolridge reviews a series of studies that calculate the MRP
7 using different methodologies; from which he places significant weight on the
8 Duff & Phelps MRP (5.50%), KPMG MRP (6.25%), Fernandez survey (5.60%),
9 and Damodaran MRP (4.63%).²¹⁹ His indicated ROE using these inputs is
10 7.60%.²²⁰ Dr. Woolridge ultimately did not place any weight on his CAPM
11 results in the determination of his ROE recommendation.²²¹

12 **Q. WOULD YOU LIKE TO COMMENT ON DR. WOOLRIDGE’S**
13 **APPLICATION OF HIS CAPM?**

14 A. Since Dr. Woolridge does not rely on the results of his CAPM for his ROE
15 recommendation, and to reduce the scope of this Rebuttal Testimony, I will not
16 address Dr. Woolridge’s application of the CAPM. As Dr. Woolridge dismissed
17 his own CAPM analysis, I would recommend that the Commission do the same.

²¹⁹ Woolridge Direct Testimony, at 51-52; Exhibit JRW-8, at 5.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, at 54.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

1 **E. Adjustments to the Cost of Common Equity**

2 **Q. DOES DR. WOOLRIDGE REFLECT THE GREATER RELATIVE RISK**
3 **OF THE COMPANY DUE TO ITS SMALLER SIZE COMPARED TO HIS**
4 **PROXY GROUP?**

5 A. No, he does not. Dr. Woolridge rejects the size premium for SWEPCO because
6 the “survivorship bias” of returns and portfolio rebalancing overstate the size
7 premium,²²² and utility stocks do not exhibit a significant size premium, as
8 described by Wong, Roll, Ang and Damodaran.²²³

9 **Q. PLEASE ADDRESS SURVIVORSHIP BIAS AS IT PERTAINS TO THE**
10 **SMALL SIZE PREMIUM.**

11 A. While the small size risk premium is a premium that attempts to measure the risk
12 of smaller companies over larger companies, the risk, as measured by variance of
13 returns, is ever-present. The survivorship and de-listing biases would only serve
14 to increase the variance of the returns of those small companies, increasing risk,
15 and therefore, the investor-required return. I discuss the applicability of
16 survivorship bias to the U.S. market later in this testimony in terms of the MRP.
17 Additionally, I did not use the entire indicated small size premium of 0.84%, but
18 0.20% to reflect the increased risk of SWEPCO relative to the proxy group.

19 **Q. DR. WOOLRIDGE CITES TO AN ARTICLE FROM CLIFFORD ANG**
20 **WHICH NOTES THAT DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1981 TO 2016**

²²² *Ibid.*, at 80-81.

²²³ *Ibid.*, at 81-83. I have previously addressed the flaws in Dr. Wong’s size study earlier in this Rebuttal Testimony and will not repeat that discussion here.

1 **SMALL CAPITALIZATION STOCKS UNDERPERFORMED LARGE**
2 **CAPITALIZATION STOCKS.²²⁴ PLEASE RESPOND.**

3 A. As I discussed in my Direct Testimony, smaller companies face increased
4 business risk as they are less equipped to cope with significant events that affect
5 sales, revenues, and earnings, as the loss of a few larger customers will have a
6 greater effect on a small company than a larger company.²²⁵

7 Reviewing data from the same source as Ang, it is clear that small
8 capitalization stocks exhibit more volatility (*i.e.*, risk) in their returns than larger
9 capitalization stocks. Table 16 presents the largest monthly gain and loss for each
10 value-weighted decile for the period 1981 through February of 2021.

11 **Table 16: Size and Volatility of Returns – Ang Study²²⁶**

Decile:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Largest Gain:	29.5%	25.9%	21.1%	18.9%	19.0%	16.5%	16.9%	14.2%	14.8%	13.3%
Largest Loss:	-28.9%	-30.5%	-28.9%	-29.5%	-28.1%	-26.2%	-26.2%	-24.3%	-22.3%	-19.7%

12 While it may be true that smaller stocks underperformed larger stocks in
13 the Ang study, risk is measured by volatility, not returns. Table 16 shows that
14 smaller stocks exhibit higher risk than larger stocks as measured by volatility.

²²⁴ Woolridge Direct Testimony, at 82.

²²⁵ D'Ascendis Direct Testimony, at 52.

²²⁶ Deciles in ascending order with one (1) representing the smallest stocks by market capitalization. Source: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#BookEquity.

1 **Q. DOES DR. WOOLRIDGE REFLECT THE GREATER RELATIVE RISK**
2 **OF THE COMPANY DUE TO ITS RISKIER BOND RATING AS**
3 **COMPARED TO HIS PROXY GROUP?**

4 A. No, he does not. Dr. Woolridge states that my credit risk adjustment is incorrect
5 because: (1) it compares SWEPCO to the ratings for proxy group operating
6 subsidiaries instead of the parent company ratings; and (2) I do not consider the
7 fact that SWEPCO's S&P rating is higher than the proxy group, and on balance,
8 this suggests the risk to the Company is similar to the proxy group.²²⁷

9 **Q. IS IT APPROPRIATE TO COMPARE SWEPCO'S BOND RATING TO**
10 **THE PROXY GROUP PARENT COMPANIES' BOND RATINGS?**

11 A. No, it is not. First, comparing the rating of SWEPCO to the proxy group
12 operating subsidiaries reflects an apples-to-apples comparison of credit risk, as
13 opposed to using the proxy group credit ratings at the parent level, which could be
14 impacted by non-utility operations. Dr. Woolridge and I both reflect that
15 consideration given we both take into account the extent to which regulated
16 electric operations are in place at the individual companies, as that is a necessary
17 consideration in selecting a proxy group that appropriately reflects the risks that
18 SWEPCO faces.

19 **Q. IS IT COMMON FOR PARENT COMPANIES TO TYPICALLY BE**
20 **RATED LOWER THAN THEIR OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES?**

21 A. Yes, it is. As Moody's notes:

22 Most HoldCos present their financial statements on a consolidated
23 basis that blurs legal considerations about priority of creditors

²²⁷ Woolridge Direct Testimony, at 84. I have accounted for the average Moody's and S&P ratings as discussed previously in this Rebuttal Testimony and will not repeat that discussion here.

1 based on the legal structure of the family, and grid scoring is thus
2 based on consolidated ratios. However, HoldCo creditors typically
3 have a secondary claim on the group's cash flows and assets after
4 OpCo creditors. We refer to this as structural subordination,
5 because it is the corporate legal structure, rather than specific
6 subordination provisions, that causes creditors at each of the utility
7 and nonutility subsidiaries to have a more direct claim on the cash
8 flows and assets of their respective OpCo obligors.²²⁸

9 Considering the importance of selecting a proxy group that appropriately
10 reflects the risks facing SWEPCO, as reflected by regulated electric operations,
11 with the fact that ratings at the regulated operating subsidiaries reflects those that
12 have the most direct claims on those cash-flows, it is clear that the use of parent
13 company ratings is inappropriate and does not reflect the same risks as investors
14 in SWEPCO face.

15 **Q. IS SWEPCO'S S&P BOND RATING OF A- LESS RISKY THAN THE**
16 **AVERAGE BOND RATING FOR THE OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES OF**
17 **DR. WOOLRIDGE'S PROXY GROUP?**

18 A. No, it is not. Dr. Woolridge's proxy group has an average S&P bond rating of A-,
19 which is equivalent to SWEPCO's S&P bond rating. However, Dr. Woolridge's
20 proxy group has an average Moody's bond rating of A3, which is less risky than
21 SWEPCO's Moody's bond rating of Baa2. Given this, Dr. Woolridge should
22 have considered a credit risk adjustment in this proceeding.

²²⁸ Moody's Investors Service, *Rating Methodology, Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities*, June 23, 2017, at 22.

1 **F. Critiques on Company Testimony**

2 **Q. DID DR. WOOLRIDGE HAVE ANY CRITIQUES OF YOUR ANALYSES?**

3 A. Yes, he did. Dr. Woolridge's critiques of my analyses are summarized below:²²⁹

- 4 1. My expectation of higher interest rates and capital costs;
- 5 2. My exclusive use of projected EPS growth rates in my DCF analysis and
- 6 the lack of weight I apply to the results;
- 7 3. My use of the ECAPM;
- 8 4. My PRPM analysis is based on the historical relationship between stocks
- 9 and bonds;
- 10 5. My PRPM analysis produces high and variable equity cost rate estimates;
- 11 6. The use of historical MRPs and ERPs in my CAPM and RPM analyses;
- 12 7. My MRPs and ERPs are exaggerated because of unrealistic assumptions
- 13 about future earnings and economic growth;
- 14 8. My use of a non-price regulated proxy group comparable in total risk to
- 15 my utility proxy group; and
- 16 9. My application of a size premium to my indicated ROE.

17 I have already addressed critiques 1, 3, and 7 through 9 previously in my

18 Rebuttal Testimony, so I will not address them again here. I will address the

19 remaining critiques in turn below.

²²⁹ Woolridge Direct Testimony, at 57-59.

1 **Q. IS DR. WOOLRIDGE CORRECT THAT YOU HAVE NOT APPLIED**
2 **ANY WEIGHT TO YOUR DCF RESULTS?**

3 A. No, he is not. As noted on page 6 of my Direct Testimony, the low end of my
4 recommended range before adjustments (9.85%) was calculated by averaging the
5 average model result (10.96%) with the lowest model result (8.73%). In
6 calculating the low end of my range then, the lowest model result, the DCF result,
7 is actually afforded more weight than any of the other results, as shown in Table
8 17, below.

9 **Table 17: Weighting of Direct Testimony Model Results²³⁰**

Method	Result	Weight	Weighted Result
DCF	8.73%	62.5%	5.45%
RPM	10.54%	12.5%	1.32%
CAPM	12.46%	12.5%	1.56%
Non-Regulated	12.12%	12.5%	1.52%
Total		100.0%	9.85%

10 Since I selected the bottom of my range in my Direct Testimony, the DCF
11 has in fact been given more weight than any of the other results combined. Even
12 though I gave significant weight to the DCF model results in this proceeding, I
13 would caution the Commission to solely rely on one ROE model result in
14 determining the ROE for the Company as discussed above.

15 **Q. DR. WOOLRIDGE CITES TWO “PROBLEMS” WITH THE PRPM.**
16 **PLEASE COMMENT.**

17 A. The first “problem” relates to the so-called errors associated with the use of
18 historical market returns to calculate ERPs. Specifically, he cites his discussion of
19 the “Peso problem” or U.S. stock market survivorship bias, as well as what he

²³⁰ Assumes equal weighting applied to RPM, CAPM and Non-Regulated approaches.

1 terms “unattainable return bias”.²³¹ There are two flaws with this “problem.” The
2 first is that none of them are applicable to the individual electric company PRPM-
3 derived ERPs and ROEs, as the individual company results are based on the
4 historical monthly company-specific ERPs and not those of a broad-based index.
5 Second, even relative to a broad-based index, these two “issues” are related to one
6 another. Ibbotson® SBBI® 2013 Valuation Yearbook, Market Results for Stocks,
7 Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 1926-2012 (“SBBI-2013”) notes:

8 One common problem in working with financial data is properly
9 accounting for survivorship. In working with company-specific
10 historical data, it is important for researchers to include data from
11 companies that failed as well as companies that succeeded before
12 drawing conclusions from elements of that data.

13 The same argument can be made regarding markets as a whole.
14 The equity risk premium data outlined in this book represent data
15 on the United States stock market. The United States has arguably
16 been the most successful stock market of the twentieth century.
17 That being the case, might equity risk premium statistics based
18 only on U.S. data overstate the returns of equities as a whole
19 because they only focus on one successful market?

20 In a recent paper, Goetzmann and Jorion study this question by
21 looking at returns from a number of world equity markets over the
22 past century.⁶ (footnote omitted) The Goetzmann-Jorion paper looks at
23 the survivorship bias from several different perspectives. They
24 conclude that once survivorship is taken into consideration the U.S.
25 equity risk premium is overstated by approximately 60 basis
26 points.⁷ (footnote omitted) The non-U.S. equity risk premium was found
27 to contain significantly more survivorship bias.

28 *While the survivorship bias evidence may be compelling on a*
29 *worldwide basis, one can question its relevance to a purely U.S.*
30 *analysis. If the entity being valued is a U.S. company, then the*
31 *relevant data set should be the performance of equities in the U.S*
32 *market. (italics added)*²³²

²³¹ Woolridge Direct Testimony, at 63-64.

²³² SBBI-2013 Valuation, at 62.

1 Thus, given that the “entity being valued” is SWEPCO, a U.S. company,
2 the relevant data should be the performance of the U.S. equity market, and given
3 that the thrust of Dr. Woolridge’s criticism of the PRPM relates to the company-
4 specific PRPM results, this first “problem” is not applicable and irrelevant.

5 Dr. Woolridge’s second “problem” relates to the actual PRPM-derived
6 company-specific cost rates. He states on line 23 on page 62 of his direct
7 testimony that the model “produces very high and variable equity cost rate
8 estimates.” He then notes that the range of results are from 7.62% to 13.38%,
9 which makes no comparable sense.²³³ Dr. Woolridge’s issue, however, is that
10 while he finds the range of PRPM results of 5.76% to be too variable, he finds
11 that I should apply more weight to my DCF model results which range from
12 5.95% to 10.78%, or 4.83%.

13 **Q. IN ADDITION TO SURVIVORSHIP BIAS, DR. WOOLRIDGE ALSO**
14 **PROVIDES A LISTING OF “A MYRIAD OF EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS”**
15 **WHICH PRODUCE “INFLATED ESTIMATES OF EXPECTED MARKET**
16 **RISK PREMIUMS.”²³⁴ PLEASE COMMENT.**

17 A. In addition to survivorship bias, which was addressed above, Dr. Woolridge
18 mentions that the measure of central tendency; the historical time horizon; the
19 change in risk and required return over time; the downward bias in bond historical
20 returns; and unattainable return bias as his “myriad factors” that inflate the
21 historical market return, and the risk premiums calculated from those returns.

²³³ Woolridge Direct Testimony., at 63.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

1 While he mentions them, he does not explain anything as to why these phenomena
2 happen or how they affect the overall returns.

3 Regarding Dr. Woolridge's concern of the measure of central tendency
4 used in my MRP, I note that financial literature endorses its use in several
5 instances. John Y. Campbell, of Harvard University, states: "When returns are
6 serially uncorrelated, the arithmetic average represents the best forecast of future
7 return in any randomly selected future year."²³⁵ As shown on pages 6-16 and 6-17
8 of SBBI-2020, returns on large stocks and ERPs have serial correlations of 0.00
9 and 0.01, respectively, showing serial uncorrelation.

10 Additionally, in SBBI-2020, regarding the use of the arithmetic mean,
11 Duff & Phelps state:

12 The equity risk premium data presented in this book are arithmetic
13 average risk premiums as opposed to geometric average risk
14 premiums. The arithmetic average equity risk premium can be
15 demonstrated to be most appropriate when discounting future cash
16 flows. For use as the expected equity risk premium in either the
17 CAPM or the building-block approach, the arithmetic mean or the
18 simple difference of the arithmetic means of stock market returns
19 and riskless rates is the relevant number. This is because both the
20 CAPM and the building-block approach are additive models, in
21 which the cost of capital is the sum of its parts. The geometric
22 average is more appropriate for reporting past performance because
23 it represents the compound average return.

24 Clearly the use of the long-term historical arithmetic average MRP is
25 appropriate.

26 Turning to the change in risk and required return over time, the downward
27 bias in bond historical returns, and unattainable return bias, those are all a

²³⁵ John Y. Campbell, *Forecasting US Equity Returns in the 21st Century*, July 2001.

function of the historical time horizon. As to the appropriate time horizon to use in a historical MRP or ERP calculation; SBBI-2020 states:

Our equity risk premium covers 1926 to the present. The original data source for the time series comprising the equity risk premium is the Center for Research in Security Prices. CRSP chose to begin its analysis of market returns with 1926 for two main reasons. CRSP determined that 1926 was approximately when quality financial data became available. They also made a conscious effort to include the period of extreme market volatility from the late 1920s and early 1930s; 1926 was chosen because it includes one full business cycle of data before the market crash of 1929.

Implicit in using history to forecast the future is the assumption that investors' expectations for future outcomes conform to past results. This method assumes that the price of taking on risk changes only slowly, if at all, over time. This "future equals the past" assumption is most applicable to a random time-series variable. A time-series variable is random if its value in one period is independent of its value in other periods.

The estimate of the equity risk premium depends on the length of the data series studied. A proper estimate of the equity risk premium requires a data series long enough to give a reliable average without being unduly influenced by very good and very poor short-term returns. When calculated using a long data series, the historical equity risk premium is relatively stable. Furthermore, because an average of the realized equity risk premium is quite volatile when calculated using a short history, using a long series makes it less likely that the analyst can justify any number he or she wants. The magnitude of how shorter periods can affect the result will be explored later in this chapter.

Some analysts estimate the expected equity risk premium using a shorter, more recent period on the basis that recent events are more likely to be repeated in the near future; furthermore, they believe that the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s contain too many unusual events. This view is suspect because all periods contain unusual events. Some of the most unusual events of the last 100 years took place quite recently, including the inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the October 1987 stock market crash, the collapse of the high-yield bond market, the major contraction and consolidation of the thrift industry, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the development of the European Economic Community, the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the more recent global financial crisis of 2008-

1 2009.

2 It is even difficult for economists to predict the economic
3 environment of the future. For example, if one were analyzing the
4 stock market in 1987 before the crash, it would be statistically
5 improbable to predict the impending short-term volatility without
6 considering the stock market crash and market volatility of the
7 1929-1931 period.

8 Without an appreciation of the 1920s and 1930s, no one would
9 believe that such events could happen. The 94-year period starting
10 with 1926 represents what can happen: It includes high and low
11 returns, volatile and quiet markets, war and peace, inflation and
12 deflation, and prosperity and depression. Restricting attention to a
13 shorter historical period underestimates the amount of change that
14 could occur in a long future period . Finally, because historical
15 event-types (not specific events) tend to repeat themselves, long-
16 run capital market return studies can reveal a great deal about the
17 future. Investors probably expect unusual events to occur from
18 time to time, and their return expectations reflect this.²³⁶

19 To this point, Dr. Woolridge cites the downward bias in bond historical
20 returns, which references the 1940s and the immediate post-war period, when the
21 Federal Reserve Bank (“Fed”) artificially held down government bond yields,
22 increasing historical MRPs for that period. It could be argued that in the period
23 between 2008 and 2015, the Fed did the same (artificially held down lending
24 rates) to spur growth. As Duff & Phelps stated above, without a view of the prior
25 period, it would be improbable for an analyst to predict future events during
26 similar circumstances. As far as unattainable return bias (that market returns
27 cannot achieve the average returns), such comments are meaningless given that
28 the large company common stocks have consistently earned over the 11.88%
29 long-term average market return recently. Specifically, out of the last ten years,

²³⁶ SBBI-2020, at 10-23 to 10-24.

1 large company stocks have earned over 11.88% in seven of those years, as shown
2 in Table 18, below.

3 **Table 18: Large Capitalization Stocks Total Return from 2010-2019²³⁷**

Year	Return
2010	15.06%
2011	2.11%
2012	16.00%
2013	32.39%
2014	13.69%
2015	1.38%
2016	11.96%
2017	21.83%
2018	-4.38%
2019	31.49%

4 In view of all of the foregoing, it is indeed appropriate to use long-term
5 historical ERPs, derived from the arithmetic mean long-term historical return on
6 large company common stocks, and the arithmetic mean long-term historical
7 income return on long-term U.S. government securities, for cost of capital
8 purposes.

9 **VII. RESPONSE TO WALMART INC. WITNESS PERRY**

10 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE MS. PERRY'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE**
11 **COMPANY'S ROE.**

12 A. Ms. Perry recommends the Commission authorize an ROE no higher than 9.60%
13 based on her review of authorized ROEs since 2017, both nationwide and within
14 Texas. Ms. Perry also notes the impact to customers if the Commission were to
15 authorize a 9.55% ROE as compared to my recommend ROE of 10.35%.²³⁸

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, at Appendix A-1.

²³⁸ Perry Direct Testimony, at 8-13.

1 Because I have largely addressed these issues in Section III, and in response to
2 Mr. Gorman, I will not repeat that discussion here. I will note, however, that the
3 authorized ROE is a market-based analysis and is independent of the ultimate
4 impact on customers. That said, I understand that the Commission has the
5 difficult task of balancing the interests of ratepayers and investors in making its
6 final decision. Lastly, as I have noted several times throughout this testimony,
7 looking to recently authorized ROEs either nationwide or within Texas, fails to
8 reflect the significantly abnormal and volatile financial and economic
9 environment caused by COVID-19. As such, the sole reliance on those returns is
10 misleading and will ultimately lead to an authorized ROE that does not reflect the
11 investor-required return.

12 **VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

13 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.**

14 A. In this Rebuttal Testimony, I updated my ROE models with market data as of
15 March 31, 2021. The results of the ROE models produced indicated ranges of
16 ROEs from 10.14% to 10.97% (unadjusted) and from 10.43% to 11.26%
17 (adjusted).²³⁹ Given these ranges, I maintain my initial recommendation of
18 10.35%, which, in light of the current capital markets, is reasonable, if not
19 conservative.

20 I then discussed capital market conditions and determined that even in
21 conditions where the stock market is at or near all-time highs and interest rates are
22 low, utility investors are monitoring utility investments. Since utility investments

²³⁹ D'Ascendis Direct Testimony, Schedule DWD-1R, at 2.

1 have been underperforming compared to the market, and have been riskier during
2 the pandemic, utility investors are requiring higher returns.

3 Regarding the Opposing Witnesses' direct testimonies, I discussed my
4 disagreements with their analyses, which I supported with citations to the
5 academic literature and empirical analyses. I also responded to any critiques to
6 my Direct Testimony, again, supporting my responses with citations to the
7 academic literature and empirical analyses.

8 **Q. SHOULD ANY OR ALL OF THE ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE**
9 **OPPOSING WITNESSES PERSUADE THE COMMISSION TO LOWER**
10 **THE RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY IT APPROVES FOR SWEPCO**
11 **BELOW YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

12 A. No, they should not. My recommended cost of common equity of 10.35%, is both
13 reasonable and conservative. It will provide the Company with sufficient earnings
14 to enable it to attract necessary new capital efficiently and at a reasonable cost, to
15 the benefit of both customers and investors.

16 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

17 A. Yes.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Recommended Capital Structure and Cost Rates
for Ratemaking Purposes

<u>Type Of Capital</u>	<u>Ratios (1)</u>	<u>Cost Rate</u>	<u>Weighted Cost Rate</u>
Long-Term Debt	50.63%	4.18% (1)	2.11%
Common Equity	<u>49.37%</u>	10.35% (2)	<u>5.11%</u>
Total	<u>100.00%</u>		<u>7.22%</u>

Notes:

- (1) Company-Provided
- (2) From page 2 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Principal Methods</u>	<u>Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies</u>
1.	Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	9.32%
2.	Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	10.70%
3.	Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	12.03%
4.	Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies (4)	<u>11.81%</u>
5.	Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates before Adjustment for Company-Specific Risk	10.14% - 10.97%
6.	Size Risk Adjustment (5)	0.20%
7.	Credit Risk Adjustment (6)	<u>0.09%</u>
8.	Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment	<u><u>10.43% - 11.26%</u></u>
9.	Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	<u><u>10.35%</u></u>

- Notes:
- (1) From page 3 of this Schedule
 - (2) From page 18 of this Schedule
 - (3) From page 31 of this Schedule
 - (4) From page 36 of this Schedule
 - (5) Adjustment to reflect the Company's greater business risk due to its smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group as detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' direct testimony.
 - (6) Company-specific risk adjustment to reflect SWEPCO's greater credit risk compared to the Utility Proxy Group. The average of SWEPCO's Moody's and S&P's bond rating is riskier than the Utility Proxy Group's average bond rating. An upward adjustment of 1/3 of the spread between A2 and Baa2 public utility bond yields (as shown on page 21 of this Schedule) is appropriate.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies	Average Dividend Yield (1)	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2)	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo' Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (3)	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5)
ALLETE, Inc	3.84 %	6.00 %	NA %	6.33 %	7.00 %	6.44 %	3.96 %	10.40 %
Alliant Energy Corporation	3.24	5.50	5.80	6.12	5.70	5.78	3.33	9.11
Ameren Corporation	2.94	6.00	7.10	7.64	7.50	7.06	3.04	10.10
Duke Energy	4.23	5.00	5.20	5.00	4.99	5.05	4.34	9.39
Edison International	4.52	12.00	4.30	4.55	(0.50)	6.95	4.68	11.63
Entergy Corporation	4.02	3.00	5.10	3.09	5.50	4.17	4.10	8.27
Evergy, Inc	3.86	8.00	5.90	7.27	5.65	6.70	3.99	10.69
IDACORP, Inc.	3.11	4.50	2.60	3.00	2.60	3.18	3.16	6.34
NorthWestern Corporation	4.19	2.50	4.40	4.46	4.57	3.98	4.27	8.25
OGE Energy Corporation	5.11	4.00	4.40	4.08	3.80	4.07	5.21	9.28
Otter Tail Corporation	3.64	7.00	NA	5.35	9.00	7.12	3.77	10.89
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	4.29	4.50	3.40	3.66	3.50	3.76	4.37	8.13
Portland General Electric Company	3.73	4.00	13.40	6.82	13.40	9.40	3.91	13.31 (6)
Xcel Energy, Inc	2.90	6.00	6.20	6.24	6.30	6.19	2.99	9.18
							Average	9.36 %
							Median	9.28 %
							Average of Mean and Median	9.32 %


NA= Not Available
NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

Notes

- (1) Indicated dividend at 03/31/2021 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 03/31/2021 for each company
- (2) From pages 4 through 17 of this Schedule.
- (3) Average of columns 2 through 5 excluding negative growth rates.
- (4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 6) x column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for ALLETE, Inc., $3.84\% \times (1 + (1/2 \times 6.44\%)) = 3.96\%$.
- (5) Column 6 + column 7.
- (6) POR's DCF results were excluded from the final average and median as they were more than 2 standard deviations above the proxy group's mean.

Source of Information

Value Line Investment Survey
www.zacks.com Downloaded on 03/31/2021
www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 03/31/2021
Bloomberg Professional Services

ALLETE NYSE-ALE		RECENT PRICE	62.70	P/E RATIO	19.6 (Trailing: 18.7; Median: 18.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	0.91	DIV'D YLD	4.1%	VALUE LINE	Target Price Range						
TIMELINESS	4 Lowered 2/26/21	High. Low	37.9 30.0	42.5 35.1	42.7 37.7	54.1 41.4	58.0 44.2	59.7 45.3	66.9 48.3	81.2 61.6	82.8 66.6	88.6 72.5	84.7 48.2	70.2 58.9	2024	2025	2026
SAFETY	2 New 10/1/04	LEGENDS															
TECHNICAL	4 Lowered 3/12/21	0.60 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength Options Yes Shaded area indicates recession															
BETA	90 (100 = Market)																
18-Month Target Price Range		Low-High Midpoint (% to Mid)															
\$50-\$117		\$84 (35%)															
2024-26 PROJECTIONS		Price Gain Ann'l Total High Low 90 65 (+45%) 12% 5%															
Institutional Decisions		to Buy 141 106 124 to Sell 136 135 124 Hld's(000) 37540 37215 37566															
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2268		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2269		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2270		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
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2272		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2273		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
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2275		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2276		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2277		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2278		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2279		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2280		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2281		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2282		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
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2285		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
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2287		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2288		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2289		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2290		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
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2300		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2301		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
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2304		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2305		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2306		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2307		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2308		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2309		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2310		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2311		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2312		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2313		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2314		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2315		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2316		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2317		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2318		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2319		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2320		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2321		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2322		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2323		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2324		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2325		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2326		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															
2327		Percent shares traded 15 10 5															

ALLIANT ENERGY NDQ-LNT										RECENT PRICE	47.09	P/E RATIO	19.5 (Trailing: 19.1 Median: 19.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	0.91	DIV'D YLD	3.4%	VALUE LINE						
TIMELINESS	4	Lowered 3/5/21	High	18.8	22.2	23.8	27.1	34.9	35.4	41.0	45.6	46.6	55.4	60.3	51.5				Target Price Range	2024	2025	2026		
SAFETY	2	Raised 9/28/07	Low	14.6	17.0	20.9	21.9	25.0	27.1	30.4	36.6	36.8	40.8	37.7	46.0									
TECHNICAL	3	Raised 3/12/21	LEGENDS																					
BETA	85	(1.00 = Market)	0.90 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate																					
18-Month Target Price Range			2-for-1 split 5/16																					
Low-High			Options: Yes																					
Midpoint (% to Mid)			Shaded area indicates recession																					
\$38-\$85																								
\$62 (30%)																								
2024-26 PROJECTIONS																								
Price	60	Gain	Ann'l Total																					
High	60	(+25%)	Return																					
Low	45	(-5%)	3%																					
Institutional Decisions																								
202020	302020	402020	Percent	24																				
to Buy	227	249	shares	16																				
to Sell	258	219	traded	8																				
Hld's(000)	186056	182149																						

(A) Diluted EPS, Excl nonrec gain (losses) '05, (11¢); '10, (\$2.19); '11, (32¢), '12, (\$6.42), '17, (63¢); gain (loss) from disc ops '13, (92¢), '15, 21¢. Next earnings report due mid-		(B) Div'ds paid late Mar., June, Sept., & Dec. (C) Div'd reinvest plan available (D) Incl intang in '20 \$5.97/sh (E) In mail (F) Base Orig cost depr Rate allowed on com	eq in MO in '20 elec, none, in '11 gas, none, in IL in '14 elec, 8.7%, in '21 gas, 9.67%, earned on avg com eq, '20 10.2% Regulatory Climate MO, Average, IL, Below Average	Company's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price/Persistence Earnings Predictability	A 100 80 90
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<p>(A) Dil. EPS, Excl nonrec losses '12, 70¢, '13, 24¢; '14, 67¢, '17, 15¢, '18, 41¢, '20, \$2.21, losses on disc ops '14, 80¢, '16, 60¢; '18 EPS don't sum due to rounding Next exs</p>	<p>report due early May (B) Div'ds paid mid-Mar, June, Sept., & Dec ■ Div'd reinv. plan avail. (C) Incl intang. in '19 \$44 37/sh (D) In mill., incl. for rev split. (E) Rate base Net org. cost</p>	<p>Rate all'd on com. eq. in '18 in NC: 9.9%, in '19 in SC: 9.5%; in '20 in FL: 9.5%-11.5% in '20 in IN: 9.7%, earn on avg com. eq. '19 8.3% Reg Clim.-NC, SC, VA, OH, IN Above Avg</p>	<p>Company's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price Growth Persistence Earnings Predictability</p>	<p>A 95 90 95</p>
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EDISON INTERNAT'L NYSE-EIX										RECENT PRICE	61.67	P/E RATIO	NMF (Trailing:NMF Median: 14.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	NMF	DIV'D YLD	4.3%	VALUE LINE	
TIMELINESS	3	Lowered 1/22/21	High Low	36 7 23 1	39 4 30.4	41 6 32 6	48 0 39 6	54.2 44 3	68 7 44 7	69 6 55 2	78 7 58 0	83 4 62 7	71.0 45.5	76.4 53 4	78.9 43 6			Target Price Range 2023 2024 2025	
SAFETY	3	Lowered 11/23/18	LEGENDS																
TECHNICAL	4	Lowered 1/22/21	0.80 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate																
BETA	95	(1.00 = Market)	Options Yes																
18-Month Target Price Range																			
Low-High Midpoint (% to Mid)																			
\$45-\$116 \$81 (30%)																			
2023-25 PROJECTIONS																			
Price Gain Ann'l Total																			
High Low 95 65 (+55%) (+5%) 14% 6%																			
Institutional Decisions																			
1Q2020 2Q2020 3Q2020																			
to Buy 274 294 269																			
to Sell 304 264 264																			
Hld's(000) 318333 329959 334110																			
Percent shares traded																			
30 20 10																			
2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 23-25	
31 30	36 38	38 74	40 25	43.31	37.98	38.09	39 16	36 41	38 61	41.17	35.37	36 43	37 81	38.85	34 11	35.60	35.45	Revenues per sh	41.25
3 79	6 99	7 25	7 60	8.08	7 96	8 41	9 03	9 63	8 80	9 95	10 35	10 43	11 03	4 69	9 15	7.95	10.30	"Cash Flow" per sh	12.25
69	3 34	3 28	3 32	3.68	3 24	3 35	3 23	4 55	3 78	4 33	4 15	3 94	4 51	d1.26	3 98	1.70	4.05	Earnings per sh A	4.75
80	1 02	1 10	1 18	1 23	1 25	1 27	1 29	1 31	1 37	1 48	1 73	1 98	2 23	2 43	2 48	2 58	2.68	Div'd Decl'd per sh B	3.00
5 32	5 73	7 78	8 67	8 67	10 07	13 94	14 76	12 73	11 05	11 99	12 97	11 46	11 75	13 84	13 47	13 20	13 65	Cap'l Spending per sh	13.75
18 57	20 30	23 66	25 92	29 21	30 20	32 44	30 86	28 95	30 50	33 64	34 89	36 82	35 82	32 10	36 75	36 65	39 05	Book Value per sh C	44.00
325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	325 81	361 99	379 00	395 00	Common Shs Outst'g D	395.00
37 6	11 7	13 0	16 0	12 4	9 7	10 3	11 8	9 7	12 7	13 0	14 8	17 9	17 2	--	16 7	NMF	NMF	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	16.5
1 99	.62	.70	.85	.75	.65	66	.74	62	.71	68	.75	.94	.87	--	.89	NMF	NMF	Relative P/E Ratio	.90
3.1%	2.6%	2.6%	2.2%	2.7%	4.0%	3.7%	3.4%	3.0%	2.8%	2.6%	2.8%	2.8%	2.9%	3 8%	3 7%	4 3%		Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	3.8%
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 9/30/20																			
Total Debt \$21738 mill Due in 5 Yrs \$6123 mill																			
LT Debt \$18958 mill LT Interest \$891 mill.																			
(LT Interest earned 2.0x)																			
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals \$107 mill																			
Pens. Assets-12/19 \$3755 mill Oblig \$4139 mill																			
Pfd Stock \$2193 mill Pfd Div'd \$121 mill																			
4,800,198 sh 4.08%-4.78%, \$25 par, call \$25 50-																			
\$28 75/sh, 3,250,000 sh variable, noncum, call																			
\$100, 1,250,000 sh 6.5%, cum, \$100 liq value;																			
350,000 sh 6.25%, \$1000 liq value, 460,012 sh																			
5 1%-5 75%, \$2500 liq. value																			
Common Stock 378,513,912 shs as of 10/20/20																			
MARKET CAP: \$23 billion (Large Cap)																			
ELECTRIC OPERATING STATISTICS																			
2017 2018 2019																			
% Change Retail Sales (KWH)																			
+2 -4 -2.7																			
Avg Indust Use (MWH)																			
643 667 657																			
Avg Indust Revs per KWH (c)																			
NA NA NA																			
Capacity at Peak (Mw)																			
NA NA NA																			
Peak Load, Summer (Mw)																			
23508 23766 22009																			
Annual Load Factor (%)																			
48 8 49 6																			
% Change Customers (yr-end)																			
+7 +6 +5																			
Fixed Charge Cov (%)																			
241 NMF 172																			
ANNUAL RATES Past Past Est'd '17-'19																			
of change (per sh) 10 Yrs. 5 Yrs. to '23-'25																			
Revenues -1 0% -1.0% 2 0%																			
"Cash Flow" 5% -2.5% 6 5%																			
Earnings -3 5% -10 5% 12 0%																			
Dividends 7 0% 11 5% 4 0%																			
Book Value 2 0% 2 5% 4 0%																			
Cal-endar	QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.)				Full Year														
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31															
2017	2463	2965	3672	3220	12320														
2018	2564	2815	4269	3009	12657														
2019	2824	2812	3741	2970	12347														
2020	2790	2987	4644	3079	13500														
2021	2900	3100	4800	3200	14000														
Cal-endar	EARNINGS PER SHARE A				Full Year														
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31															
2017	1.11	.85	1 43	1 12	4.51														
2018	.82	84	1 57	d4 49	d1.26														
2019	64	1 57	1 35	45	3.98														
2020	50	.85	d 76	1 11	1.70														
2021	.65	1 10	1 40	.90	4.05														
Cal-endar	QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID B				Full Year														
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31															
2017	.5425	.5425	.5425	.5425	2 17														
2018	.605	.605	.605	.605	2.42														
2019	.6125	.6125	.6125	.6125	2.45														
2020	.6375	.6375	.6375	.6375	2 55														
2021	.6625																		
BUSINESS: Edison International (formerly SCECorp) is a holding company for Southern California Edison Company (SCE), which supplies electricity to 5.1 mill customers in a 50,000-sq.-mi area in central, coastal, & southern CA (excl Los Angeles & San Diego). Edison Energy is an energy svcs. co. Disc Edison Mission Energy (independent power producer) in '12 Elec rev breakdown residential, 39%, commercial, 43%, industrial, 4%, other, 14%. Generating sources nuclear, 8%, gas, 7%, hydro, 5%, purchased, 80%. Fuel costs 39% of revs. '19 reported depr rate 3.6%. Has 12,500 empls Chairman William P. Sullivan Pres & CEO Pedro J. Pizarro Inc CA Address. 2244 Walnut Grove Ave., P.O. Box 976, Rosemead, CA 91770 Tel. 626-302-2222. Web www.edison.com																			
Our 2020 earnings estimate for Edison International requires an explanation. The bottom line fell into the red in the third quarter due to a \$2.33-a-share charge for expected liabilities stemming from wildfires and mudslides in Southern California Edison's service area in 2017 and 2018. We also include the effects of amortization of SCE's contributions to the state's wildfire insurance fund, which reduces quarterly earnings by \$0.16 a share. Edison International is excluding these items from its 2020 "core" earnings guidance of \$4.47-\$4.62 a share. Note that the weak economy and lockdowns in California don't have a large effect on the company's income because SCE operates under a regulatory mechanism that decouples revenues and volume.																			
The utility is awaiting an order in its general rate case. SCE is seeking rate increases of \$1.3 billion in 2021 (and asking that the order be retroactive to the start of the year), \$452 million in 2022, and \$524 million in 2023. Rate relief and the absence of the wildfire-liability reserve point to material earnings improvement this year. The California commission will consider the recovery of incremental wildfire mitigation costs in two separate tracks. SCE and other parties reached a settlement that, if approved by the commission, would raise rates \$391 million to recover incremental wildfire mitigation costs from 2018 and 2019. A decision is expected in the current quarter. In March, the utility will apply for recovery of its incremental costs from 2020. Separately, the regulators have allowed the company to recover incremental wildfire insurance premium costs that were incurred through mid-2020.																			
An equity issuance is upcoming. Edison International expects to issue \$1 billion of common stock in order to fund expected wildfire liability payments. The board of directors raised the dividend, effective with the January payment. The increase was \$0.10 a share (3.9%) annually.																			
This stock's dividend yield is above the utility average. Total return potential is attractive for the next 18 months and a bit above average for the 2023-2025 period.																			
Paul E. Debbas, CFA January 22, 2021																			

ENTERGY CORP. NYSE-ETR										RECENT PRICE	87.76	P/E RATIO	12.2 (Trailing: 12.7 Median: 13.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	0.57	DIV'D YLD	4.5%	VALUE LINE				
TIMELINESS	4	Lowered 2/5/21	High	84.3	74.5	74.5	72.6	92.0	90.3	82.1	87.9	90.8	122.1	135.5	100.1							
SAFETY	2	Raised 12/13/19	Low:	68.7	57.6	61.6	60.2	60.4	61.3	65.4	69.6	71.9	83.2	75.2	86.8							
TECHNICAL	3	Raised 3/1/2/21	LEGENDS																			
BETA	95	(1.00 = Market)	0.54 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate																			
			Relative Price Strength																			
			Options Yes																			
			Shaded area indicates recession																			
18-Month Target Price Range																						
Low-High Midpoint (% to Mid)																						
\$68-\$157 \$113 (30%)																						
2024-26 PROJECTIONS																						
High Low			Price	150	110	Gain	(+70%)	Ann'l Total Return	17%	10%												
			Low	110		(+25%)																
Institutional Decisions																						
			202020	302020	402020																	
			to Buy	283	262	312																
			to Sell	315	303	276																
			Hld's(000)	173722	173339	174980																
			Percent shares traded	30	20	10																

EVERGY, INC. NYSE-EVRG										RECENT PRICE	53.96	P/E RATIO	16.5	(Trailing: 19.8 Median: NMF)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	0.77	DIV'D YLD	4.1%	VALUE LINE	Target Price Range					
TIMELINESS	4	Lowered 11/13/20											High	61.1	67.8	76.6	55.6				2024	2025	2026		
SAFETY	2	New 9/14/18											Low:	50.9	54.6	42.0	51.9								
TECHNICAL	3	Raised 3/12/21																							
BETA	95	(1.00 = Market)																							
18-Month Target Price Range																									
Low-High Midpoint (% to Mid)																									
\$39-\$97 \$68 (25%)																									
2024-26 PROJECTIONS																									
Price Gain Ann'l Total																									
High 80 (+50%) 14%																									
Low 60 (+10%) 7%																									
Institutional Decisions																									
202020 3Q2020 4Q2020																									
to Buy 216 260 268																									
to Sell 312 279 291																									
Hld's(000) 184926 181645 188200																									
Percent shares traded 36 24 12																									
Evergy, Inc. was formed through the merger of Great Plains Energy and Westar Energy in June of 2018. Great Plains Energy holders received .5981 of a share of Evergy for each of their shares, and Westar Energy holders received one share of Evergy for each of their shares. The merger was completed on June 4, 2018. Shares of Evergy began trading on the New York Stock Exchange one day later.			2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 24-26										
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 12/31/20																									
Total Debt \$10321 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$3410.8 mill																									
LT Debt \$9190.9 mill LT Interest \$330.9 mill																									
Incl. \$45.3 mill capitalized leases.																									
(LT interest earned 3.0x)																									
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals \$18.5 mill																									
Pension Assets-12/20 \$1799.1 mill																									
Oblig \$2901.1 mill																									
Pfd Stock None																									
Common Stock 226,944,941 shs as of 2/19/21																									
MARKET CAP: \$12 billion (Large Cap)																									
ELECTRIC OPERATING STATISTICS			2018	2019	2020																				
% Change Retail Sales (KWH)			NA	NA	-3.9																				
Avg Indust Use (MWH)			NA	NA	NA																				
Avg Indust Revs per KWH (¢)			7.11	7.25	7.14																				
Capacity at Peak (MW)			NA	NA	NA																				
Peak Load, Summer (MW)			NA	NA	NA																				
Annual Load Factor (%)			NA	NA	NA																				
% Change Customers (yr-end)			NA	NA	NA																				
Fixed Charge Cov (%)			322	305	286																				
ANNUAL RATES			Past 10 Yrs.	Past 5 Yrs.	Est'd '18-'20 to '24-'26																				
Revenues			--	--	3.5%																				
"Cash Flow"			--	--	6.5%																				
Earnings			--	--	8.0%																				
Dividends			--	--	5.5%																				
Book Value			--	--	2.5%																				
Cal-endar	QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$mill.)					Full Year																			
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31																					
2018	600.2	893.4	1582	1199	4275.9																				
2019	1216	1221	1577	1131	5147.8																				
2020	1116	1184	1517	1094	4913.4																				
2021	1250	1200	1550	1100	5100																				
2022	1250	1250	1600	1100	5200																				
Cal-endar	EARNINGS PER SHARE ^					Full Year																			
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31																					
2018	.42	.56	1.32	.07	2.50																				
2019	.39	.57	1.56	.28	2.79																				
2020	.31	.59	1.60	.22	2.72																				
2021	.60	.70	1.75	.35	3.40																				
2022	.50	.75	1.85	.40	3.55																				
Cal-endar	QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^					Full Year																			
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31																					
2017	--	--	--	--	--																				
2018	.40	.40	.46	.475	1.74																				
2019	.475	.475	.475	.505	1.93																				
2020	.505	.505	.505	.535	2.05																				
2021	.535	--	--	--	--																				
BUSINESS: Evergy, Inc. was formed through the merger of Great Plains Energy and Westar Energy in June of 2018. Through its subsidiaries (now doing business under the Evergy name), provides electric service to 1.6 million customers in Kansas and Missouri, including the greater Kansas City area. Electric revenue breakdown residential, 39%, commercial, 33%, industrial, 12%, wholesale, 5%, other, 11%. Generating sources: coal, 54%; nuclear, 17%, purchased, 29%. Fuel costs 22% of revenues '20 reported deprec. rate: 3%. Has 5,100 employees. Chairman: Mark A. Ruelle. President & Chief Executive Officer: David A. Campbell. Incorporated Missouri. Address: 1200 Main Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64105. Telephone: 816-556-2200. Internet: www.evergy.com																									
We have raised our 2021 earnings estimate for Evergy by \$0.25 a share, to \$3.40. Our previous estimate of \$3.15 a share was near the low end of the company's guidance (on a GAAP basis) of \$3.14-\$3.24. Evergy has a nonregulated energy-marketing subsidiary that typically contributes \$0.03-\$0.07 a share to annual income. During the cold spell in Texas, this unit had a long position that benefited from the surge in gas and power prices. Potentially, Evergy might have earned about three times the upper end of its yearly range. We will include this benefit in our earnings presentation even though this is not included in management's guidance. Gas and purchased-power costs for Evergy's utilities rose sharply, but we assume that all of these will be recoverable through the fuel-adjustment clause. Other positive factors include an assumed return to normal weather patterns, volume growth as the economy improves, earnings from additional investment in the utility's transmission system, and effective expense control. Most of these factors should produce higher profits in 2022, despite a tough comparison in the first quarter.																									
Evergy reached an agreement with two investor groups, Bluescape Energy Partners and Elliott Investment Management. The investors had been pushing the company to look for a buyer. Indeed, in November, Reuters reported that the company turned down an offer from NextEra Energy. Instead, Bluescape will invest about \$115 million in Evergy (through the purchase of newly issued stock) and will get warrants. Evergy appointed the head of Bluescape to its board, along with another board member. Bluescape and Elliott signed standstill agreements with Evergy, effective through the date of the 2022 annual meeting. The company is proceeding with its Sustainability Transformation Plan. Evergy's capital budget for 2021 through 2025 is \$9.2 billion. This includes \$675 million for renewable-energy projects in 2023 and 2024. This stock is untimely, but may interest income-oriented accounts. The dividend yield is about average for a utility. Total return potential is above average for the 18-month and 3- to 5-year periods. Paul E. Debbas, CFA March 12, 2021																									

<p>(A) Diluted EPS. Excl. nonrecurring gain (loss) '05, (24c), '06, 17c '17 & '19 earnings don't sum due to rounding. Next earnings report due mid-Feb</p> <p>(B) Dividends historically paid in late Feb., May, Aug., and Nov</p>	<p>■ Dividend reinvestment plan available to Shareholder investment plan available (C) Incl intangibles in '19 \$26 31/sh (D) In millions (E) Rate base Net</p>	<p>original cost Rate allowed on common equity in '12 10% (imputed), earned on avg com eq, '19 9.6% Regulatory Climate Above Average</p>	<p>Company's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price/Promise Persistence Earnings Predictability</p>	<p>A 100 90 100</p>
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(A) Diluted EPS Excl gain (loss) on disc ops '05, (6c), '06, 1c, nonrec. gains '12, 39c net, '15, 27c, '18, 52c, '19, 45c. '18 EPS don't sum due to rounding. Next earnings report due mid-Feb.	(B) Div'ds historically paid in late Mar., June, Sept & Dec. Div'd reinvestment plan avail. (C) Incl def'd charges. In '19 \$166/sh. (D) In mill. (E) Rate base Net op. cost Rate	allowed on com. eq. in MT in '19 (elec.) 9.65%, in '17 (gas) 9.55%, in SD in '15 none spec., in NE in '07, 10.4%, earned on avg. com. eq. '19 9.0%. Reg. Climate Below Avg.	Company's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price Growth Persistence Earnings Predictability	B++ 90 70 85
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OGE ENERGY CORP. NYSE-OGE										RECENT PRICE	29.59	P/E RATIO	13.8	(Trailing: 14.2 Median: 17.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	0.64	DIV'D YLD	5.5%	VALUE LINE	Target Price Range							
TIMELINESS	2	Raised 2/5/21	High	23.1	28.6	30.1	40.0	39.3	36.5	34.2	37.4	41.8	45.8	46.4	33.1					2024	2025	2026					
SAFETY	2	Lowered 12/18/15	Low	16.9	20.3	25.1	27.7	32.8	24.2	23.4	32.6	29.6	38.0	23.0	29.2												
TECHNICAL	3	Raised 3/12/21	<div>LEGENDS</div> <div>0.76 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate</div> <div>... Relative Price Strength</div> <div>2-for-1 split 7/13</div> <div>Options Yes</div> <div>Shaded area indicates recession</div>																								
18-Month Target Price Range																											
Low-High		Midpoint (% to Mid)																									
\$24-\$64		\$44 (50%)																									
2024-26 PROJECTIONS																											
	Price	Gain	Ann'l Total Return																								
High	55	(+85%)	20%																								
Low	40	(+35%)	12%																								
Institutional Decisions																											
	2020	3Q2020	4Q2020																								
to Buy	203	181	188																								
to Sell	182	195	193																								
Hlds(000)	129209	126932	127332																								
				Percent shares traded	18	12	6																				
© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 24-26																											
2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022										
32.83	21.96	20.68	21.77	14.79	19.04	19.96	18.58	14.45	12.30	11.00	11.31	11.32	11.37	11.15	10.61	12.25	13.25	Revenues per sh		16.25							
1.94	2.23	2.39	2.40	2.69	3.01	3.31	3.69	3.46	3.40	3.23	3.31	3.34	3.74	4.02	4.03	4.25	4.70	"Cash Flow" per sh		5.50							
92	123	132	125	133	150	173	179	194	1.98	1.69	1.69	1.92	2.12	2.24	2.08	2.10	2.40	Earnings per sh A		2.75							
.67	.67	.68	.70	.71	.73	.76	.80	.85	.95	1.05	1.16	1.27	1.40	1.51	1.58	1.64	1.69	Div'd Decl'd per sh B		1.95							
1.65	2.67	3.04	4.01	4.37	4.36	6.48	5.85	4.99	2.86	2.74	3.31	4.13	2.87	3.18	3.25	3.75	3.95	Cap'l Spending per sh		4.25							
7.59	8.79	9.16	10.14	10.52	11.73	13.06	14.00	15.30	16.27	16.66	17.24	19.28	20.06	20.69	18.15	18.60	19.25	Book Value per sh C		21.50							
181.20	182.40	183.60	187.00	194.00	195.20	196.20	197.60	198.50	199.40	199.70	199.70	199.70	199.70	200.10	200.10	200.00	200.00	Common Shs Outst'g D		200.00							
14.9	13.7	13.8	12.4	10.8	13.3	14.4	15.2	17.7	18.3	17.7	17.7	18.3	16.5	19.0	16.2	Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio		17.0									
79	.74	73	75	72	85	90	.97	.99	.96	.89	.93	92	.89	1.01	83	Relative P/E Ratio		.95									
4.9%	4.0%	3.8%	4.5%	5.0%	3.7%	3.1%	2.9%	2.5%	2.6%	3.5%	3.9%	3.6%	4.0%	3.5%	4.7%	Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield		4.0%									
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 12/31/20						3915.9	3671.2	2867.7	2453.1	2196.9	2259.2	2261.1	2270.3	2231.6	2122.3	2450	2650	Revenues (\$mill)		3250							
Total Debt \$3589.4 mill Due in 5 Yrs \$95.0 mill						342.9	355.0	387.6	395.8	337.6	338.2	384.3	425.5	449.6	415.9	425	485	Net Profit (\$mill)		555							
LT Debt \$3494.4 mill LT Interest \$152.5 mill						30.7%	26.0%	24.9%	30.4%	29.2%	30.5%	32.5%	14.5%	7.4%	13.2%	14.0%	14.0%	Income Tax Rate		14.0%							
(LT interest earned 4.1x)						9.0%	2.7%	2.6%	1.7%	3.7%	6.4%	15.0%	8.3%	1.6%	1.6%	2.0%	1.0%	AFUDC % to Net Profit		1.0%							
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals \$6.3 mill						51.6%	50.7%	43.1%	45.9%	44.3%	41.1%	41.7%	42.0%	43.6%	49.0%	48.5%	48.5%	Long-Term Debt Ratio		49.0%							
Pension Assets-12/20 \$570.3 mill.						48.4%	49.3%	56.9%	54.1%	55.7%	58.9%	58.3%	58.0%	56.4%	51.0%	51.5%	51.5%	Common Equity Ratio		51.0%							
Oblig \$654.6 mill						5300.4	5615.8	5337.2	5999.7	5971.6	5849.6	6600.7	6902.0	7334.7	7126.2	7210	7490	Total Capital (\$mill)		8375							
Pfd Stock None						7474.0	8344.8	6672.8	6979.9	7322.4	7696.2	8339.9	8643.8	9044.6	9374.6	9705	10040	Net Plant (\$mill)		11000							
Common Stock 200,021,161 shs.						7.8%	7.7%	8.6%	7.8%	6.9%	7.0%	7.0%	7.3%	7.1%	6.9%	7.0%	7.5%	Return on Total Cap'l		7.5%							
as of 1/29/21						13.4%	12.8%	12.8%	12.2%	10.2%	9.8%	10.0%	10.6%	10.9%	11.5%	11.5%	12.5%	Return on Shr. Equity		13.0%							
MARKET CAP: \$5.9 billion (Large Cap)						13.4%	12.8%	12.8%	12.2%	10.2%	9.8%	10.0%	10.6%	10.9%	11.5%	11.5%	12.5%	Return on Com Equity E		13.0%							
ELECTRIC OPERATING STATISTICS						7.7%	7.2%	7.3%	6.5%	4.0%	3.3%	3.5%	3.8%	3.6%	2.8%	2.5%	4.0%	Retained to Com Eq		4.0%							
						43%	44%	43%	47%	61%	67%	64%	64%	67%	76%	77%	70%	All Div'ds to Net Prof		70%							
						2018	2019	2020																			
						% Change Retail Sales (KWH)	+6.8	+1.1	-4.9																		
						Avg Indust. Use (MWH)	NA	NA	NA																		
						Avg Indust. Revs per KWH (c)	4.86	4.69	4.40																		
						Capacity at Peak (Mw)	NA	NA	NA																		
						Peak Load, Summer (Mw)	6863	6817	6437																		
						Annual Load Factor (%)	NA	NA	NA																		
						% Change Customers (yr end)	+9	+1.0	+1.1																		
						Fixed Charge Cov (%)	292	335	326																		
ANNUAL RATES						Past 10 Yrs.	Past 5 Yrs.	Est'd '18-'20																			
of change (per sh)						10 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	to '24-'26																			
Revenues						-5.0%	-2.5%	4.5%																			
"Cash Flow"						4.0%	3.0%	6.0%																			
Earnings						4.5%	3.0%	4.0%																			
Dividends						7.5%	9.5%	4.5%																			
Book Value						6.0%	4.0%	1.5%																			
Cal-endar	QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.)				Full Year																						
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31																							
2018	492.7	567.0	698.8	511.8	2270.3																						
2019	490.0	513.7	755.4	472.5	2231.6																						
2020	431.3	503.5	702.1	485.4	2122.3																						
2021	500	600	800	550	2450																						
2022	575	650	850	575	2650																						
Cal-endar	EARNINGS PER SHARE A				Full Year																						
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31																							
2018	27	55	1.02	27	2.12																						
2019	.24	.50	1.25	26	2.24																						
2020	23	.51	1.04	.30	2.08																						
2021	.15	.50	1.20	.25	2.10																						
2022	.25	.55	1.30	.30	2.40																						
Cal-endar	QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID B				Full Year																						
	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31																							
2017	.3025	.3025	.3025	.3325	1.24																						
2018	.3325	.3325	.3325	.365	1.36																						
2019	.365	.365	.365	.3875	1.48																						
2020	.3875	.3875	.3875	.4025	1.57																						
2021	.4025																										
<p>BUSINESS: OGE Energy Corp is a holding company for Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E), which supplies electricity to 867,000 customers in Oklahoma (84% of electric revenues) and western Arkansas (8%), wholesale is (8%) Owns 25.5% of Enable Midstream Partners Electric revenue breakdown: residential, 41%, commercial, 23%, industrial, 9%, oilfield, 8%, other, 19% Generating sources gas, 38%, coal, 15%, wind, 5%, purchased, 42% Fuel costs 30% of revenues '20 reported depreciation rate (utility): 2.6% Has 2,400 employees Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer Sean Trauschke Incorporated Oklahoma Address 321 North Harvey, P.O. Box 321, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73101-0321 Telephone 405-553-3000 Internet www.oge.com.</p> <p>OGE Energy's utility subsidiary was hurt by the cold spell that hit the region in February. A surge in gas and purchased-power costs resulting from the disruption of gas supplies cost an estimated \$800 million-\$1 billion. Oklahoma Gas and Electric will defer these for future recovery, but because this is such a large amount, the utility proposes to amortize the cost over a 10-year period beginning in January. The company obtained \$1 billion in bank financing to cover the costs, and will seek recovery of financing costs, too.</p> <p>This will affect earnings in 2021. OG&E has a guaranteed flat bill program that applies to 3% of its load, so the utility has to absorb higher power expenses for these customers. This will hurt the bottom line by an estimated \$0.06 a share. Financing costs associated with the new debt facility will amount to \$0.03-\$0.04 a share. For now, we assume OG&E will be allowed to recover its power costs, but do not assume recovery of the financing costs. We think OGE Energy's profits will rise slightly in 2021 thanks to higher equity income from the company's stake in Enable Midstream Partners. The utility will get additional revenues from a formula rate plan in Arkansas and rider recovery of grid enhancement spending in Oklahoma. Enable has agreed to be acquired by Energy Transfer Partners. Once the deal closes, the company will own 3% of Energy Transfer, and will get cash of \$35 million. The poor performance of Enable units in 2020 led to a 28% decline in the price of OGE Energy stock last year. The company plans to sell its stake in Energy Transfer. For now, it expects to get \$60 million-\$73 million in cash distributions from midstream gas investments in 2021. Earnings should improve in 2022. We assume no drag from the weather-related problems experienced in February. OG&E should get a partial year of rate relief from a case it must file in Oklahoma no later than the first quarter of 2022. Income-oriented investors should consider this timely stock. The yield is well above the utility mean, which should compensate stockholders for the regulatory uncertainty regarding the surge in power costs. Total return potential is attractive for the 18-month and 2024-2026 periods.</p> <p>Paul E. Debbas, CFA March 12, 2021</p>																											

OTTER TAIL CORP. NDQ-OTTR					RECENT PRICE	41.29	P/E RATIO	17.2 (Trailing: 17.6 Median: 21.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	0.80	DIV'D YLD	3.8%	VALUE LINE	Target Price Range					
					High: 25.4	23.5	25.3	31.9	32.7	33.4	42.6	48.7	51.9	57.7	56.9	44.0	2024 2025 2026		
					Low: 18.2	17.5	20.7	25.2	26.5	24.8	25.8	35.7	39.0	45.9	31.0	39.4			
TIMELINESS 4 Lowered 2/26/21					LEGENDS: 0.61 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate Relative Price Strength Options: Yes Shaded area indicates recession														
SAFETY 2 Raised 6/17/16																			
TECHNICAL 4 Lowered 2/19/21																			
BETA 85 (100 = Market)																			
18-Month Target Price Range																			
Low-High Midpoint (% to Mid)																			
\$33-\$75 \$54 (30%)																			
2024-26 PROJECTIONS																			
Price Gain Ann'l Total																			
High Low 65 45 (+55%) (+10%) 15% 6%																			
Institutional Decisions																			
202020 302020 402020																			
to Buy 75 71 89																			
to Sell 82 74 63																			
Hld's(000) 18869 19002 19252																			
Percent shares traded 9 6 3																			

(A) Diluted EPS, Excl nonrec gain (loss) '09, (\$1.45); '17, 8c; gains (losses) from discount ops., '05, (36c), '06, '10c, '08, 28c, '09, (13c), '10, '08, '11, 10c, '12, (5c) '19 EPS don't sum	due to rounding. Next earnings report due late Feb (B) Div'ds historically paid in early Mar, June, Sept, & Dec There were 5 declarations in '12 '21 Div'd reinvestment plan avail (C) Incl	deferred charges In '19 \$14.00/sh (D) In mill (E) Rate base Fair value Rate allowed on com eq in '17 10.0%, earned on avg com eq, '19 10.1% Regulatory Climate Average	Company's Financial Strength A+ Stock's Price Stability 90 Price Growth Persistence 65 Earnings Predictability 100
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(A) Diluted EPS. Excl. nonrecurring losses '13, 42¢; '17, 19¢. Next earnings report due mid-Feb. (B) Div'ds paid mid-Jan., Apr., July, and Oct. (C) Div'd reinvestment plan avail. † Share-	holder investment plan avail. (C) Incl. deferred charges. In '19: \$483 mill, \$5.40/sh (D) In mill. (E) Rate base: Net ong. cost. Rate allowed on com. eq. in '19: 9.5%; earned on avg. com. eq.	'19: 8.4% Regulatory Climate Average. (F) '05 per-share data are pro forma, based on shs. outstanding when stock began trading in '06	Company's Financial Strength B++ Stock's Price Stability 90 Price Growth Persistence 75 Earnings Predictability 90
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(A) Diluted EPS Excl. nonrecurring gain (losses) '10, 5¢, '15, (16¢), '17, (5¢), gains (losses) on discontinued ops '04, (30¢), '05, 3¢, '06, 1¢, '09, (1¢), '10, 1¢ '17 EPS don't	sum due to rounding. Next earnings report due late Jan (B) Div'ds historically paid mid-Jan , Apr., July and Oct ■ Div'd reinvestment plan available (C) Incl intangibles In '19 \$5 60/sh	(D) In mill (E) Rate base: Varies Rate allowed on com. eq. (blended) 9.6%, earned on avg com. eq., '19 10.8% Regulatory Climate Average	Company's Financial Strength A+ Stock's Price Stability 95 Price Growth Persistence 65 Earnings Predictability 100
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Southwestern Electric Power Company
Summary of Risk Premium Models for the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

	<u>Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies</u>
Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) (1)	10.77 %
Risk Premium Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach (2)	<u>10.62 %</u>
Average	<u><u>10.70 %</u></u>

Notes:

(1) From page 19 of this Schedule.

(2) From page 20 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Indicated ROE
Derived by the Predictive Risk Premium Model (1)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies	LT Average Predicted Variance	Spot Predicted Variance	Recommended Variance (2)	GARCH Coefficient	Predicted Risk Premium (3)	Risk-Free Rate (4)	Indicated ROE (5)
ALLETE, Inc.	0.29%	0.36%	0.29%	2.1616	7.67%	2.73%	10.40%
Alliant Energy Corporation	0.27%	0.33%	0.27%	2.6656	9.07%	2.73%	11.80%
Ameren Corporation	0.23%	0.26%	0.23%	2.0009	5.70%	2.73%	8.43%
Duke Energy	0.31%	0.31%	0.31%	1.8115	7.05%	2.73%	9.78%
Edison International	0.43%	0.62%	0.43%	1.4761	7.94%	2.73%	10.67%
Entergy Corporation	0.40%	0.57%	0.40%	2.2102	11.21%	2.73%	13.94%
Evergy, Inc.	0.39%	0.72%	0.39%	1.0754	5.20%	2.73%	7.93%
IDACORP, Inc.	0.29%	0.39%	0.29%	2.1914	7.86%	2.73%	10.59%
NorthWestern Corporation	0.35%	0.41%	0.35%	2.4360	10.70%	2.73%	13.43%
OGE Energy Corporation	0.31%	0.28%	0.31%	2.1493	8.27%	2.73%	11.00%
Otter Tail Corporation	0.38%	0.32%	0.38%	1.6238	7.56%	2.73%	10.29%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	0.60%	0.47%	0.60%	1.2527	9.47%	2.73%	12.20%
Portland General Electric Company	0.28%	0.26%	0.28%	2.0276	6.99%	2.73%	9.72%
Xcel Energy, Inc.	0.28%	0.31%	0.28%	2.8067	9.70%	2.73%	12.43%
						Average	<u>10.90%</u>
						Median	<u>10.63%</u>
						Average of Mean and Median	<u>10.77%</u>

Notes:

- (1) The Predictive Risk Premium Model uses historical data to generate a predicted variance and a GARCH coefficient. The historical data used are the equity risk premiums for the first available trading month as reported by Bloomberg Professional Service.
- (2) Given current market conditions, I recommend using the long-term predicted variance.
- (3) $(1 + (\text{Column [3]} * \text{Column [4]})^{12}) - 1$.
- (4) From note 2 on page 32 of this Schedule.
- (5) Column [5] + Column [6].

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate
Through Use of a Risk Premium Model
Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies</u>
1.	Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	3.44 %
2.	Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and A Rated Public Utility Bonds	<u>0.42 (2)</u>
3.	Adjusted Prospective Yield on A Rated Public Utility Bonds	3.86 %
4.	Adjustment to Reflect Bond Rating Difference of Proxy Group	<u>0.09 (3)</u>
5.	Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield	3.95 %
6.	Equity Risk Premium (4)	<u>6.67</u>
7.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	<u><u>10.62 %</u></u>

- Notes:
- (1) Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corporate bonds from Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 27-28 of this Schedule).
 - (2) The average yield spread of A rated public utility bonds over Aaa rated corporate bonds of 0.42% from page 21 of this Schedule.
 - (3) Adjustment to reflect the A3 Moody's LT issuer rating of the Utility Proxy Group as shown on page 5 of this Schedule. The 0.09% upward adjustment is derived by taking 1/3 of the spread between A2 and Baa2 Public Utility Bonds ($1/3 * 0.27\% = 0.09\%$) as derived from page 21 of this Schedule.
 - (4) From page 24 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for
Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

Selected Bond Yields

	[1]	[2]	[3]
	<u>Aaa Rated Corporate Bond</u>	<u>A Rated Public Utility Bond</u>	<u>Baa Rated Public Utility Bond</u>
Mar-2021	3.04 %	3.44 %	3.72 %
Feb-2021	2.70	3.09	3.37
Jan-2021	<u>2.45</u>	<u>2.91</u>	<u>3.18</u>
Average	<u>2.73 %</u>	<u>3.15 %</u>	<u>3.42 %</u>

Selected Bond Spreads

A Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds:

0.42 % (1)

Baa Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A Rated Public Utility Bonds:

0.27 % (2)

Notes:

(1) Column [2] - Column [1].

(2) Column [3] - Column [2].

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Service

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

	Moody's		Standard & Poor's	
	Long-Term Issuer Rating		Long-Term Issuer Rating	
	March 2021		March 2021	
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies	Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)	Numerical Weighting (2)	Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)	Numerical Weighting (2)
ALLETE, Inc.	A3	7.0	NR	- -
Alliant Energy Corporation	A3/Baa1	7.5	A/A-	6.5
Ameren Corporation	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Duke Energy	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Edison International	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Entergy Corporation	Baa1/Baa2	8.5	BBB+	8.0
Evergy, Inc.	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
IDACORP, Inc.	A3	7.0	BBB	9.0
NorthWestern Corporation	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
OGE Energy Corporation	A3	7.0	A-	7.0
Otter Tail Corporation	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	A2	6.0	A-	7.0
Portland General Electric Company	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Xcel Energy, Inc.	A3	7.0	A-	7.0
Average	A3	7.4	BBB+	7.8

Notes:

- (1) Ratings are that of the average of each company's utility operating subsidiaries.
(2) From page 23 of this Schedule.

Source Information: Moody's Investors Service
Standard & Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service

Numerical Assignment for
Moody's and Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings

Moody's Bond Rating	Numerical Bond Weighting	Standard & Poor's Bond Rating
Aaa	1	AAA
Aa1	2	AA+
Aa2	3	AA
Aa3	4	AA-
A1	5	A+
A2	6	A
A3	7	A-
Baa1	8	BBB+
Baa2	9	BBB
Baa3	10	BBB-
Ba1	11	BB+
Ba2	12	BB
Ba3	13	BB-
B1	14	B+
B2	15	B
B3	16	B-

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies</u>
1.	Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1)	8.46 %
2.	Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A rated bonds (2)	5.77
3.	Predicted Equity Risk Premium Based on Regression Analysis of 1,179 Fully-Litigated Electric Utility Rate Cases (3)	<u>5.78</u>
4.	Average equity risk premium	<u><u>6.67 %</u></u>

Notes: (1) From page 25 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 29 of this Schedule.
(3) From page 30 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Equity Risk Premium Measure</u>	<u>Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies</u>
<u>Ibbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums:</u>		
1.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1)	5.78 %
2.	Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2)	8.85
3.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	9.74
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4)	5.03
5.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.77
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6)	<u>12.17</u>
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	8.72 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	<u>0.97</u>
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	<u><u>8.46 %</u></u>

Notes provided on page 26 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

Notes:

- (1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Ibbotson® SBBI® 2020 Market Report minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's average Aaa and Aa corporate bonds from 1926-2019.
- (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's average Aaa and Aa rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2019 referenced in Note 1 above.
- (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Ibbotson equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Ibbotson large company common stock monthly returns and average Aaa and Aa corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through March 2021.
- (4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived by subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.44% (from page 20 of this Schedule) from the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of 8.47% (described fully in note 1 on page 32 of this Schedule).
- (5) Using data from Value Line for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 14.21% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.44% results in an expected equity risk premium of 10.77%.
- (6) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Service for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 15.61% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.44% results in an expected equity risk premium of 12.17%.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from page 31 of this Schedule.

Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 1, 2020 and April 1, 2021
Bloomberg Professional Service

2 ■ BLUE CHIP FINANCIAL FORECASTS ■ APRIL 1, 2021

Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions

Interest Rates	History								Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly Avg.					
	Average For Week Ending				Average For Month			Latest Qtr	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q
	Mar 26	Mar 19	Mar 12	Mar 5	Feb	Jan	Dec	1Q 2021*	2021	2021	2021	2022	2022	2022
Federal Funds Rate	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Prime Rate	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
LIBOR, 3-mo	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.22	0.23	0.20	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Commercial Paper, 1-mo	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 3-mo.	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Treasury bill, 6-mo.	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 1 yr.	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Treasury note, 2 yr.	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5
Treasury note, 5 yr.	0.84	0.85	0.82	0.73	0.54	0.45	0.39	0.61	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2
Treasury note, 10 yr.	1.65	1.66	1.57	1.49	1.26	1.08	0.93	1.32	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0
Treasury note, 30 yr.	2.35	2.41	2.30	2.25	2.04	1.82	1.67	2.08	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7
Corporate Aaa bond	3.15	3.23	3.13	3.06	2.84	2.64	2.52	2.88	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4
Corporate Baa bond	3.63	3.71	3.62	3.52	3.30	3.14	3.03	3.36	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4
State & Local bonds	2.75	2.74	2.72	2.77	2.63	2.65	2.70	2.68	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.2
Home mortgage rate	3.17	3.09	3.05	3.02	2.81	2.74	2.68	2.88	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7

Key Assumptions	History								Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly					
	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q
	2019	2019	2019	2020	2020	2020	2020	2021**	2021	2021	2021	2022	2022	2022
Fed's AFE \$ Index	110.4	110.6	110.5	111.4	112.4	107.3	105.2	103.4	104.0	103.9	103.9	103.6	103.5	103.4
Real GDP	1.5	2.6	2.4	-5.0	-31.4	33.4	4.3	4.3	8.1	6.9	4.8	3.5	3.0	2.7
GDP Price Index	2.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	-1.8	3.5	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.2
Consumer Price Index	3.5	1.3	2.6	1.0	-3.1	4.7	2.4	2.8	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2
PCE Price Index	2.5	1.4	1.5	1.3	-1.6	3.7	1.5	2.7	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1


Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H 15, AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity, State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity, Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed, LIBOR quotes from Intercontinental Exchange. All interest rate data are sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index are from FRSR H 10. Historical data for Real GDP and GDP Chained Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index (CPI) history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). *Interest rate data for 1Q 2021 based on historical data through the week ended March 26. **Data for 1Q 2021 for the Fed's AFE \$ Index based on data through the week ended March 26. Figures for 1Q 2021 Real GDP, GDP Chained Price Index and CPI and PCE Price Index are consensus forecasts from the March 2021 survey.

U.S. Treasury Yield Curve

Week ended March 26, 2021 & Year Ago vs

2Q 2021 & 3Q 2022


Consensus Forecasts



U.S. 3-Mo. T-Bills & 10-Yr. T-Note Yield


(Quarterly Average)

Forecast




Corporate Bond Spreads

As of week ended March 26, 2020



U.S. Treasury Yield Curve

As of week ended March 26, 2020



14 ■ BLUE CHIP FINANCIAL FORECASTS ■ DECEMBER 1, 2020

Long-Range Survey:

The table below contains the results of our twice-annual long-range CONSENSUS survey. There are also Top 10 and Bottom 10 averages for each variable. Shown are consensus estimates for the years 2022 through 2026 and averages for the five-year periods 2022-2026 and 2027-2031. Apply these projections cautiously. Few if any economic, demographic and political forces can be evaluated accurately over such long time spans.


		Average For The Year					Five-Year Averages	
		2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2022-2026	2027-2031
1 Federal Funds Rate	CONSENSUS	0.1	0.3	0.7	1.2	1.5	0.8	1.8
	Top 10 Average	0.2	0.7	1.4	2.0	2.4	1.3	2.5
	Bottom 10 Average	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.3	1.2
2 Prime Rate	CONSENSUS	3.3	3.5	3.9	4.3	4.6	3.9	4.9
	Top 10 Average	3.4	3.7	4.4	5.0	5.4	4.4	5.4
	Bottom 10 Average	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.4	4.5
3 LIBOR, 3-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.4	0.6	1.1	1.5	1.8	1.1	2.2
	Top 10 Average	0.5	1.0	1.7	2.2	2.6	1.6	2.7
	Bottom 10 Average	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.1	0.6	1.6
4 Commercial Paper, 1-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.3	0.7	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.1	2.1
	Top 10 Average	0.4	0.9	1.6	2.1	2.4	1.5	2.5
	Bottom 10 Average	0.2	0.4	0.8	1.2	1.5	0.8	1.7
5 Treasury Bill Yield, 3-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.2	0.4	0.8	1.2	1.5	0.8	1.9
	Top 10 Average	0.3	0.7	1.5	2.0	2.4	1.4	2.5
	Bottom 10 Average	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.3	1.3
6 Treasury Bill Yield, 6-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.2	0.5	0.9	1.3	1.6	0.9	2.0
	Top 10 Average	0.3	0.8	1.6	2.1	2.5	1.5	2.6
	Bottom 10 Average	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.4	1.4
7 Treasury Bill Yield, 1-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.3	0.6	1.0	1.4	1.8	1.0	2.1
	Top 10 Average	0.5	1.0	1.7	2.3	2.6	1.6	2.7
	Bottom 10 Average	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.9	0.5	1.6
8 Treasury Note Yield, 2-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.4	0.8	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.2	2.3
	Top 10 Average	0.7	1.2	1.9	2.4	2.8	1.8	2.9
	Bottom 10 Average	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.1	0.6	1.7
9 Treasury Note Yield, 5-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.8	1.2	1.6	2.0	2.3	1.5	2.5
	Top 10 Average	1.1	1.6	2.3	2.8	3.1	2.1	3.1
	Bottom 10 Average	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.0	1.9
10 Treasury Note Yield, 10-Yr	CONSENSUS	1.3	1.7	2.0	2.4	2.6	2.0	2.8
	Top 10 Average	1.7	2.2	2.7	3.1	3.4	2.6	3.5
	Bottom 10 Average	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.8	1.4	2.2
11 Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Yr	CONSENSUS	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.1	3.4	2.8	3.6
	Top 10 Average	2.5	3.0	3.5	4.0	4.2	3.4	4.3
	Bottom 10 Average	1.6	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.1	2.9
12 Corporate Aaa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	2.8	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.2	3.6	4.5
	Top 10 Average	3.1	3.6	4.2	4.6	4.9	4.1	5.0
	Bottom 10 Average	2.4	2.8	3.0	3.3	3.6	3.0	3.9
13 Corporate Baa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	3.9	4.3	4.7	5.0	5.2	4.6	5.4
	Top 10 Average	4.3	4.7	5.2	5.6	5.9	5.1	6.0
	Bottom 10 Average	3.5	3.9	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.1	4.9
14 State & Local Bonds Yield	CONSENSUS	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.3	3.9
	Top 10 Average	3.1	3.5	3.8	4.1	4.3	3.8	4.3
	Bottom 10 Average	2.5	2.8	2.9	3.2	3.4	2.9	3.6
15 Home Mortgage Rate	CONSENSUS	3.2	3.5	3.9	4.2	4.5	3.9	4.7
	Top 10 Average	3.5	3.9	4.4	4.9	5.2	4.4	5.2
	Bottom 10 Average	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.4	4.2
A Fed's AFE Nominal \$ Index	CONSENSUS	107.2	107.0	106.5	106.4	106.6	106.7	106.7
	Top 10 Average	109.0	108.9	108.8	108.9	109.5	109.0	110.2
	Bottom 10 Average	105.4	105.2	104.4	103.8	103.7	104.5	103.0
		Year-Over-Year, % Change					Five-Year Averages	
		2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2022-2026	2027-2031
B. Real GDP	CONSENSUS	3.2	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.1
	Top 10 Average	3.8	3.0	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.9	2.4
	Bottom 10 Average	2.6	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.1	1.8
C GDP Chained Price Index	CONSENSUS	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.1
	Top 10 Average	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
	Bottom 10 Average	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.9
D Consumer Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.2
	Top 10 Average	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
	Bottom 10 Average	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
E PCE Price Index	CONSENSUS	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.1
	Top 10 Average	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.4
	Bottom 10 Average	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.9

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based Studies
Using Holding Period Returns and
Projected Market Appreciation of the S&P Utility Index

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Implied Equity Risk Premium</u>
	<u>Equity Risk Premium based on S&P Utility Index Holding Period Returns (1):</u>	
1.	Historical Equity Risk Premium	4.21 %
2.	Regression of Historical Equity Risk Premium (2)	6.58
3.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium Based on PRPM (3)	5.60
4.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Value Line Data) (4)	6.75
5.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Bloomberg Data) (5)	<u>5.72</u>
6.	Average Equity Risk Premium (6)	<u><u>5.77 %</u></u>

- Notes: (1) Based on S&P Public Utility Index monthly total returns and Moody's Public Utility Bond average monthly yields from 1928-2019. Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.
- (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A rated public utility bond yields from 1928 - 2019 referenced in note 1 above.
- (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is applied to the risk premium of the monthly total returns of the S&P Utility Index and the monthly yields on Moody's A rated public utility bonds from January 1928 - March 2021.
- (4) Using data from Value Line for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 10.61% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A rated public utility bond yield of 3.86%, calculated on line 3 of page 20 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of 6.75%. (10.61% - 3.86% = 6.75%)
- (5) Using data from Bloomberg Professional Service for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 9.58% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A rated public utility bond yield of 3.86%, calculated on line 3 of page 20 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of 5.72%. (9.58% - 3.86% = 5.72%)
- (6) Average of lines 1 through 5.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Prediction of Equity Risk Premiums Relative to
Moody's A Rated Utility Bond Yields



Constant	Slope	Prospective A2 Rated Utility Bond (1)	Prospective Equity Risk Premium
7.649492 %	-0.48508	3.86 %	5.78 %

Notes:

(1) From line 3 of page 20 of this Schedule.

Source of Information: Regulatory Research Associates

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use
of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Bloomberg Adjusted Beta	Average Beta	Market Risk Premium (1)	Risk-Free Rate (2)	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	ECAPM Cost Rate	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)
ALLETE, Inc.	0.90	1.07	0.99	9.59 %	2.73 %	12.22 %	12.24 %	12.23 %
Alliant Energy Corporation	0.85	1.02	0.93	9.59	2.73	11.64	11.81	11.73
Ameren Corporation	0.80	0.95	0.88	9.59	2.73	11.17	11.45	11.31
Duke Energy	0.85	0.98	0.91	9.59	2.73	11.45	11.67	11.56
Edison International	0.95	1.09	1.02	9.59	2.73	12.51	12.46	12.48
Entergy Corporation	0.95	1.17	1.06	9.59	2.73	12.89	12.75	12.82
Evergy, Inc.	0.95	1.05	1.00	9.59	2.73	12.32	12.32	12.32
IDACORP, Inc.	0.80	1.04	0.92	9.59	2.73	11.55	11.74	11.64
NorthWestern Corporation	0.95	1.25	1.10	9.59	2.73	13.27	13.03	13.15
OGE Energy Corporation	1.05	1.25	1.15	9.59	2.73	13.75	13.39	13.57 (4)
Otter Tail Corporation	0.85	1.07	0.96	9.59	2.73	11.93	12.03	11.98
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	0.90	1.13	1.02	9.59	2.73	12.51	12.46	12.48
Portland General Electric Company	0.85	1.05	0.95	9.59	2.73	11.84	11.96	11.90
Xcel Energy, Inc.	0.80	0.98	0.89	9.59	2.73	11.26	11.53	11.39
Mean			0.97			12.04 %	12.11 %	12.08 %
Median			0.96			11.93 %	12.03 %	11.98 %
Average of Mean and Median			0.97			11.99	12.07	12.03 %

Notes on page 32 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Notes to Accompany the Application of the CAPM and ECAPM

Notes:

- (1) The market risk premium (MRP) is derived by using six different measures from three sources. Ibbotson, Value Line, and Bloomberg as illustrated below:

Historical Data MRP Estimates

Measure 1: Ibbotson Arithmetic Mean MRP (1926-2019)

Arithmetic Mean Monthly Returns for Large Stocks 1926-2019:	12.10 %
Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds	5.09
MRP based on Ibbotson Historical Data.	<u>7.01 %</u>

Measure 2: Application of a Regression Analysis to Ibbotson Historical Data (1926-2019)

9.56 %

Measure 3: Application of the PRPM to Ibbotson Historical Data.
(January 1926 - March 2021)

10.85 %

Value Line MRP Estimates:

Measure 4: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks ending April 02, 2021)

Total projected return on the market 3-5 years hence*	8.47 %
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	2.73
MRP based on Value Line Summary & Index:	<u>5.74 %</u>

Measure 5: Value Line Projected Return on the Market based on the S&P 500

Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500	14.21 %
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	2.73
MRP based on Value Line data	<u>11.48 %</u>

Measure 6: Bloomberg Projected MRP

Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500:	15.61 %
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	2.73
MRP based on Bloomberg data	<u>12.88 %</u>

Average of Value Line, Ibbotson, and Bloomberg MRP 9.59 %

- (2) For reasons explained in the direct testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (See pages 27-28 of this Schedule) The projection of the risk-free rate is illustrated below

Second Quarter 2021	2.40 %
Third Quarter 2021	2.50
Fourth Quarter 2021	2.50
First Quarter 2022	2.60
Second Quarter 2022	2.70
Third Quarter 2022	2.70
2022-2026	2.80
2027-2031	3.60
	<u>2.73 %</u>

- (3) Average of Column 6 and Column 7
- (4) OGE's CAPM results were excluded from the final average and median as they were more than 2 standard deviations above the proxy group's mean

Sources of Information:

Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 1, 2020 and April 1, 2021
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Bloomberg Professional Services

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Basis of Selection of the Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies
Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group

The criteria for selection of the proxy group of forty-five non-price regulated companies was that the non-price regulated companies be domestic and reported in Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition).

The Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group were then selected based on the unadjusted beta range of 0.66 – 0.94 and residual standard error of the regression range of 2.5544 – 3.0468 of the Utility Proxy Group.

These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression. Plus or minus two standard deviations captures 95.50% of the distribution of unadjusted betas and residual standard errors of the regression.

The standard deviation of the Utility Proxy Group's residual standard error of the regression is 0.1231. The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr.} = \frac{\text{Standard Error of the Regression}}{\sqrt{2N}}$$

where: N = number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, N = 259

$$\text{Thus, } 0.1231 = \frac{2.8006}{\sqrt{518}} = \frac{2.8006}{22.7596}$$

Source of Information: Value Line, Inc., March 2021
Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition)

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk
Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta
ALLETE, Inc.	0.90	0.79	2.7853	0.0695
Alliant Energy Corporation	0.85	0.70	2.7878	0.0696
Ameren Corporation	0.80	0.68	2.6125	0.0652
Duke Energy	0.85	0.75	2.7871	0.0695
Edison International	0.95	0.91	3.2791	0.0818
Entergy Corporation	0.95	0.87	2.6764	0.0668
Eversource, Inc.	0.95	0.91	3.3442	0.0892
IDACORP, Inc.	0.80	0.68	2.5678	0.0641
NorthWestern Corporation	0.95	0.87	2.8342	0.0707
OGE Energy Corporation	1.05	1.04	2.7132	0.0677
Otter Tail Corporation	0.85	0.77	2.4704	0.0616
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	0.90	0.82	2.7915	0.0697
Portland General Electric Company	0.90	0.77	2.8436	0.0710
Xcel Energy, Inc.	0.80	0.65	2.7151	0.0677
Average	0.89	0.80	2.8006	0.0703
Beta Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of Beta)	0.66	0.94		
2 std. Devs. of Beta	0.14			
Residual Std. Err. Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of the Residual Std. Err.)	2.5544	3.0468		
Std. dev. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.1231			
2 std. devs. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.2462			

Source of Information: Valueline Proprietary Database, March 2021

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies
Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Proxy Group of Forty-Five Non-Price Regulated Companies	VL Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta
Abbott Labs.	0.95	0.88	2.7401	0.0684
Analog Devices	0.95	0.88	2.6493	0.0661
Assurant Inc.	0.90	0.84	2.9537	0.0737
ANSYS, Inc.	0.85	0.74	2.8841	0.0720
Smith (A.O.)	0.85	0.77	2.6911	0.0672
Brown-Forman 'B'	0.90	0.77	2.7453	0.0685
Broadridge Fin'l	0.85	0.70	2.7332	0.0682
Brady Corp	1.00	0.93	3.0007	0.0749
Cadence Design Sys.	0.90	0.79	3.0338	0.0757
Cerner Corp	0.90	0.84	2.7309	0.0681
Chemed Corp.	0.85	0.71	2.5922	0.0647
Cooper Cos.	0.95	0.90	2.7184	0.0678
CSW Industrials	0.90	0.81	2.8884	0.0721
Quest Diagnostics	0.85	0.75	2.7411	0.0684
Dolby Labs.	0.95	0.86	2.6998	0.0674
Lauder (Estee)	0.95	0.85	2.8216	0.0704
Exponent, Inc.	0.90	0.79	2.9131	0.0727
Gentex Corp.	0.95	0.91	2.7546	0.0687
Hershey Co	0.85	0.73	2.7004	0.0674
Ingredion Inc.	0.90	0.78	2.8793	0.0718
Hunt (J.B.)	0.95	0.86	2.8344	0.0707
J&J Snack Foods	0.90	0.84	2.9208	0.0729
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	0.85	0.71	2.7734	0.0692
Lennox Int'l	1.00	0.93	2.6499	0.0661
MAXIMUS Inc.	0.80	0.67	2.6635	0.0665
Altria Group	0.90	0.83	2.9215	0.0729
MSA Safety	1.00	0.94	3.0076	0.0750
MSCI Inc.	0.95	0.87	2.9662	0.0740
Motorola Solutions	0.90	0.80	2.7926	0.0697
Maxim Integrated	0.95	0.87	2.9404	0.0734
Northrop Grumman	0.85	0.71	2.9032	0.0724
PerkinElmer Inc	0.95	0.86	2.8896	0.0721
Post Holdings	0.95	0.86	3.0105	0.0751
Rollins, Inc	0.85	0.73	2.9697	0.0741
Sherwin-Williams	0.90	0.84	2.6989	0.0673
Selective Ins. Group	0.85	0.77	3.0004	0.0749
Sirius XM Holdings	0.95	0.91	2.7995	0.0699
Sensient Techn	0.90	0.81	2.5553	0.0638
Tetra Tech	0.90	0.84	3.0245	0.0755
AMERCO	0.95	0.91	2.6511	0.0662
UniFirst Corp	1.00	0.94	2.6748	0.0667
VeriSign Inc.	0.90	0.82	2.6587	0.0663
Waters Corp.	0.95	0.86	2.7531	0.0687
Watsco, Inc.	0.85	0.73	2.7166	0.0678
Western Union	0.80	0.67	2.7346	0.0682
Average	0.91	0.82	2.8085	0.0701
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies	0.89	0.80	2.8006	0.0703

Source of Information:

ValueLine Proprietary Database, March 2021

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to
Proxy Group of Forty-Five Non-Price Regulated Companies
Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

<u>Principal Methods</u>	<u>Proxy Group of Forty-Five Non- Price Regulated Companies</u>
Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	11.62 %
Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	12.47
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	<u>11.69</u>
Mean	<u><u>11.93 %</u></u>
Median	<u><u>11.69 %</u></u>
Average of Mean and Median	<u><u>11.81 %</u></u>

Notes:

- (1) From page 37 of this Schedule.
- (2) From page 38 of this Schedule.
- (3) From page 41 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
DCF Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Proxy Group of Forty-Five Non-Price Regulated Companies	Average Dividend Yield	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (1)
Abbott Labs	1.52 %	12.00 %	14.00 %	14.20 %	15.58 %	13.94 %	15.57 %
Analog Devices	1.79	8.50	12.30	11.60	11.78	11.05	12.94
Assurant Inc	1.96	11.50	NA	NA	19.40	15.45	17.56
ANSYS, Inc	-	10.00	NA	12.05	8.00	10.02	NA
Smith (A O)	1.71	5.00	9.00	10.00	8.00	8.00	9.78
Brown-Forman 'B'	0.98	12.00	NA	5.39	7.53	8.31	9.33
Broadridge Fin'l	1.56	10.50	NA	10.70	10.00	10.40	12.04
Brady Corp	1.68	8.00	7.00	7.33	7.00	7.33	9.07
Cadence Design Sys	-	13.00	11.10	11.90	11.10	11.78	NA
Cerner Corp.	1.17	8.00	12.30	8.61	11.51	10.11	11.34
Chemed Corp	0.28	12.50	7.00	6.95	6.95	8.35	8.64
Cooper Cos	0.02	14.50	11.00	10.50	10.00	11.50	11.52
CSW Industrials	0.42	8.50	NA	NA	12.00	10.25	10.69
Quest Diagnostics	2.01	10.00	26.50	(6.93)	9.22	15.24	17.40
Dolby Labs	0.92	10.50	13.00	NA	16.00	13.17	14.15
Lauder (Estec)	0.77	11.00	10.70	17.23	21.10	15.01	15.84
Exponent, Inc	0.85	12.00	NA	13.30	15.00	13.43	14.34
Gentex Corp	1.35	10.50	4.70	10.25	15.80	10.31	11.73
Hershey Co	2.14	5.00	7.70	4.70	7.60	6.25	8.46
Ingredion Inc	2.99	6.00	NA	11.00	1.90	6.30	9.38
Hunt (J B)	0.74	6.50	15.00	17.23	20.73	14.87	15.67
J&J Snack Foods	1.47	10.00	NA	NA	6.00	8.00	9.53
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	1.21	10.50	10.90	12.47	10.02	10.97	12.25
Lennox Int'l	1.06	10.00	NA	10.30	8.47	9.59	10.70
MAXIMUS Inc	1.37	10.50	NA	5.00	12.50	9.33	10.76
Altria Group	7.66	6.50	4.00	2.70	4.42	4.41	12.24
MSA Safety	1.07	6.50	NA	9.00	18.00	11.17	12.30
MSCI Inc	0.74	18.00	NA	12.20	14.37	14.86	15.65
Motorola Solutions	1.59	7.00	9.00	11.30	5.88	8.30	9.96
Maxim Integrated	-	8.00	10.00	11.30	18.44	11.94	NA
Northrop Grumman	1.92	7.00	NA	4.96	5.44	5.80	7.78
PerkinElmer Inc.	0.20	17.50	19.50	(6.87)	17.20	18.07	18.29
Post Holdings	-	11.50	NA	20.30	31.20	21.00	NA
Rollins, Inc.	0.89	11.50	NA	NA	8.20	9.85	10.78
Sherwin-Williams	0.92	10.00	10.70	8.32	9.49	9.63	10.59
Selective Ins Group	1.44	8.50	NA	NA	5.10	6.80	8.29
Sirius XM Holdings	0.96	24.50	14.80	26.96	12.93	19.80	20.86 (2)
Sensient Techn	2.03	2.50	NA	10.70	3.80	5.67	7.76
Tetra Tech	0.51	13.50	15.00	13.85	15.00	14.34	14.89
AMERCO	-	8.00	NA	13.00	15.00	12.00	NA
Unifirst Corp	0.43	4.00	NA	10.00	10.00	8.00	8.45
VeriSign Inc	-	9.50	NA	4.30	8.00	7.27	NA
Waters Corp	-	6.00	8.80	9.03	7.17	7.75	NA
Watsco, Inc	2.88	7.00	NA	NA	15.00	11.00	14.04
Western Union	3.99	6.00	NA	4.57	9.25	6.61	10.73
						Mean	11.90 %
						Median	11.34 %
						Average of Mean and Median	11.62 %

NA= Not Available

NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

- (1) The application of the DCF model to the domestic, non-price regulated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the Utility Proxy Group. The dividend yield is derived by using the 60 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of March 31, 2021. The dividend yield is then adjusted by 1/2 the average projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, www.zacks.com, Bloomberg Professional Services, and www.yahoo.com (excluding any negative growth rates) and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield.
- (2) SIRI's DCF results were excluded from the final average and median as they were more than 2 standard deviations above the proxy group's mean.

Source of Information Value Line Investment Survey
www.zacks.com Downloaded on 03/31/2021
www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 03/31/2021
Bloomberg Professional Services

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate
Through Use of a Risk Premium Model
Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Forty- Five Non-Price Regulated Companies</u>
1.	Prospective Yield on Baa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	4.36 %
2.	Equity Risk Premium (2)	<u>8.11</u>
3.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	<u><u>12.47</u> %</u>

Notes: (1) Average forecast of Baa2 corporate bonds based upon the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated December 1, 2020 and April 1, 2020 (see pages 27-28 of this Schedule). The estimates are detailed below.

Second Quarter 2021	3.90 %
Third Quarter 2021	4.00
Fourth Quarter 2021	4.10
First Quarter 2022	4.20
Second Quarter 2022	4.30
Third Quarter 2022	4.40
2022-2026	4.60
2027-2031	<u>5.40</u>
Average	<u><u>4.36</u> %</u>

(2) From page 40 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the
Proxy Group of Forty-Five Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

	Moody's Long-Term Issuer Rating March 2021		Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Rating March 2021	
Proxy Group of Forty-Five Non- Price Regulated Companies	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)
Abbott Labs	A3	7.0	A	6.0
Analog Devices	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0
Assurant Inc	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
ANSYS, Inc.	NA	--	NA	--
Smith (A.O.)	NA	--	NA	--
Brown-Forman 'B'	A1	5.0	A-	7.0
Broadridge Fin'l	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Brady Corp.	NA	--	NA	--
Cadence Design Sys	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
Cerner Corp.	NA	--	NA	--
Chemed Corp.	WR	--	NR	--
Cooper Cos.	WR	--	NR	--
CSW Industrials	NA	--	NA	--
Quest Diagnostics	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
Dolby Labs	NA	--	NA	--
Lauder (Estee)	A1	5.0	A+	5.0
Exponent, Inc.	NA	--	NA	--
Gentex Corp.	NA	--	NA	--
Hershey Co	A1	5.0	A	6.0
Ingredion Inc	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0
Hunt (J.B.)	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
J&J Snack Foods	NA	--	NA	--
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	NA	--	NA	--
Lennox Int'l	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
MAXIMUS Inc	NA	--	NA	--
Altria Group	A3	7.0	BBB	9.0
MSA Safety	NA	--	NA	--
MSCI Inc	Ba2	12.0	BB+	11.0
Motorola Solutions	Baa3	10.0	BBB-	10.0
Maxim Integrated	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Northrop Grumman	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
PerkinElmer Inc	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
Post Holdings	B2	15.0	B+	14.0
Rollins, Inc.	NA	--	NA	--
Sherwin-Williams	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Selective Ins Group	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Sirius XM Holdings	NA	--	BB	12.0
Sensient Techn	WR	--	NR	--
Tetra Tech	NA	--	NA	--
AMERCO	WR	--	NR	--
UniFirst Corp	NA	--	NA	--
VeriSign Inc.	Baa3	10.0	BBB-	10.0
Waters Corp	NA	--	NA	--
Watsco, Inc	NA	--	NA	--
Western Union	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Average	Baa2	8.7	BBB	8.8

Notes.
(1) From page 23 of this Schedule

Source of Information:
Bloomberg Professional Services

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for
Proxy Group of Forty-Five Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Equity Risk Premium Measure</u>	<u>Proxy Group of Forty-Five Non- Price Regulated Companies</u>
<u>Ibbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums:</u>		
1.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1)	5.78 %
2.	Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2)	8.85
3.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	9.74
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4)	5.03
5.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.77
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6)	<u>12.17</u>
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	8.72 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	<u>0.93</u>
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	<u><u>8.11 %</u></u>

Notes:

- (1) From note 1 of page 26 of this Schedule.
- (2) From note 2 of page 26 of this Schedule.
- (3) From note 3 of page 26 of this Schedule.
- (4) From note 4 of page 26 of this Schedule.
- (5) From note 5 of page 26 of this Schedule.
- (6) From note 6 of page 26 of this Schedule.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from page 41 of this Schedule.

Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 1, 2020 and April 1, 2021
Bloomberg Professional Services

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Proxy Group of Forty-Five Non-Price Regulated Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Bloomberg Beta	Average Beta	Market Risk Premium (1)	Risk-Free Rate (2)	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	ECAPM Cost Rate	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)
Abbott Labs.	0.95	0.86	0.90	9.59 %	2.73 %	11.36 %	11.60 %	11.48 %
Analog Devices	0.95	1.05	1.00	9.59	2.73	12.32	12.32	12.32
Assurant Inc.	0.95	0.98	0.97	9.59	2.73	12.03	12.10	12.06
ANSYS, Inc	0.85	0.97	0.91	9.59	2.73	11.45	11.67	11.56
Smith (A O)	0.90	1.03	0.96	9.59	2.73	11.93	12.03	11.98
Brown-Forman 'B'	0.85	0.98	0.92	9.59	2.73	11.55	11.74	11.64
Broadridge Fin'l	0.85	0.83	0.84	9.59	2.73	10.78	11.17	10.97
Brady Corp.	1.00	1.05	1.03	9.59	2.73	12.60	12.53	12.57
Cadence Design Sys	0.90	0.98	0.94	9.59	2.73	11.74	11.88	11.81
Cerner Corp	0.90	0.89	0.89	9.59	2.73	11.26	11.53	11.39
Chemed Corp	0.85	0.91	0.88	9.59	2.73	11.17	11.45	11.31
Cooper Cos	0.95	0.93	0.94	9.59	2.73	11.74	11.88	11.81
CSW Industrials	0.85	1.03	0.94	9.59	2.73	11.74	11.88	11.81
Quest Diagnostics	0.85	0.96	0.91	9.59	2.73	11.45	11.67	11.56
Dolby Labs	0.95	0.95	0.95	9.59	2.73	11.84	11.96	11.90
Lauder (Estee)	0.95	1.01	0.98	9.59	2.73	12.12	12.17	12.15
Exponent, Inc	0.90	0.94	0.92	9.59	2.73	11.55	11.74	11.64
Gentex Corp.	0.95	1.07	1.01	9.59	2.73	12.41	12.39	12.40
Hershey Co.	0.85	0.83	0.84	9.59	2.73	10.78	11.17	10.97
Ingredion Inc.	0.90	0.93	0.91	9.59	2.73	11.45	11.67	11.56
Hunt (J.B.)	0.95	0.92	0.94	9.59	2.73	11.74	11.88	11.81
J&J Snack Foods	0.90	0.77	0.84	9.59	2.73	10.78	11.17	10.97
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	0.85	0.89	0.87	9.59	2.73	11.07	11.38	11.23
Lennox Int'l	1.00	1.01	1.01	9.59	2.73	12.41	12.39	12.40
MAXIMUS Inc.	0.80	0.90	0.85	9.59	2.73	10.88	11.24	11.06
Altria Group	0.90	0.89	0.89	9.59	2.73	11.26	11.53	11.39
MSA Safety	1.00	1.00	1.00	9.59	2.73	12.32	12.32	12.32
MSCI Inc	0.95	0.93	0.94	9.59	2.73	11.74	11.88	11.81
Motorola Solutions	0.90	0.95	0.92	9.59	2.73	11.55	11.74	11.64
Maxim Integrated	0.95	1.00	0.97	9.59	2.73	12.03	12.10	12.06
Northrop Grumman	0.85	0.79	0.82	9.59	2.73	10.59	11.02	10.81
PerkinElmer Inc	0.95	0.84	0.90	9.59	2.73	11.36	11.60	11.48
Post Holdings	0.95	0.90	0.92	9.59	2.73	11.55	11.74	11.64
Rollins, Inc.	0.85	0.69	0.77	9.59	2.73	10.11	10.66	10.39 (4)
Sherwin-Williams	0.90	1.02	0.96	9.59	2.73	11.93	12.03	11.98
Selective Ins. Group	0.85	0.96	0.91	9.59	2.73	11.45	11.67	11.56
Sirius XM Holdings	1.00	1.10	1.05	9.59	2.73	12.80	12.68	12.74
Sensient Techn.	0.90	0.96	0.93	9.59	2.73	11.64	11.81	11.73
Tetra Tech	0.90	1.05	0.98	9.59	2.73	12.12	12.17	12.15
AMERCO	0.95	1.06	1.01	9.59	2.73	12.41	12.39	12.40
Unitrust Corp.	1.00	1.10	1.05	9.59	2.73	12.80	12.68	12.74
Versign Inc	0.95	0.79	0.87	9.59	2.73	11.07	11.38	11.23
Waters Corp.	0.95	0.85	0.90	9.59	2.73	11.36	11.60	11.48
Watsco, Inc	0.85	0.80	0.82	9.59	2.73	10.59	11.02	10.81
Western Union	0.80	1.05	0.92	9.59	2.73	11.55	11.74	11.64
Mean			0.93			11.64 %	11.81 %	11.73 %
Median			0.92			11.55 %	11.74 %	11.64 %
Average of Mean and Median			0.93			11.60 %	11.78 %	11.69 %

Notes

- (1) From note 1 of page 32 of this Schedule
(2) From note 2 of page 32 of this Schedule
(3) Average of CAPM and ECAPM cost rates
(4) ROI's CAPM results were excluded from the final average and median as they were more than 2 standard deviations below the proxy group's mean.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Calculation of Price Appreciation and Annualized Volatility of the
Combined Electric Proxy Group, Other Utility Indices, and Market Indices since January 31, 2020


<u>Combined Electric Proxy Group</u>	<u>Price Appreciation (1)</u>	<u>Annualized Volatility (2)</u>
ALLETE, Inc.	-19.51%	50.09%
Alliant Energy Corporation	-8.76%	37.14%
Ameren Corporation	-0.84%	41.26%
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	-18.73%	36.75%
Avista Corporation	-6.10%	49.79%
Black Hills Corporation	-19.58%	48.79%
CMS Energy Corporation	-10.64%	37.20%
Consolidated Edison, Inc.	-20.43%	39.21%
Dominion Energy, Inc.	-11.42%	42.85%
DTE Energy Company	0.40%	45.03%
Duke Energy	-1.13%	39.37%
Edison International	-23.45%	43.07%
Entergy Corporation	-24.37%	44.68%
Evergy, Inc.	-17.50%	46.91%
Eversource Energy	-6.33%	43.35%
Fortis Inc	-5.53%	33.15%
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	-9.16%	45.06%
IDACORP, Inc.	-10.89%	41.03%
MGE Energy, Inc.	-10.68%	53.02%
NextEra Energy, Inc.	12.77%	41.18%
NorthWestern Corporation	-15.29%	50.34%
OGE Energy Corporation	-29.42%	42.49%
Otter Tail Corporation	-13.80%	54.43%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	-16.73%	42.54%
Portland General Electric Company	-22.81%	47.78%
Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	1.71%	39.00%
PPL Corporation	-20.31%	45.00%
Sempra Energy	-17.47%	44.85%
The Southern Company	-11.70%	43.69%
WEC Energy Group	-6.31%	41.03%
Xcel Energy, Inc.	-3.87%	37.85%
Average	<u>-11.87%</u>	<u>43.48%</u>
Dow Jones Utility Average	<u>-6.20%</u>	<u>36.59%</u>
Utilities Select SPDR Fund	<u>-7.16%</u>	<u>36.80%</u>
Dow Jones Industrial Average	<u>16.72%</u>	<u>34.47%</u>
S&P 500	<u>23.17%</u>	<u>32.64%</u>

Notes:

- (1) (3/31/2021 price minus 1/31/2020 price) divided by 1/31/2020 price.
- (2) Standard deviation of returns over the period multiplied by the square root of 252, or number of trading days in a year.

Source: S&P Market Intelligence, S&P Capital IQ

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Correction to Staff's Conventional Risk-Premium Estimate
Using Moody's Baa Rated Utility Bond Yields



Utility Baa Bond Yield:	4.04 %
Average bond yield over study period:	- 9.52 %
Change in bond yield:	(5.48) %
Risk Premium/Interest Rate Relationship:	x (0.49)
Adjustment to average risk premium:	2.70 %
Average Risk Premium over Study Period:	+ 2.81 %
Adjusted Risk Premium:	5.51 %
Utility Baa Bond Yield:	+ 4.04 %
<i>Implied Cost of Equity:</i>	<u><u>9.55 %</u></u>

Source of Information: Regulatory Research Associates, Blue Chip Forecasts, Bloomberg Professional

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Correction of Staff's CAPM Results Reflecting a Corrected
Expected Risk-Free Rate, Expected MRP, and use of the ECAPM

Company	Risk-Free Rate (1)	Beta	Risk Premium (2)	CAPM	ECAPM	AVERAGE
Staff Proxy Group						
Alliant Energy	2.48%	0.85	8.59%	9.78%	10.10%	9.94%
Ameren Corporation	2.48%	0.85	8.59%	9.78%	10.10%	9.94%
Avista Corporation	2.48%	0.95	8.59%	10.64%	10.75%	10.69%
Black Hills Corporation	2.48%	1.00	8.59%	11.07%	11.07%	11.07%
Consolidated Edison, Inc.	2.48%	0.75	8.59%	8.92%	9.46%	9.19%
DTE Energy	2.48%	0.95	8.59%	10.64%	10.75%	10.69%
Duke Energy Corporation	2.48%	0.85	8.59%	9.78%	10.10%	9.94%
Edison International	2.48%	0.95	8.59%	10.64%	10.75%	10.69%
Evergy, Inc.	2.48%	1.00	8.59%	11.07%	11.07%	11.07%
Eversource Energy	2.48%	0.90	8.59%	10.21%	10.42%	10.32%
Fortis Inc.	2.48%	0.80	8.59%	9.35%	9.78%	9.57%
NextEra Energy, Inc.	2.48%	0.90	8.59%	10.21%	10.42%	10.32%
NorthWestern Corporation	2.48%	0.95	8.59%	10.64%	10.75%	10.69%
OGE Energy	2.48%	1.10	8.59%	11.93%	11.71%	11.82%
Otter Tail Corporation	2.48%	0.85	8.59%	9.78%	10.10%	9.94%
Pinnacle West	2.48%	0.90	8.59%	10.21%	10.42%	10.32%
Portland General	2.48%	0.85	8.59%	9.78%	10.10%	9.94%
Public Service Enterprise Group Inc.	2.48%	0.90	8.59%	10.21%	10.42%	10.32%
WEC Energy	2.48%	0.80	8.59%	9.35%	9.78%	9.57%
Xcel Energy	2.48%	0.80	8.59%	9.35%	9.78%	9.57%
Mean				10.17%	10.39%	10.28%
Median				10.21%	10.42%	10.32%

Notes on page 2 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Notes to Accompany the Correction of Staff's CAPM and ECAPM

Notes:

- (1) For reasons explained in the direct testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. (See page 3 of this Schedule and page 28 of Schedule DWD-1R). The projection of the risk-free

First Quarter 2021	2.00	%
Second Quarter 2021	2.10	
Third Quarter 2021	2.20	
Fourth Quarter 2021	2.30	
First Quarter 2022	2.40	
Second Quarter 2022	2.40	
2022-2026	2.80	
2027-2031	3.60	
	<u>2.48</u>	%

- (2) The market risk premium (MRP) is derived by using four different measures as illustrated below:

Measure 1: Ibbotson Arithmetic Mean MRP (1926-2019) 7.01 %

Measure 2: Application of a Regression Analysis to Ibbotson Historical Data 9.81 %

Measure 3: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks ending 3/19/2021)

Total projected return on the market 3-5 years hence*:	8.50	%
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 1):	<u>2.48</u>	
MRP based on Value Line Summary & Index:	<u>6.02</u>	%

Measure 4: Value Line Projected Return on the Market based on the S&P 500

Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500:	14.01	%
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 1):	<u>2.48</u>	
MRP based on Value Line data	<u>11.53</u>	%

Average: 8.59 %

Sources of Information:

Attachment MF-8

Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, March 1, 2021 and December 1, 2020

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

2 ■ BLUE CHIP FINANCIAL FORECASTS ■ MARCH 1, 2021


Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions

Interest Rates	History								Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly Avg.					
	Average For Week Ending				Average For Month			Latest Qtr	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q
	Feb 19	Feb 12	Feb 5	Jan 29	Jan	Dec	Nov	4Q 2020	2021	2021	2021	2021	2022	2022
Federal Funds Rate	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Prime Rate	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
LIBOR, 3-mo.	0.18	0.20	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Commercial Paper, 1-mo.	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 3-mo.	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Treasury bill, 6-mo.	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 1 yr.	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
Treasury note, 2 yr.	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.15	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4
Treasury note, 5 yr.	0.57	0.48	0.45	0.42	0.45	0.39	0.39	0.37	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9
Treasury note, 10 yr.	1.31	1.18	1.14	1.06	1.08	0.93	0.87	0.86	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6
Treasury note, 30 yr.	2.09	1.96	1.91	1.81	1.82	1.67	1.62	1.62	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.4
Corporate Aaa bond	2.86	2.77	2.74	2.64	2.64	2.52	2.58	2.58	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.1
Corporate Baa bond	3.31	3.22	3.21	3.13	3.14	3.03	3.13	3.14	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.0
State & Local bonds	2.60	2.58	2.62	2.61	2.65	2.70	2.82	2.82	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.0
Home mortgage rate	2.81	2.73	2.73	2.73	2.74	2.68	2.77	2.76	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4


Key Assumptions	History								Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly					
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q
	2019	2019	2019	2019	2020	2020	2020	2020	2021	2021	2021	2021	2022	2022
Fed's AFE \$ Index	109.5	110.4	110.6	110.5	111.4	112.4	107.3	105.2	103.6	103.2	103.1	103.2	102.9	103.0
Real GDP	2.9	1.5	2.6	2.4	-5.0	-31.4	33.4	4.1	4.3	6.8	6.3	4.6	3.3	2.9
GDP Price Index	1.2	2.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	-1.8	3.5	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0
Consumer Price Index	0.7	3.5	1.3	2.6	1.0	-3.1	4.7	2.4	2.8	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1
PCE Price Index	0.6	2.5	1.4	1.5	1.3	-1.6	3.7	1.6	2.7	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H 15, AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity, State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity, Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed, LIBOR quotes from Intercontinental Exchange. All interest rate data are sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index are from FRSR H 10. Historical data for Real GDP and GDP Chained Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index (CPI) history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).


U.S. Treasury Yield Curve
Week ended February 19, 2021 & Year Ago vs
1Q 2021 & 2Q 2022
Consensus Forecasts




U.S. 3-Mo. T-Bills & 10-Yr. T-Note Yield
(Quarterly Average) Forecast



Corporate Bond Spreads
As of week ended February 19, 2020



U.S. Treasury Yield Curve
As of week ended February 19, 2020



Southwestern Electric Power Company
Portfolio Ranks by Size and Risk Premiums over CAPM Results
as Compiled by Duff and Phelps 2020 Guide to Cost of Capital

Portfolio Rank by Size	B-1		B-2		B-3		B-4		B-5		B-6		B-7		B-8	
	Average Market Val (in \$millions)	RP	Average Book Val (in \$millions)	RP	5-yr Net Income (in \$millions)	RP	Invested Capital (in \$millions)	RP	Total Assets (in \$millions)	RP	5-yr EBITDA (in \$millions)	RP	Sales (in \$millions)	RP	Average Number of Employees	RP
1	\$185,926 and Up	-0.84%	\$41,558 and Up	1.38%	\$6,822 and Up	1.01%	\$229,194 and Up	-0.32%	\$114,076 and Up	1.09%	\$14,974 and Up	1.13%	\$90,302 and Up	1.29%	229,840 and Up	0.89%
2	\$56,959 - \$185,926	0.49%	\$15,115 - \$41,558	2.02%	\$2,337 - \$6,822	1.82%	\$78,039 - \$229,194	0.75%	\$50,546 - \$114,076	1.72%	\$5,656 - \$14,974	1.88%	\$32,344 - \$90,302	2.05%	89,648 - 229,840	1.76%
3	\$35,409 - \$56,959	0.98%	\$9,686 - \$15,115	2.29%	\$1,439 - \$2,337	2.13%	\$47,251 - \$78,039	1.24%	\$33,793 - \$50,546	1.98%	\$3,665 - \$5,656	2.18%	\$20,065 - \$32,344	2.44%	60,958 - 89,648	2.10%
4	\$24,895 - \$35,409	1.34%	\$6,887 - \$9,686	2.46%	\$970 - \$1,439	2.41%	\$33,818 - \$47,251	1.55%	\$23,107 - \$33,793	2.22%	\$2,644 - \$3,665	2.41%	\$15,623 - \$20,065	2.61%	45,827 - 60,958	2.32%
5	\$18,621 - \$24,895	1.61%	\$5,248 - \$6,887	2.64%	\$753 - \$970	2.60%	\$25,668 - \$33,818	1.79%	\$16,907 - \$23,107	2.45%	\$1,996 - \$2,644	2.59%	\$11,773 - \$15,263	2.78%	35,414 - 45,827	2.52%
6	\$14,297 - \$18,621	1.87%	\$4,392 - \$5,248	2.74%	\$615 - \$753	2.71%	\$19,728 - \$25,668	2.01%	\$13,508 - \$16,907	2.59%	\$1,559 - \$1,996	2.76%	\$9,610 - \$11,773	2.94%	28,157 - 35,414	2.70%
7	\$11,416 - \$14,297	2.10%	\$3,712 - \$4,392	2.83%	\$483 - \$615	2.86%	\$15,391 - \$19,728	2.23%	\$10,972 - \$13,508	2.73%	\$1,270 - \$1,559	2.89%	\$8,275 - \$9,610	3.03%	23,063 - 28,157	2.86%
8	\$9,274 - \$11,416	2.29%	\$3,122 - \$3,712	2.91%	\$388 - \$483	3.01%	\$12,436 - \$15,391	2.42%	\$9,164 - \$10,972	2.85%	\$1,044 - \$1,270	3.01%	\$7,157 - \$8,275	3.13%	18,965 - 23,063	3.00%
9	\$7,759 - \$9,274	2.48%	\$2,596 - \$3,122	3.01%	\$328 - \$388	3.12%	\$10,361 - \$12,436	2.58%	\$7,673 - \$9,164	2.95%	\$852 - \$1,044	3.14%	\$6,098 - \$7,157	3.22%	15,846 - 18,965	3.15%
10	\$6,635 - \$7,759	2.61%	\$2,201 - \$2,596	3.11%	\$289 - \$328	3.22%	\$8,701 - \$10,361	2.73%	\$6,462 - \$7,673	3.07%	\$721 - \$852	3.27%	\$4,991 - \$6,098	3.33%	13,921 - 15,846	3.26%
11	\$5,502 - \$6,635	2.77%	\$1,911 - \$2,201	3.18%	\$256 - \$289	3.28%	\$7,448 - \$8,701	2.88%	\$5,629 - \$6,462	3.17%	\$636 - \$721	3.35%	\$4,127 - \$4,991	3.47%	12,271 - 13,921	3.35%
12	\$4,624 - \$5,502	2.96%	\$1,687 - \$1,911	3.25%	\$218 - \$256	3.37%	\$6,594 - \$7,448	2.99%	\$4,934 - \$5,629	3.25%	\$555 - \$636	3.43%	\$3,550 - \$4,127	3.57%	10,760 - 12,271	3.45%
13	\$3,983 - \$4,624	3.09%	\$1,499 - \$1,687	3.31%	\$183 - \$218	3.48%	\$5,781 - \$6,594	3.08%	\$4,236 - \$4,934	3.33%	\$485 - \$555	3.52%	\$3,093 - \$3,550	3.66%	9,489 - 10,760	3.54%
14	\$3,413 - \$3,983	3.23%	\$1,312 - \$1,499	3.38%	\$155 - \$183	3.58%	\$4,947 - \$5,781	3.21%	\$3,576 - \$4,236	3.44%	\$427 - \$485	3.60%	\$2,723 - \$3,093	3.75%	8,303 - 9,489	3.64%
15	\$2,975 - \$3,413	3.38%	\$1,143 - \$1,312	3.45%	\$132 - \$155	3.69%	\$4,258 - \$4,947	3.34%	\$3,062 - \$3,576	3.54%	\$374 - \$427	3.68%	\$2,404 - \$2,723	3.82%	7,138 - 8,303	3.74%
16	\$2,644 - \$2,975	3.48%	\$996 - \$1,143	3.52%	\$111 - \$132	3.78%	\$3,684 - \$4,258	3.46%	\$2,642 - \$3,062	3.63%	\$323 - \$374	3.76%	\$2,137 - \$2,404	3.90%	6,060 - 7,138	3.86%
17	\$2,313 - \$2,644	3.59%	\$857 - \$996	3.59%	\$93 - \$111	3.90%	\$3,188 - \$3,684	3.59%	\$2,249 - \$2,642	3.73%	\$274 - \$323	3.86%	\$1,916 - \$2,137	3.97%	5,130 - 6,060	3.99%
18	\$1,932 - \$2,313	3.73%	\$739 - \$857	3.68%	\$79 - \$93	4.00%	\$2,722 - \$3,188	3.70%	\$1,898 - \$2,249	3.83%	\$227 - \$274	3.97%	\$1,692 - \$1,916	4.04%	4,330 - 5,130	4.11%
19	\$1,578 - \$1,932	3.93%	\$649 - \$739	3.75%	\$67 - \$79	4.10%	\$2,229 - \$2,722	3.86%	\$1,591 - \$1,898	3.94%	\$187 - \$227	4.10%	\$1,446 - \$1,692	4.13%	3,605 - 4,330	4.24%
20	\$1,320 - \$1,578	4.11%	\$562 - \$649	3.82%	\$55 - \$67	4.21%	\$1,790 - \$2,229	4.04%	\$1,310 - \$1,591	4.05%	\$155 - \$187	4.22%	\$1,171 - \$1,446	4.24%	2,894 - 3,605	4.39%
21	\$1,080 - \$1,320	4.26%	\$464 - \$562	3.90%	\$44 - \$55	4.33%	\$1,457 - \$1,790	4.23%	\$1,074 - \$1,310	4.18%	\$127 - \$155	4.33%	\$926 - \$1,171	4.40%	2,247 - 2,894	4.57%
22	\$835 - \$1,080	4.48%	\$373 - \$464	4.02%	\$34 - \$44	4.49%	\$1,169 - \$1,457	4.39%	\$845 - \$1,074	4.30%	\$98 - \$127	4.47%	\$722 - \$926	4.54%	1,687 - 2,247	4.77%
23	\$591 - \$835	4.74%	\$292 - \$373	4.13%	\$24 - \$34	4.67%	\$825 - \$1,169	4.60%	\$594 - \$845	4.49%	\$70 - \$98	4.66%	\$525 - \$722	4.72%	1,203 - 1,687	5.01%
24	\$306 - \$591	5.15%	\$168 - \$292	4.28%	\$12 - \$24	4.95%	\$412 - \$825	5.01%	\$320 - \$594	4.76%	\$38 - \$70	4.90%	\$284 - \$525	4.95%	649 - 1,203	5.28%
25	Up to \$306	6.20%	Up to \$168	4.82%	Up to \$12	5.69%	Up to \$412	5.99%	Up to \$320	5.38%	Up to \$38	5.60%	Up to \$284	5.67%	Up to 649	6.14%

	B-1 Value	Portfolio Ranking	B-2 Value	Portfolio Ranking	B-3 Value	Portfolio Ranking	B-4 Value	Portfolio Ranking	B-5 Value	Portfolio Ranking	B-6 Value	Portfolio Ranking	B-7 Value	Portfolio Ranking	B-8 Value	Portfolio Ranking
Mr. Filarowicz's Proxy Group of Electric Companies	\$ 24,537	5	\$ 11,565,931	3	\$ 946	5	\$ 15,316	8	\$ 39,410	3	\$ 2,743	4	\$ 7,888	8	\$ 8,397	14
Mr. Gorman's Proxy Group of Electric Companies	\$ 17,089	6	\$ 8,812,925	4	\$ 628	6	\$ 12,643	8	\$ 33,031	4	\$ 2,171	5	\$ 6,464	9	\$ 7,556	15
Dr. Woolridge's Proxy Group of Electric Companies	\$ 26,731	4	\$ 11,792,953	3	\$ 977	4	\$ 17,089	7	\$ 43,175	3	\$ 2,945	4	\$ 8,455	7	\$ 9,361	14
Southwestern Electric Power Company	\$ 1,920	19	\$ 417	22	(1) \$ 163,52	14	\$ 2,503	19	\$ 2,026	18	(2) \$ 545	13	\$ 1,772	18	\$ 1,469	23
Indicated Risk Premium - Mr. Filarowicz's Proxy Group	2.32%		1.73%		0.98%		1.44%		1.85%		1.11%		0.91%		1.37%	
Indicated Risk Premium - Mr. Gorman's Proxy Group	2.06%		1.56%		0.87%		1.44%		1.61%		0.93%		0.82%		1.27%	
Indicated Risk Premium - Dr. Woolridge's Proxy Group	2.59%		1.73%		1.17%		1.63%		1.85%		1.11%		1.01%		1.37%	

Notes (1) SWEPCO-TX Book Value Estimated by multiplying (SWEPCO TX Rate Base / SWEPCO Plant Property and Equipment) by SWEPCO Book Value
(2) SWEPCO-TX Market Value of Debt Estimated by multiplying (SWEPCO TX Rate Base / SWEPCO Plant Property and Equipment) by SWEPCO Long Term Debt

Sources of Information Duff & Phelps 2020 Cost of Capital Navigator
SNL Financial
Company Annual Reports
Company Form 10-K

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Retention Ratio Regression Analysis

SUMMARY OUTPUT

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.4101
R Square	0.1682
Adjusted R Square	0.1642
Standard Error	0.1361
Observations	213

ANOVA

	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	1	0.7907	0.7907	42.6630	0.0000
Residual	211	3.9106	0.0185		
Total	212	4.7013			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>
Intercept	0.1006	0.0124	8.0902	0.0000	0.0761	0.1251
X Variable 1	-0.1790	0.0274	-6.5317	0.0000	-0.2330	-0.1250

Date	Ticker	Payout Ratio	Retention Ratio	5-year Fwd EPS
				Growth
2004	ALE	22.22%	77.78%	13.03%
2005	ALE	50.40%	49.60%	-0.53%
2006	ALE	52.35%	47.65%	1.33%
2007	ALE	53.25%	46.75%	-1.44%
2008	ALE	60.99%	39.01%	0.64%
2009	ALE	93.12%	6.88%	9.29%
2010	ALE	80.37%	19.63%	9.42%
2011	ALE	67.17%	32.83%	3.80%
2012	ALE	71.32%	28.68%	4.27%
2013	ALE	72.24%	27.76%	5.48%
2014	ALE	67.59%	32.41%	3.13%
2015	ALE	59.76%	40.24%	-0.06%
1996	LNT	86.78%	13.22%	6.92%
1997	LNT	105.26%	-5.26%	-0.07%
1998	LNT	158.73%	-58.73%	13.28%
1999	LNT	91.32%	8.68%	2.08%
2000	LNT	80.97%	19.03%	3.42%
2001	LNT	82.64%	17.36%	2.46%
2002	LNT	169.49%	-69.49%	18.83%
2003	LNT	63.69%	36.31%	11.10%
2004	LNT	55.14%	44.86%	2.50%
2005	LNT	47.51%	52.49%	7.55%
2006	LNT	55.83%	44.17%	8.91%
2007	LNT	47.21%	52.79%	4.97%
2008	LNT	55.12%	44.88%	7.73%
2009	LNT	78.95%	21.05%	13.86%
2010	LNT	57.45%	42.55%	4.34%
2011	LNT	61.82%	38.18%	3.86%
2012	LNT	59.02%	40.98%	5.80%
2013	LNT	56.97%	43.03%	6.17%
2014	LNT	58.62%	41.38%	6.36%
2015	LNT	65.09%	34.91%	8.14%
1996	AEE	87.76%	12.24%	4.29%
1997	AEE	104.10%	-4.10%	2.83%
1998	AEE	90.07%	9.93%	3.32%
1999	AEE	90.39%	9.61%	1.35%

Date	Ticker	Payout Ratio	Retention Ratio	5-year Fwd EPS
				Growth
2000	AEE	76.28%	23.72%	-0.15%
2001	AEE	74.49%	25.51%	-3.63%
2002	AEE	95.49%	4.51%	3.17%
2003	AEE	80.89%	19.11%	-1.11%
2004	AEE	90.07%	9.93%	0.24%
2005	AEE	81.15%	18.85%	-2.03%
2006	AEE	95.49%	4.51%	-1.20%
2007	AEE	85.23%	14.77%	-4.09%
2008	AEE	88.19%	11.81%	-5.99%
2009	AEE	55.40%	44.60%	-2.44%
2010	AEE	55.60%	44.40%	-2.53%
2011	AEE	63.16%	36.84%	2.15%
2012	AEE	66.39%	33.61%	3.31%
2013	AEE	76.19%	23.81%	9.85%
2014	AEE	67.08%	32.92%	7.18%
2015	AEE	69.75%	30.25%	8.24%
2007	DUK	71.67%	28.33%	1.45%
2008	DUK	89.11%	10.89%	6.07%
2009	DUK	83.19%	16.81%	4.45%
2010	DUK	72.39%	27.61%	0.58%
2011	DUK	71.74%	28.26%	-1.92%
2012	DUK	81.67%	18.33%	2.91%
2013	DUK	77.64%	22.36%	1.03%
2014	DUK	76.27%	23.73%	4.83%
2015	DUK	79.02%	20.98%	0.95%
2004	EIX	115.94%	-15.94%	76.47%
2005	EIX	30.54%	69.46%	0.34%
2006	EIX	33.54%	66.46%	-0.02%
2007	EIX	35.54%	64.46%	7.91%
2008	EIX	33.42%	66.58%	2.36%
2009	EIX	38.58%	61.42%	7.66%
2010	EIX	37.91%	62.09%	6.15%
2011	EIX	39.94%	60.06%	5.86%
2012	EIX	28.79%	71.21%	0.58%
2013	EIX	36.24%	63.76%	-21.63%
2014	EIX	34.18%	65.82%	-107.71%
2015	EIX	41.69%	58.31%	-118.34%
1997	ETR	80.00%	20.00%	11.04%
1998	ETR	67.57%	32.43%	11.36%
1999	ETR	53.33%	46.67%	12.39%
2000	ETR	41.08%	58.92%	8.38%
2001	ETR	41.56%	58.44%	12.01%
2002	ETR	36.41%	63.59%	9.01%
2003	ETR	43.36%	56.64%	11.09%
2004	ETR	48.09%	51.91%	10.12%
2005	ETR	49.09%	50.91%	8.87%
2006	ETR	40.30%	59.70%	7.18%
2007	ETR	46.07%	53.93%	2.23%
2008	ETR	48.39%	51.61%	-3.44%
2009	ETR	47.62%	52.38%	-0.49%
2010	ETR	48.65%	51.35%	-1.50%
2011	ETR	43.97%	56.03%	-0.49%
2012	ETR	55.15%	44.85%	-1.35%
2013	ETR	66.94%	33.06%	4.83%
2014	ETR	57.54%	42.46%	3.00%
2015	ETR	57.49%	42.51%	4.76%
1996	IDA	84.16%	15.84%	9.88%
1997	IDA	80.17%	19.83%	-1.38%
1998	IDA	78.48%	21.52%	-10.03%
1999	IDA	76.54%	23.46%	9.04%

Date	Ticker	Payout Ratio	Retention Ratio	5-year Fwd EPS
				Growth
2000	IDA	53.14%	46.86%	-1.34%
2001	IDA	55.52%	44.48%	6.37%
2002	IDA	114.11%	-14.11%	12.47%
2003	IDA	177.08%	-77.08%	24.13%
2004	IDA	63.16%	36.84%	8.77%
2005	IDA	68.57%	31.43%	12.70%
2006	IDA	51.06%	48.94%	8.62%
2007	IDA	64.52%	35.48%	12.85%
2008	IDA	55.05%	44.95%	11.01%
2009	IDA	45.45%	54.55%	7.94%
2010	IDA	40.68%	59.32%	5.70%
2011	IDA	35.71%	64.29%	3.28%
2012	IDA	40.65%	59.35%	4.59%
2013	IDA	43.13%	56.87%	4.32%
2014	IDA	45.71%	54.29%	3.70%
2015	IDA	49.61%	50.39%	3.77%
2005	NWE	58.48%	41.52%	5.90%
2006	NWE	94.66%	5.34%	14.23%
2007	NWE	88.89%	11.11%	10.11%
2008	NWE	74.58%	25.42%	7.29%
2009	NWE	66.34%	33.66%	8.78%
2010	NWE	63.55%	36.45%	6.99%
2011	NWE	56.92%	43.08%	6.72%
2012	NWE	65.49%	34.51%	8.56%
2013	NWE	61.79%	38.21%	7.15%
2014	NWE	53.51%	46.49%	3.61%
2015	NWE	66.21%	33.79%	2.06%
1996	OGE	82.72%	17.28%	-2.52%
1997	OGE	82.72%	17.28%	-0.37%
1998	OGE	65.69%	34.31%	-1.39%
1999	OGE	69.07%	30.93%	0.05%
2000	OGE	70.53%	29.47%	1.14%
2001	OGE	103.08%	-3.08%	14.19%
2002	OGE	93.06%	6.94%	13.50%
2003	OGE	77.01%	22.99%	8.28%
2004	OGE	75.28%	24.72%	9.10%
2005	OGE	72.83%	27.17%	10.98%
2006	OGE	54.47%	45.53%	7.31%
2007	OGE	51.52%	48.48%	6.54%
2008	OGE	56.00%	44.00%	9.27%
2009	OGE	53.38%	46.62%	8.41%
2010	OGE	48.67%	51.33%	2.92%
2011	OGE	43.93%	56.07%	-0.15%
2012	OGE	44.69%	55.31%	1.88%
2013	OGE	43.81%	56.19%	2.29%
2014	OGE	47.98%	52.02%	3.01%
2015	OGE	62.13%	37.87%	4.51%
1996	OTTR	72.58%	27.42%	6.36%
1997	OTTR	72.09%	27.91%	6.86%
1998	OTTR	74.42%	25.58%	3.73%
1999	OTTR	68.28%	31.72%	1.12%
2000	OTTR	63.75%	36.25%	2.78%
2001	OTTR	61.90%	38.10%	0.77%
2002	OTTR	59.22%	40.78%	0.53%
2003	OTTR	71.52%	28.48%	-4.10%
2004	OTTR	73.33%	26.67%	-10.94%
2005	OTTR	62.92%	37.08%	-23.97%
2006	OTTR	68.05%	31.95%	-19.27%
2007	OTTR	65.73%	34.27%	6.33%
2008	OTTR	109.17%	-9.17%	20.18%

Date	Ticker	Payout Ratio	Retention Ratio	5-year Fwd EPS
				Growth
2009	OTTR	167.61%	-67.61%	29.78%
2010	OTTR	313.16%	-213.16%	39.20%
2011	OTTR	264.44%	-164.44%	36.03%
2012	OTTR	113.33%	-13.33%	12.61%
2013	OTTR	86.86%	13.14%	8.67%
2014	OTTR	78.06%	21.94%	7.11%
2015	OTTR	78.85%	21.15%	8.55%
1996	PNW	41.70%	58.30%	8.36%
1997	PNW	40.94%	59.06%	-0.24%
1998	PNW	43.16%	56.84%	-0.97%
1999	PNW	41.82%	58.18%	-2.81%
2000	PNW	42.69%	57.31%	-6.52%
2001	PNW	41.58%	58.42%	-0.18%
2002	PNW	64.43%	35.57%	4.74%
2003	PNW	68.65%	31.35%	-0.86%
2004	PNW	70.93%	29.07%	-0.01%
2005	PNW	86.16%	13.84%	9.88%
2006	PNW	64.04%	35.96%	0.99%
2007	PNW	70.95%	29.05%	5.73%
2008	PNW	99.06%	0.94%	12.32%
2009	PNW	92.92%	7.08%	10.56%
2010	PNW	68.18%	31.82%	5.20%
2011	PNW	70.23%	29.77%	5.94%
2012	PNW	76.29%	23.71%	4.96%
2013	PNW	60.93%	39.07%	4.54%
2014	PNW	65.08%	34.92%	5.99%
2015	PNW	62.24%	37.76%	5.48%
2006	POR	59.65%	40.35%	20.49%
2007	POR	39.91%	60.09%	-1.20%
2008	POR	69.78%	30.22%	5.80%
2009	POR	77.10%	22.90%	11.58%
2010	POR	62.65%	37.35%	4.95%
2011	POR	54.36%	45.64%	2.63%
2012	POR	57.75%	42.25%	4.66%
2013	POR	62.15%	37.85%	6.43%
2014	POR	51.38%	48.62%	1.96%
2015	POR	57.84%	42.16%	-3.78%
1996	XEL	71.73%	28.27%	6.01%
1997	XEL	86.96%	13.04%	-7.15%
1998	XEL	77.72%	22.28%	28.57%
1999	XEL	101.40%	-1.40%	33.67%
2000	XEL	92.50%	7.50%	30.19%
2001	XEL	66.08%	33.92%	24.32%
2002	XEL	269.05%	-169.05%	40.62%
2003	XEL	60.98%	39.02%	3.68%
2004	XEL	63.78%	36.22%	3.44%
2005	XEL	70.83%	29.17%	5.48%
2006	XEL	65.19%	34.81%	5.03%
2007	XEL	67.41%	32.59%	6.54%
2008	XEL	64.38%	35.62%	5.56%
2009	XEL	65.10%	34.90%	6.41%
2010	XEL	64.10%	35.90%	6.16%
2011	XEL	59.88%	40.12%	5.15%
2012	XEL	57.84%	42.16%	4.46%
2013	XEL	58.12%	41.88%	5.29%
2014	XEL	59.11%	40.89%	5.41%
2015	XEL	60.95%	39.05%	5.93%

Retention Ratio Regression Analysis

Company	Tracker	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	
ALLETE Inc	ALE	Earnings Per Share	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.35	2.48	2.77	3.08	2.82	1.89	2.19	2.95	2.58	2.63	2.90	3.38	3.14	3.13	3.38	3.33	3.35	
		Dividends Per Share	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.30	1.25	1.45	1.64	1.72	1.76	1.78	1.84	1.90	1.96	2.02	2.08	2.14	2.24	2.35	2.47		
		Payout Ratio	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	22.22%	50.40%	52.35%	53.25%	60.99%	93.12%	80.37%	67.17%	71.32%	72.24%	67.59%	59.76%	66.24%	68.37%	66.27%	70.57%	73.73%
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	11.69%	11.19%	8.44%	32.98%	15.87%	21.00%	2.64%	1.94%	10.27%	16.55%	-0.32%	1.84%	0.60%	N/A	N/A	
		Sr. Avg Fwd EPS Growth	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	13.03%	-0.53%	1.33%	-1.44%	0.64%	9.29%	9.42%	1.80%	4.27%	5.48%	3.13%	-0.06%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT	Earnings Per Share	1.14	0.95	0.63	1.10	1.24	1.21	0.59	0.79	0.93	1.11	1.03	1.35	1.27	0.95	1.38	1.38	1.53	1.65	1.74	1.69	1.65	1.99	2.19	2.33	
		Dividends Per Share	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.51	0.53	0.58	0.64	0.70	0.75	0.79	0.85	0.90	0.94	1.02	1.10	1.18	1.26	1.34	1.42	
		Payout Ratio	86.78%	105.26%	158.73%	91.32%	80.97%	82.64%	169.49%	63.69%	55.14%	47.51%	55.83%	47.21%	55.12%	78.95%	57.45%	61.82%	59.02%	56.97%	58.62%	65.09%	71.52%	63.32%	61.19%	60.94%	61.54%
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	-16.30%	33.68%	73.81%	12.79%	2.02%	51.24%	33.05%	17.83%	19.46%	-8.79%	30.58%	5.58%	25.20%	44.74%	0.00%	10.51%	8.20%	5.45%	-2.97%	-2.37%	20.61%	10.05%	6.39%	6.01%
		Sr. Avg Fwd EPS Growth	6.92%	-0.07%	13.28%	2.08%	3.42%	2.46%	18.83%	11.10%	2.50%	7.55%	8.91%	4.97%	7.73%	13.86%	4.34%	3.86%	5.80%	6.17%	6.35%	8.14%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Ameren Corporation	AEE	Earnings Per Share	2.86	2.44	2.82	2.81	3.33	3.41	2.66	3.14	2.82	3.13	2.66	2.98	2.88	2.78	2.77	2.47	2.41	2.10	2.40	2.38	2.68	2.77	3.32	3.35	3.50
		Dividends Per Share	2.51	2.54	2.54	2.54	2.54	2.54	2.54	2.54	2.54	2.54	2.54	2.54	2.54	1.54	1.54	1.56	1.60	1.60	1.61	1.66	1.72	1.78	1.85	1.92	2.00
		Payout Ratio	87.76%	104.10%	90.07%	90.39%	76.28%	74.45%	95.49%	80.88%	90.07%	81.15%	86.40%	85.23%	88.19%	55.40%	55.50%	63.16%	66.39%	76.19%	87.08%	69.75%	64.18%	64.26%	55.72%	57.31%	57.14%
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	-14.69%	15.57%	-0.35%	18.51%	2.40%	-21.99%	18.05%	-10.19%	10.99%	-15.02%	12.03%	-3.36%	-3.47%	-0.36%	-10.83%	2.43%	-12.96%	14.29%	-0.83%	12.61%	3.36%	19.88%	0.90%	N/A
		Sr. Avg Fwd EPS Growth	-4.29%	2.83%	3.32%	1.35%	-0.15%	-3.63%	3.17%	-1.11%	0.24%	-2.03%	-1.20%	-4.09%	-5.99%	-2.44%	-2.53%	2.15%	3.31%	5.85%	7.18%	8.24%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK	Earnings Per Share	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.76	3.6	3.03	3.39	4.02	4.14	3.71	3.98	4.13	4.1	3.71	4.22	4.13
		Dividends Per Share	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.00	2.58	2.7	2.82	2.91	2.97	3.03	3.09	3.15	3.24	3.36	3.49	3.64
		Payout Ratio	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.00%	71.67%	89.11%	83.15%	72.39%	71.74%	81.67%	77.64%	76.27%	79.02%	90.51%	82.70%	73.96%
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	30.43%	-15.83%	11.88%	16.58%	2.99%	-10.39%	7.28%	3.77%	-0.73%	-9.51%	13.75%	-2.13%	22.76%
		Sr. Avg Fwd EPS Growth	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	9.61%	1.45%	6.07%	4.45%	0.58%	-1.92%	2.91%	1.03%	3.83%	0.95%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Edison International	EIX	Earnings Per Share	1.64	1.75	1.86	2.03	N/A	1.30	1.82	2.38	0.69	3.34	3.28	3.32	3.68	3.24	3.35	3.23	4.55	3.78	4.33	4.15	3.94	4.51	-1.26	3.98	
		Dividends Per Share	1.00	1.00	1.04	1.08	0.83	N/A	N/A	0.80	1.02	1.10	1.18	1.23	1.25	1.27	1.29	1.31	1.37	1.48	1.73	1.98	2.23	2.43	2.48	2.58	
		Payout Ratio	60.98%	57.14%	55.91%	53.20%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	115.94%	30.54%	33.54%	35.54%	33.42%	38.58%	37.91%	39.94%	28.79%	36.24%	34.18%	41.69%	50.35%	49.45%	N/A	62.31%	
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	6.71%	6.29%	1.04%	N/A	N/A	40.00%	30.77%	-71.01%	10.84%	-1.80%	1.22%	10.84%	-11.96%	3.40%	-3.58%	40.87%	-16.90%	14.55%	-4.16%	-5.00%	14.47%	-127.94%	415.87%	
		Sr. Avg Fwd EPS Growth	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	9.61%	1.45%	6.07%	4.45%	0.58%	-1.92%	2.91%	1.03%	3.83%	0.95%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
Entergy Corporation	ETR	Earnings Per Share	N/A	2.25	2.22	2.25	2.97	3.08	3.68	3.69	3.93	4.40	5.38	5.60	6.20	6.30	6.66	7.55	6.02	4.96	5.77	5.81	6.88	5.19	5.88	6.30	
		Dividends Per Share	N/A	1.50	1.80	1.58	1.28	1.34	1.58	1.86	1.86	2.16	2.16	2.58	3.00	3.00	3.24	3.32	3.32	3.32	3.32	3.42	3.50	3.58	3.66	3.74	
		Payout Ratio	N/A	80.00%	67.57%	53.33%	41.08%	41.56%	36.41%	43.36%	48.09%	49.09%	40.30%	48.07%	47.82%	47.82%	48.65%	43.97%	55.15%	66.94%	57.54%	57.49%	49.71%	67.44%	60.86%	58.10%	
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	N/A	-1.33%	1.35%	32.00%	3.70%	19.48%	0.27%	6.50%	11.96%	21.82%	4.48%	10.71%	1.61%	5.71%	13.36%	-20.26%	-17.61%	16.33%	0.69%	18.42%	-24.96%	13.29%	7.14%	
		Sr. Avg Fwd EPS Growth	N/A	11.04%	11.36%	12.39%	8.38%	12.01%	9.01%	11.09%	10.12%	8.87%	7.18%	2.23%	-3.44%	-0.49%	-1.50%	-0.49%	-1.35%	4.83%	3.00%	4.76%	N/A	N/A	N/A		
IDACORP Inc	IDA	Earnings Per Share	2.21	2.32	2.37	2.43	3.50	3.35	1.63	0.96	1.90	1.75	2.35	1.86	2.18	2.64	2.95	3.36	3.37	3.64	3.85	3.87	3.94	4.21	4.49		
		Dividends Per Share	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	1.86	
		Payout Ratio	84.16%	80.17%	78.48%	76.54%	53.14%	55.52%	114.11%	177.08%	83.16%	68.57%	51.06%	64.52%	55.06%	45.45%	40.68%	35.71%	40.65%	43.13%	45.71%	49.61%	52.79%	53.21%	53.45%	55.53%	
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	4.98%	2.16%	2.53%	44.03%	4.29%	51.34%	41.10%	97.82%	-7.89%	34.29%	-20.85%	17.20%	21.10%	11.74%	13.90%	0.30%	8.01%	5.77%	0.52%	1.81%	6.85%	6.65%	6.07%	
		Sr. Avg Fwd EPS Growth	9.88%	-1.38%	-10.03%	8.04%	-1.34%	6.37%	12.47%	24.13%	8.77%	12.70%	8.52%	12.85%	11.01%	7.94%	5.70%	3.28%	4.59%	4.32%	3.70%	3.77%	N/A	N/A	N/A		
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	Earnings Per Share	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	71.14%	1.44	1.77	2.02	2.14	2.25	2.26	2.42	2.59	2.69	2.80	2.90	3.34	3.40	3.53		
		Dividends Per Share	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.00	1.24	1.38	1.54	1.62	1.70	1.82	1.90	1.98	2.08	2.18	2.30	2.40	2.50		
		Payout Ratio	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	58.48%	94.66%	88.89%	74.58%	66.34%	63.56%	56.92%	65.49%	61.79%	53.51%	66.21%	59.00%	62.87%	64.71%		
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	111.94%	23.39%	9.92%	22.92%	14.12%	5.94%	18.22%	-10.67%	8.85%	21.54%	-30.01%	16.90%	1.47%	1.80%		
		Sr. Avg Fwd EPS Growth	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	17.87%	5.80%	14.23%	10.11%	7.29%	8.78%	5.95%	6.72%	8.56%	7.15%	3.61%	2.06%	N/A	N/A		
OGE Energy Corp	OGE	Earnings Per Share	0.81	0.81	1.02	0.95	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67		
		Dividends Per Share	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67		
		Payout Ratio	82.72%	82.72%	65.69%	69.07%	70.53%	103.08%	93.06%	77.01%	75.28%	72.33%	54.47%	51.52%	56.00%	53.38%	48.67%	43.93%	44.69%	43.81%	47.98%	62.13%	66.64%	66.15%	66.04%		
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	0.00%	25.93%	-4.80%	-2.06%	-31.08%	10.77%	20.83%	2.20%	3.37%	33.70%	7.32%	-5.30%	6.40%	12.78%	15.33%	34.47%	8.38%	2.08%	-14.65%	0.00%	13.61%	10.42%		
		Sr. Avg Fwd EPS Growth	-2.52%	-0.32%	-1.38%	9.02%	11.98%	9.02%	13.57%	8.28%	10.98%	14.07%	7.31%	6.54%	8.27%	8.41%	2.58%	-0.15%	1.88%	2.26%	3.01%	4.51%	N/A	N/A	N/A		
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR	Earnings Per Share	1.24	1.29	1.29	1.45	1.60	1.68	1.08	1.08	1.51	1.50	1.78	1.68	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08		
		Dividends Per Share	0.90	0.93	0.96	0.99	1.02	1.04	1.06	1.08	1.10	1.12	1.15	1.17	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19		
		Payout Ratio	72.58%	72.09%	74.42%	68.28%	63.75%	61.90%	59.22%	71.52%	73.33%	62.92%	68.05%	65.73%	109.17%	167.61%	313.16%	264.44%	113.33%	86.86%	78.06%	78.85%	78.13%	68.82%	65.06%		
		Annual Earnings Growth	N/A	4.03%	0.00%	12.40%	10.34%	5.00%	6.55%	-15.64%	-0.66%	18.67%	-5.06%	5.33%	-3.76%	34.86%	-46.48%	18.42%	133.33%								

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Gross Domestic Product by Industry

Industry	1947	2019	CAGR	Percent of Total GDP in the Year 2244	Percent of Total GDP in the Year 5449
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	19.9	169.2	3.02%		
Mining	5.8	320.3	5.73%		
Utilities	3.5	334.6	6.54%		
Construction	8.9	886.6	6.60%		
Manufacturing	63.4	2,359.9	5.15%		
Wholesale trade	15.6	1,278.1	6.31%		
Retail trade	23.2	1,172.9	5.60%		
Transportation and warehousing	14.1	684.5	5.54%		
Information	7.7	1,120.3	7.16%		
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing	25.8	4,491.7	7.43%		
Professional and business services	8.2	2,742.2	8.41%		
Educational services, health care, and social assistance	4.6	1,881.4	8.71%	50.06%	99.99%
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services	8.0	898.5	6.78%		
Other services, except government	7.5	456.6	5.87%		
Government	33.5	2,630.9	6.25%		
Total Gross domestic product	249.7	21,427.7	6.38%		

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Market-to-Book Ratios, Earnings / Book Ratios and
Inflation for Standard & Poor's Industrial Index and
the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index
from 1947 through 2019

Year	Market-to-Book Ratio (1)		Earnings / Book Common Equity Ratio (2)		Inflation (4)	Earnings / Book Common Equity Ratio - Net of Inflation	
	S&P Industrial Index (3)	S&P 500 Composite Index (3)	S&P Industrial Index (3)	S&P 500 Composite Index (3)			
1947	1.23	NA	13.0 %	NA	9.0 %	4.0 %	NA
1948	1.13	NA	17.3	NA	2.7	14.6	NA
1949	1.00	NA	16.3	NA	(1.8)	18.1	NA
1950	1.16	NA	18.3	NA	5.8	12.5	NA
1951	1.27	NA	14.4	NA	5.9	8.5	NA
1952	1.29	NA	12.7	NA	0.9	11.8	NA
1953	1.21	NA	12.7	NA	0.6	12.1	NA
1954	1.45	NA	13.5	NA	(0.5)	14.0	NA
1955	1.81	NA	16.0	NA	0.4	15.6	NA
1956	1.92	NA	13.7	NA	2.9	10.8	NA
1957	1.71	NA	12.5	NA	3.0	9.5	NA
1958	1.70	NA	9.8	NA	1.8	8.0	NA
1959	1.94	NA	11.2	NA	1.5	9.7	NA
1960	1.82	NA	10.3	NA	1.5	8.8	NA
1961	2.01	NA	9.8	NA	0.7	9.1	NA
1962	1.83	NA	10.9	NA	1.2	9.7	NA
1963	1.94	NA	11.4	NA	1.7	9.8	NA
1964	2.18	NA	12.3	NA	1.2	11.1	NA
1965	2.21	NA	13.2	NA	1.9	11.3	NA
1966	2.00	NA	13.2	NA	3.4	9.9	NA
1967	2.05	NA	12.1	NA	3.0	9.1	NA
1968	2.17	NA	12.6	NA	4.7	7.9	NA
1969	2.10	NA	12.1	NA	6.1	6.0	NA
1970	1.71	NA	10.4	NA	5.5	4.9	NA
1971	1.99	NA	11.2	NA	3.4	7.8	NA
1972	2.16	NA	12.0	NA	3.4	8.6	NA
1973	1.96	NA	14.6	NA	8.8	5.8	NA
1974	1.39	NA	14.8	NA	12.2	2.6	NA
1975	1.34	NA	12.3	NA	7.0	5.3	NA
1976	1.51	NA	14.5	NA	4.8	9.7	NA
1977	1.38	NA	14.6	NA	6.8	7.8	NA
1978	1.25	NA	15.3	NA	9.0	6.3	NA
1979	1.23	NA	17.2	NA	13.3	3.9	NA
1980	1.31	NA	15.6	NA	12.4	3.2	NA
1981	1.24	NA	14.9	NA	8.9	6.0	NA
1982	1.17	NA	11.3	NA	3.9	7.4	NA
1983	1.45	NA	12.2	NA	3.8	8.4	NA
1984	1.46	NA	14.6	NA	4.0	10.7	NA
1985	1.67	NA	12.2	NA	3.8	8.4	NA
1986	2.02	NA	11.5	NA	1.1	10.4	NA
1987	2.50	NA	15.7	NA	4.4	11.3	NA
1988	2.13	NA	19.0	NA	4.4	14.6	NA
1989	2.56	NA	18.5	NA	4.7	13.9	NA
1990	2.63	NA	16.3	NA	6.1	10.2	NA
1991	2.77	NA	10.8	NA	3.1	7.8	NA
1992	3.29	NA	13.0	NA	2.9	10.1	NA
1993	3.72	NA	15.7	NA	2.8	13.0	NA
1994	3.73	NA	23.0	NA	2.7	20.3	NA
1995	4.06	2.64	22.9	16.0	2.5	20.4	13.5
1996	4.79	3.00	24.8	16.8	3.3	21.5	13.5
1997	5.88	3.53	24.6	16.3	1.7	22.9	14.6
1998	7.13	4.16	21.3	14.5	1.6	19.7	12.9
1999	8.27	4.76	25.2	17.1	2.7	22.5	14.4
2000	7.51	4.51	23.9	16.2	3.4	20.5	12.8
2001	NA	3.50	NA	7.4	1.6	NA	5.9
2002	NA	2.93	NA	8.3	2.4	NA	5.9
2003	NA	2.78	NA	14.1	1.9	NA	12.2
2004	NA	2.91	NA	15.3	3.3	NA	12.0
2005	NA	2.78	NA	16.4	3.4	NA	13.0
2006	NA	2.77	NA	17.0	2.5	NA	14.5
2007	NA	2.84	NA	12.8	4.1	NA	8.7
2008	NA	2.24	NA	3.0	0.1	NA	2.9
2009	NA	1.87	NA	10.6	2.7	NA	7.9
2010	NA	2.09	NA	14.2	1.5	NA	12.7
2011	NA	2.07	NA	14.6	3.0	NA	11.6
2012	NA	2.14	NA	13.5	1.7	NA	11.8
2013	NA	2.39	NA	14.5	1.5	NA	13.0
2014	NA	2.66	NA	14.2	0.8	NA	13.4
2015	NA	2.73	NA	11.8	0.7	NA	11.1
2016	NA	2.72	NA	12.5	2.1	NA	10.5
2017	NA	3.10	NA	13.8	2.1	NA	11.7
2018	NA	3.15	NA	15.8	1.9	NA	13.9
2019	NA	3.22	NA	15.8	2.3	NA	13.5


Notes

- (1) Market-to-Book Ratio equals average of the high and low market price for the year divided by the average book value
(2) Earnings/Book equals earnings per share for the year divided by the average book value
(3) On January 2, 2001 Standard & Poor's released Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) price indexes for all Standard & Poor's U.S. indexes. As a result, all S&P Indexes have been calculated with a common base of 100 at a start date of December 31, 1994. Also, the GICS industrial sector is not comparable to the former S&P Industrial Index and data for the former S&P Industrial Index was discontinued
(4) As measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI)

Sources of Information

Standard & Poor's Security Price Index Record, 2000 Edition, p. 40
Standard & Poor's Statistical Service, Current Statistics, March 2013, p. 30
Duff and Phelps SBBI 2020 Yearbook Appendix A Tables, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation | 1926-2019
sp 500 eps est.xlsx https://ycharts.com/indicators/sp_500_eps,
https://ycharts.com/indicators/sp_500_book_value_per_share
finance.yahoo.com


Southwestern Electric Power Company
Mr. Gorman's Corrected Risk Premium Model - Treasury Bond



		Prospective 30- Year Treasury Yield	Risk Premium	Return on Equity
Constant	Slope	2.48%	6.96%	9.44%
8.10%	-45.93%			

Sources: MPG-12; Bloomberg Professional; Blue Chip Financial Forecasts,
March 1, 2021 and December 1, 2020

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Mr. Gorman's Corrected Risk Premium Model - Baa Utility Bond



Constant	Slope	Prospective Baa Utility Yield	Risk Premium	Return on Equity
7.43%	-46.92%	4.04%	5.53%	9.57%

Sources: MPG-12; Bloomberg Professional; Blue Chip Financial Forecasts,
March 1, 2021 and December 1, 2020

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Mr Gorman's Financial Integrity Analysis (Schedule MPG-18)

Line	Description	Retail Cost of Service Amount	S&P Benchmark (Medial Volatility)			Reference
		(1)	Intermediate (2)	Significant (3)	Aggressive (4)	
1	Rate Base (Retail)	\$ 2,025,542,720				Schedule A-1
2	Weighted Common Return	4.52%				Sch MPG-18, Page 2, Line 2, Col 4
3	Pre-Tax Rate of Return	8.00%				Sch MPG-18, Page 2, Line 3, Col 5.
4	Income to Common	\$ 91,505,242				Line 1 x Line 2
5	EBIT	\$ 162,086,043				Line 1 x Line 3
6	Depreciation & Amortization	\$ 105,928,834				Schedule A-1
7	Imputed Amortization	\$ 2,424,541				S&P Capital IQ, downloaded on March 16, 2021
8	Capitalized Interest	\$ (294,472)				Response to 4th RFI, TIEC 4-10.
9	Deferred Income Taxes & ITC	\$ (128,564)				Schedule A, Workpaper A
10	Funds from Operations (FFO)	\$ 199,435,581				Sum of Line 4 and Lines 6 through 9.
11	Imputed Interest Expense	\$ 5,956,837				S&P Capital IQ, downloaded on March 16, 2021
12	EBITDA	\$ 276,396,255				Sum of Lines 5 through 7 and Line 11
13	Adjusted Debt	\$ 1,047,065,141				Page 3, Line 3, Col. 1 x RB TX Allocator
14	Total Adjusted Debt Ratio	53.12%				Sch MPG-18, Page 3, Line 4, Col 2
15	Debt to EBITDA	3.79x	2.5x - 3.5x	3.5x - 4.5x	4.5x - 5.5x	Line 13 / Line 12
16	FFO to Total Debt	19.05%	23% - 35%	13% - 23%	9% - 13%	Line 10 / Line 13
17	Indicative Credit Rating		A	A-	BBB	S&P Methodology, November 19, 2013

S&P's Credit Metrics - ROE to Meet Upper Bound Debt/EBITDA Significant Test (5.80% ROE)

Line	Description	Retail Cost of Service Amount (1)	S&P Benchmark (Medial Volatility)			Reference (5)
			Intermediate (2)	Significant (3)	Aggressive (4)	
1	Rate Base (Retail)	\$ 2,025,542,720				Schedule A-1
2	Weighted Common Return	2.86%				Overall ROR with 5 80% ROE and Proposed Capital Structure
3	Pre-Tax Rate of Return	5.84%				Line 3 x Tax Conversion Factor of 1 30337
4	Income to Common	\$ 57,953,320				Line 1 x Line 2
5	EBIT	\$ 118,355,462				Line 1 x Line 3
6	Depreciation & Amortization	\$ 105,928,834				Schedule A-1
7	Imputed Amortization	\$ 2,424,541				S&P Capital IQ, downloaded on March 16, 2021
8	Capitalized Interest	\$ (294,472)				Response to 4th RFI, TIEC 4-10
9	Deferred Income Taxes & ITC	\$ (128,564)				Schedule A, Workpaper A
10	Funds from Operations (FFO)	\$ 165,883,659				Sum of Line 4 and Lines 6 through 9
11	Imputed Interest Expense	\$ 5,956,837				S&P Capital IQ, downloaded on March 16, 2021
12	EBITDA	\$ 232,665,674				Sum of Lines 5 through 7 and Line 11.
13	Adjusted Debt	\$ 1,047,065,141				Page 3, Line 3, Col 1 x RB TX Allocator
14	Total Adjusted Debt Ratio	53 1%				Sch MPG-18, Page 3, Line 4, Col 2
15	Debt to EBITDA	4 50x	2 5x - 3 5x	3 5x - 4 5x	4 5x - 5 5x	Line 13 / Line 12
16	FFO to Total Debt	15 84%	23% - 35%	13% - 23%	9% - 13%	Line 10 / Line 13
17	Indicative Credit Rating		A	A-	BBB	S&P Methodology, November 19, 2013

S&P's Credit Metrics - ROE to Meet Lower Bound Debt/EBITDA Significant Test (10.89% ROE)


Line	Description	Retail Cost of Service Amount (1)	S&P Benchmark (Medial Volatility)			Reference (5)
			Intermediate (2)	Significant (3)	Aggressive (4)	
1	Rate Base (Retail)	\$ 2,025,542,720				Schedule A-1
2	Weighted Common Return	5.38%				Overall ROR with 10.89% ROE and Proposed Capital Structure
3	Pre-Tax Rate of Return	9.12%				Line 3 x Tax Conversion Factor of 1.30337
4	Income to Common	\$ 108,906,239				Line 1 x Line 2
5	EBIT	\$ 184,765,987				Line 1 x Line 3
6	Depreciation & Amortization	\$ 105,928,834				Schedule A-1
7	Imputed Amortization	\$ 2,424,541				S&P Capital IQ, downloaded on March 16, 2021
8	Capitalized Interest	\$ (294,472)				Response to 4th RFI, TIEC 4-10
9	Deferred Income Taxes & ITC	\$ (128,564)				Schedule A, Workpaper A
10	Funds from Operations (FFO)	\$ 216,836,577				Sum of Line 4 and Lines 6 through 9
11	Imputed Interest Expense	\$ 5,956,837				S&P Capital IQ, downloaded on March 16, 2021
12	EBITDA	\$ 299,076,199				Sum of Lines 5 through 7 and Line 11
13	Adjusted Debt	\$ 1,047,065,141				Page 3, Line 3, Col 1 x RB TX Allocator.
14	Total Adjusted Debt Ratio	53.1%				Sch MPG-18, Page 3, Line 4, Col 2
15	Debt to EBITDA	3.50x	2.5x - 3.5x	3.5x - 4.5x	4.5x - 5.5x	Line 13 / Line 12
16	FFO to Total Debt	20.71%	23% - 35%	13% - 23%	9% - 13%	Line 10 / Line 13
17	Indicative Credit Rating		A	A-	BBB	S&P Methodology, November 19, 2013

S&P's Credit Metrics - at Company's Proposed 10 35% ROE


Line	Description	Retail Cost of Service Amount (1)	S&P Benchmark (Medial Volatility)			Reference (5)
			Intermediate (2)	Significant (3)	Aggressive (4)	
1	Rate Base (Retail)	\$ 2,025,542,720				Schedule A-1
2	Weighted Common Return	5 11%				Overall ROR with 10 35% ROE and Proposed Capital Structure
3	Pre-Tax Rate of Return	8 77%				Line 3 x Tax Conversion Factor of 1.30337
4	Income to Common	\$ 103,505,929				Line 1 x Line 2
5	EBIT	\$ 177,727,383				Line 1 x Line 3
6	Depreciation & Amortization	\$ 105,928,834				Schedule A-1
7	Imputed Amortization	\$ 2,424,541				S&P Capital IQ, downloaded on March 16, 2021
8	Capitalized Interest	\$ (294,472)				Response to 4th RFI, TIEC 4-10.
9	Deferred Income Taxes & ITC	\$ (128,564)				Schedule A, Workpaper A
10	Funds from Operations (FFO)	\$ 211,436,268				Sum of Line 4 and Lines 6 through 9
11	Imputed Interest Expense	\$ 5,956,837				S&P Capital IQ, downloaded on March 16, 2021
12	EBITDA	\$ 292,037,596				Sum of Lines 5 through 7 and Line 11
13	Adjusted Debt	\$ 1,047,065,141				Page 3, Line 3, Col 1 x RB TX Allocator
14	Total Adjusted Debt Ratio	53.1%				Sch MPG-18, Page 3, Line 4, Col 2.
15	Debt to EBITDA	3 59x	2 5x - 3 5x	3 5x - 4 5x	4 5x - 5 5x	Line 13 / Line 12
16	FFO to Total Debt	20 19%	23% - 35%	13% - 23%	9% - 13%	Line 10 / Line 13
17	Indicative Credit Rating		A	A-	BBB	S&P Methodology, November 19, 2013

Source: Schedule MPG-18

Predicted and Actual Equity Risk Premiums 1936 - 2019



Southwestern Electric Power Company
Frequency Distribution of Market Risk Premium, 1926 - 2019



	Large Company Stocks Total Returns	Long-Term Government Bond Income Returns
Year	Jan-Dec*	Jan-Dec*
1926	0 1162	0 0373
1927	0 3749	0 0341
1928	0 4361	0 0322
1929	-0 0842	0 0347
1930	-0 2490	0 0332
1931	-0 4334	0 0333
1932	-0 0819	0 0369
1933	0 5399	0 0312
1934	-0 0144	0 0318
1935	0 4767	0 0281
1936	0 3392	0 0277
1937	-0 3503	0 0266
1938	0 3112	0 0264
1939	-0 0041	0 0240
1940	-0 0978	0 0223
1941	-0 1159	0 0194
1942	0 2034	0 0246
1943	0 2590	0 0244
1944	0 1975	0 0246
1945	0 3644	0 0234
1946	-0 0807	0 0204
1947	0 0571	0 0213
1948	0 0550	0 0240
1949	0 1879	0 0225
1950	0 3171	0 0212
1951	0 2402	0 0238
1952	0 1837	0 0266
1953	-0 0099	0 0284
1954	0 5262	0 0279
1955	0 3156	0 0275
1956	0 0656	0 0299
1957	-0 1078	0 0344
1958	0 4336	0 0327
1959	0 1196	0 0401
1960	0 0047	0 0426
1961	0 2689	0 0383
1962	-0 0873	0 0400
1963	0 2280	0 0389
1964	0 1648	0 0415
1965	0 1245	0 0419
1966	-0 1006	0 0449
1967	0 2398	0 0459
1968	0 1106	0 0550
1969	-0 0850	0 0595
1970	0 0386	0 0674
1971	0 1430	0 0632
1972	0 1899	0 0587
1973	-0 1469	0 0651
1974	-0 2647	0 0727
1975	0 3723	0 0799
1976	0 2393	0 0789
1977	-0 0716	0 0714
1978	0 0657	0 0790
1979	0 1861	0 0886
1980	0 3250	0 0997
1981	-0 0492	0 1155
1982	0 2155	0 1350
1983	0 2256	0 1038

MRP
Jan-Dec*

0 0789
0 3408
0 4039
-0 1189
-0 2822
-0 4667
-0 1188
0 5087
-0 0462
0 4486
0 3115
-0 3769
0 2848
-0 0281
-0 1201
-0 1353
0 1788
0 2346
0 1729
0 3410
-0 1011
0 0358
0 0310
0 1654
0 2959
0 2164
0 1571
-0 0383
0 4983
0 2881
0 0357
-0 1422
0 4009
0 0795
-0 0379
0 2306
-0 1273
0 1891
0 1233
0 0826
-0 1455
0 1939
0 0556
-0 1445
-0 0288
0 0798
0 1312
-0 2120
-0 3374
0 2924
0 1604
-0 1430
-0 0133
0 0975
0 2253
-0 1647
0 0805
0 1218

MRP		
Bin	Frequency	Cumulative %
-50 00%	0	0 0%
-47 50%	0	0 0%
-45 00%	1	1 1%
-42 50%	0	1 1%
-40 00%	1	2 1%
-37 50%	1	3 2%
-35 00%	0	3 2%
-32 50%	1	4 3%
-30 00%	0	4 3%
-27 50%	2	6 4%
-25 00%	0	6 4%
-22 50%	0	6 4%
-20 00%	1	7 4%
-17 50%	0	7 4%
-15 00%	3	10 6%
-12 50%	6	17 0%
-10 00%	5	22 3%
-7 50%	0	22 3%
-5 00%	3	25 5%
-2 50%	6	31 9%
0 00%	3	35 1%
2 50%	3	38 3%
5 00%	4	42 6%
7 50%	2	44 7%
10 00%	9	54 3%
12 50%	5	59 6%
15 00%	2	61 7%
17 50%	6	68 1%
20 00%	4	72 3%
22 50%	3	75 5%
25 00%	7	83 0%
27 50%	1	84 0%
30 00%	7	91 5%
32 50%	1	92 6%
35 00%	2	94 7%
37 50%	0	94 7%
40 00%	0	94 7%
42 50%	2	96 8%
45 00%	1	97 9%
47 50%	0	97 9%
50 00%	1	98 9%
51 00%	1	100 0%

Count 94

MRP from Direct		Rank
10 92%		56 10%
MRP from Rebuttal		Rank
9 59%		51 50%

Historical Market Return - Direct		
	% Rank	Occurrence
13 01%	48 80%	48
Historical Market Return - Rebuttal		
	% Rank	Occurrence
12 32%	48 10%	49

Year	Large Company Stocks Total Returns	Long-Term Government Bond Income Returns	MRP
	Jan-Dec*	Jan-Dec*	Jan-Dec*
1984	0 0627	0 1174	-0 0547
1985	0 3173	0 1125	0 2048
1986	0 1867	0 0898	0 0969
1987	0 0525	0 0792	-0 0267
1988	0 1661	0 0897	0 0764
1989	0 3169	0 0881	0 2288
1990	-0 0310	0 0819	-0 1129
1991	0 3047	0 0822	0 2225
1992	0 0762	0 0726	0 0036
1993	0 1008	0 0717	0 0291
1994	0 0132	0 0659	-0 0527
1995	0 3758	0 0760	0 2998
1996	0 2296	0 0618	0 1678
1997	0 3336	0 0664	0 2672
1998	0 2858	0 0583	0 2275
1999	0 2104	0 0557	0 1547
2000	-0 0910	0 0650	-0 1560
2001	-0 1189	0 0553	-0 1742
2002	-0 2210	0 0559	-0 2769
2003	0 2868	0 0480	0 2388
2004	0 1088	0 0502	0 0586
2005	0 0491	0 0469	0 0022
2006	0 1579	0 0468	0 1111
2007	0 0549	0 0486	0 0063
2008	-0 3700	0 0445	-0 4145
2009	0 2646	0 0347	0 2299
2010	0 1506	0 0425	0 1081
2011	0 0211	0 0382	-0 0171
2012	0 1600	0 0246	0 1354
2013	0 3239	0 0288	0 2951
2014	0 1369	0 0341	0 1028
2015	0 0138	0 0247	-0 0109
2016	0 1196	0 0230	0 0966
2017	0 2183	0 0267	0 1916
2018	-0 0438	0 0282	-0 0720
2019	0 3149	0 0255	0 2894
Average	0 1209	0 0494	0 0715
Std Dev	0 1976	0 0262	0 1987

Source Duff & Phelps, 2020 SBBi Yearbook, Appendix A-1, A-7

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Comparable Earnings: New Life for an Old Precept

by
Frank J. Hanley
Pauline M. Ahern

Comparable Earnings: New Life for an Old Precept

Accelerating deregulation has greatly increased the investment risk of natural gas utilities. As a result, the authors believe it more appropriate than ever to employ the comparable earnings model. We believe our application of the model overcomes the greatest traditional objection to it — lack of comparability of the selected non-utility proxy firms. Our illustration focuses on a target gas pipeline company with a beta of 0.96 — almost equal to the market's beta of 1.00.



Introduction

The comparable earnings model used to determine a common equity cost rate is deeply rooted in the standard of "corresponding risk" enunciated in the landmark *Bluefield* and *Hope* decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.¹ With such solid grounding in the foundations of rate of return regulation, comparable earnings should be accepted as a principal model, along with the currently popular market-based models, provided that its most common criticism, non-comparability of the proxy companies, is overcome.

Our comparable earnings model overcomes the non-comparability issue of the non-utility firms selected as a proxy for the target utility, in this example, a gas pipeline company. We should note that in the absence of common stock prices for the target utility (as with a wholly-owned subsidiary), it is appropriate to use the average of a proxy group of similar risk gas pipeline companies whose common stocks are actively traded. As we will demonstrate, our selection process results in a group of domestic, non-utility firms that is comparable in total risk, the sum of business and financial risk, which reflects both non-diversifiable systematic, or market, risk as well as diversifiable unsystematic, or firm-specific, risk.

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Embedded in the Landmark Decisions

As stated in *Bluefield* in 1922: "A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties."

In addition, the court stated in *Hope* in 1944: "By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks."

Thus, the "corresponding risk" pre-

cept of *Bluefield* and *Hope* predates the use of such market-based cost-of-equity models as the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Capital Asset Pricing (CAPM), which were developed later and are currently popular in rate-base/rate-of-return regulation. Consequently, the comparable earnings model has a longer regulatory and judicial history. However, it has far greater relevance now than ever before in its history because significant deregulation has substantially increased natural gas utilities' investment risk to a level similar to that of non-utility firms. As a result, it is

Comparable Earnings *from page 4*

more important than ever to look to similar-risk non-utility firms for insight into common equity cost rate, especially in view of the deficiencies inherent in the currently popular market-based cost of common equity models, particularly the DCF model.

Despite the fact that the landmark decisions are still regarded as having set the standards for determining a fair rate of return, the comparable earnings model has experienced decreased usage by expert witnesses, as well as less regulatory acceptance over the years. We believe the decline in the popularity of the comparable earnings model, in large measure, is attributable to the difficulty of selecting non-utility proxy firms that regulators will accept as comparable to the target utility. Regulatory acceptance is difficult to gain when the selection process is arbitrary. Our application of the model is objective and consistent with fundamental financial tenets.

Principles of Comparable Earnings

Regulation is a substitute for the competition of the marketplace. Moreover, regulated public utilities compete in the capital markets with all firms, including unregulated non-utilities. The comparable earnings model is based upon the opportunity cost principle; i.e., that the true cost of an investment is the return that could have been earned on the next best available alternative investment of similar risk. Consequently, the comparable earnings model is consistent with regulatory and financial principles, as it is a surrogate for the competition of the marketplace, and investors seek the greatest available rate of return for bearing similar risk.

The selection of comparable firms is the most difficult step in applying the comparable earnings model, as noted by Phillips² as well as by Bonbright, Danielsen and Kamerschen.³ The selection of non-utility proxy firms should result in a sufficiently broad-based group in order to minimize the effect of company-specific aberrations. How-

ever, if the selection process is arbitrary, it likely would result in a proxy group that is too broad-based, such as the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index or the Value Line Industrial Composite. The use of such groups would require subjective adjustments to the comparable earnings results to reflect risk differences between the group(s) and the target utility, a gas pipeline company in this example.

Authors' Selection Criteria

We base the selection of comparable non-utility firms on market-based, objective, quantitative measures of risk resulting from market prices that subsume investors' assessments of all elements of risk. Thus, our approach is based upon the principle of risk and return; namely, that firms of comparable risk should be expected to earn comparable returns. It is also consistent with the "corresponding risk" standard established in *Bluefield* and *Hope*. We measure total investment risk as the sum of non-diversifiable systematic and diversifiable unsystematic risk. We use the unadjusted beta as a measure of systematic risk and the standard error of the estimate (residual standard error) as a measure of unsystematic risk. Both the unadjusted beta and the residual standard error are derived from a regression of the target utility's security returns relative to the market's returns, which takes the general form:

$$r_{it} = a_i + b_i r_{mt} + e_{it}$$

where:

r_{it} = t th observation of the i th utility's rate of return

r_{mt} = t th observation of the market's rate of return

e_{it} = t th random error term

a_i = constant least-squares

regression coefficient

b_i = least-squares regression slope coefficient, the unadjusted beta

As shown by Francis,⁴ the total variation or risk of a firm's return, $\text{Var}(r_i)$, comes from two sources:

$\text{Var}(r_i)$ = total risk of i th asset

$$\begin{aligned} &= \text{var}(a_i + b_i r_{mt} + e) \\ &\quad \text{substituting } (a_i + b_i r_{mt} + e) \\ &\quad \text{for } r_i \\ &= \text{var}(b_i r_{mt}) + \text{var}(e) \text{ since} \\ &\quad \text{var}(a_i) = 0 \\ &= b_i^2 \text{var}(r_{mt}) + \text{var}(e) \\ &\quad \text{since } \text{var}(b_i r_{mt}) = b_i^2 \\ &\quad \text{var}(r_{mt}) \\ &= \text{systematic} + \\ &\quad \text{unsystematic risk} \end{aligned}$$

Francis⁵ also notes: "The term $\sigma^2(r_i|r_{mt})$ is called the *residual variance around the regression line* in statistical terms or *unsystematic risk* in capital market theory language. $\sigma^2(r_i|r_{mt}) = \dots = \text{var}(e)$. The residual variance is the squared standard error in regression language, a measure of unsystematic risk." Application of these criteria results in a group of non-utility firms whose average total investment risk is indeed comparable to that of the target gas pipeline.

As a measure of systematic risk, we use the Value Line unadjusted beta. Beta measures the extent to which market-wide or macro-economic events affect a firm's stock price. We use the unadjusted beta of the target utility as a starting point because it results from the regression of the target utility's security returns relative to the market's returns. Thus, the resulting standard deviation of beta relates to the unadjusted beta. We use the standard deviation of the unadjusted beta to determine the range around it as the selection criterion based on systematic risk.

We use the residual standard error of the regression as a measure of unsystematic risk. The residual standard error reflects the extent to which events specific to the firm's operations affect a firm's stock price. Thus, it is a measure of diversifiable, unsystematic, firm-specific risk.

An Illustration of Authors' Approach

Step One: We begin our approach by establishing the selection criteria as a range of both unadjusted beta and residual standard error of the target gas
continued on page 6

Comparable Earnings from page 5

pipeline company.

As shown in table 1, our target gas pipeline company has a Value Line unadjusted beta of 0.90, whose standard deviation is 0.1250. The selection criterion range of unadjusted beta is the unadjusted beta plus (+) and minus (-) three of its standard deviations. By using three standard deviations, 99.73 percent of the comparable unadjusted betas is captured.

Three standard deviations of the target utility's unadjusted beta equals 0.38 ($0.1250 \times 3 = 0.3750$, rounded to 0.38). Consequently, the range of unadjusted betas to be used as a selection criteria is $0.52 - 1.28$ ($0.52 = 0.90 - 0.38$) and $(1.28 = 0.90 + 0.38)$.

Likewise, the selection criterion range of residual standard error equals the residual standard error plus (+) and

minus (-) three of its standard deviations. The standard deviation of the residual standard error is defined as: $\sigma/\sqrt{2N}$.

As also shown in table 1, the target gas pipeline company has a residual standard error of 3.7867. According to the above formula, the standard deviation of the residual standard error would be 0.1664 ($0.1664 = 3.7867/\sqrt{2(259)} = 3.7867/22.7596$, where $259 = N$, the number of weekly price change observations over a period of five years). Three standard deviations of the target utility's residual standard error would be 0.4992 ($0.1664 \times 3 = 0.4992$). Consequently, the range of residual standard errors to be used as a selection criterion is $3.2875 - 4.2859$ ($3.2875 = 3.7867 - 0.4992$) and $(4.2859 = 3.7867 + 0.4992)$.

Step Two: The step one criteria are applied to Value Line's data base of nearly 4,000 firms for which Value Line derives unadjusted betas and residual standard errors on a weekly basis. All firms with unadjusted betas and residual standard errors within the criteria ranges are then selected.

Step Three: In the regulatory ratemaking environment, authorized common equity return rates are applied to a book-value rate base. Thus, the earnings rates on book common equity, or net worth, of competitive, non-utility firms are highly relevant provided those firms are indeed comparable in total risk to the target gas pipeline. The use of the return rates of other utilities has no relevance because their allowed, and hence subsequently achieved, earnings rates are dependent upon the regulatory

table 1

Summary of the Comparable Earnings Analysis for the Proxy Group of 248 Non-Utility Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Target Gas Pipeline Company¹

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	adj. beta	unadj. beta	residual standard error	3-year average ²	4-year average ²	5-year average ²	5-year projected ³	
average for the proxy group of 248 non-utility companies comparable in total risk to the target gas pipeline company	0.97	0.92	3.7705					
target gas pipeline company	0.96	0.90 ⁴	3.7867					
median				11.7%	12.0%	12.6%	15.5%	
average of the median historical returns					12.1%			
conclusion ⁵								13.8%

¹ The criteria for selection of the non-utility group was that the non-utility companies be domestic and included in Value Line Investment Survey. The non-utility group was selected based on an unadjusted beta range of 0.52 to 1.28 and a residual standard error range of 3.2875 to 4.2859.

² Ending 1992.

³ 1996-1998/1997-1999.

⁴ The average standard deviation of the target gas pipeline company's unadjusted beta is 0.1250.

⁵ Equal weight given to both the average of the 3-, 4- and 5-year historical medians (12.1%) and 5-year projected median rate of return on net worth (15.5%). Thus, $13.8\% = (12.1\% + 15.5\% / 2)$.

Source: Value Line Inc., March 15, 1994.

Value Line Investment Survey

Comparable Earnings from page 6

process. Consequently, we believe all utilities must be eliminated to avoid circularity. Moreover, we believe non-domestic firms must be eliminated because their reporting methods differ significantly from U.S. firms.

Step Four: We then eliminated those firms for which Value Line does not publish a "Ratings & Report" in *Value Line Investment Survey* so that the historical and projected returns on net worth⁶ are from a consistent source. We use historical returns on net worth for the most recent five years, as well as those projected three to five years into the future. We believe it is logical to evaluate both historical and projected return rates because it is reasonable to assume that investors avail themselves of both when they are available from widely disseminated information ser-

vices, such as Value Line Inc. The use of Value Line's return rates on net worth understates the common equity return rates for two reasons. First, preferred stock is included in net worth. Second, the net worth return rates are as of the end of each period. Thus, the use of average common equity return rates would yield higher results.

Step Five: Median returns based on the historical average three, four and five years ending 1992 and projected 1996-1998 or 1997-1999 rates of return on net worth are then determined as shown in columns 4 through 7 of table 1. The median is used due to the wide variations and skewness in rates of return on net worth for the non-utility firms as evidenced by the frequency distributions of those returns as shown in illustration 1.

However, we show the average unadjusted beta, 0.92, and residual standard error, 3.7705, for the proxy group in columns 2 and 3 of table 1 because their frequency distributions are not significantly skewed, as shown in illustration 2.

Step Six: Our conclusion of a com-
continued on page 8

Illustration 1
Rates of Return on Net Worth
for the Proxy Group of 248 Non-Utility Companies¹





Illustration 2
Unadjusted Betas
and Residual Standard Errors
for the Proxy Group of 248
Non-Utility Companies¹



Comparable Earnings *from page 7*

comparable earnings cost rate is based upon the mid-point of the average of the median three-, four- and five-year historical rates of return on net worth of 12.1 percent as shown in column 5 and the median projected 1996-1998/1997-1999 rate of return on net worth of 15.5 percent as shown in column 7 of table 1. As shown in column 8, it is 13.8 percent.

Summary

Our comparable earnings approach demonstrates that it is possible to select a proxy group of non-utility firms that is comparable in total risk to a target utility. In our example, the 13.8 percent comparable earnings cost rate is very conservative as it is an expected achieved rate on book common equity (a regulatory allowed rate should be

greater) and because it is based on end-of-period net worth. A similar rate on average net worth would be about 20 to 40 basis points higher (i.e., 14.0 to 14.2 percent) and still understate the appropriate regulatory allowed rate of return on book common equity.

Our selection criteria are based upon measures of systematic and unsystematic risk, specifically unadjusted beta and residual standard error. They provide the basis for the objective selection of comparable non-utility firms. Our selection criteria rely on changes in market prices over approximately five years. We compare the aggregate total risk, or the sum of systematic and unsystematic risk, which reflects investors' aggregate assessment of both business and financial risk. Thus, no adjustments are necessary to the proxy group results to

compensate for the differences in business risk and financial risk, such as accounting practices and debt/equity ratios. Moreover, it is inappropriate to attempt a comparison of the target utility with any individual firm, or subset of firms, in the proxy group because only the average firm of the group is relevant.

Because the comparable earnings model is firmly anchored in the "corresponding risk" precept established in the landmark court decisions, it is worthy of consideration as a principal model for use in estimating the cost rate of common equity capital of a regulated utility. Our approach to the comparable earnings model produces a proxy group that is indeed comparable in total risk because the selection process is objective and quantitative. It therefore overcomes criticism linked to arbitrary selection processes.

All cost-of-common-equity models, including the DCF and CAPM, are fraught with deficiencies, usually stemming from the many necessary but unrealistic assumptions that underlie them. The effects of the deficiencies of individual models can be mitigated by using more than one model when estimating a utility's common equity cost rate. Therefore, when the non-comparability issue is overcome, the comparable earnings model deserves to receive the same consideration as a primary model, as do the currently popular market-based models. ■

Report Lists Pipeline, Storage Projects

More than \$9 billion worth of projects to expand the nation's natural gas pipeline network are in various stages of development, according to an A.G.A. report. These projects involve nearly 8,000 miles of new pipelines and capacity additions to existing lines and represent 15.3 billion cubic feet (Bcf) per day of new pipeline capacity.

During 1993 and early 1994, construction on 3,100 miles of pipeline was completed or under way, at a cost of nearly \$4 billion, says A.G.A. These projects are adding 5.4 Bcf in daily delivery capacity nationwide.

Among the projects completed in 1993 were Pacific Gas Transmission Co.'s 805 miles of looping that allows increased deliveries of Canadian gas to the West Coast; Northwest Pipeline Corp.'s addition of 433 million cubic feet of daily capacity for customers in the Pacific Northwest and Rocky Mountain areas; and the 156-mile Empire State Pipeline in New York.

In addition, major construction projects were started on the systems of Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. and Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. — both subsidiaries of Panhandle Eastern Corp. — and along Florida Gas Transmission Co.'s pipeline.

The report goes on to discuss another \$5 billion in proposed projects, which, if completed, will add nearly 5,000 miles of pipeline and 9.8 Bcf per day in capacity, much of it serving Florida and West Coast markets.

A.G.A. also identifies 47 storage projects and says that if all of them are built, existing storage capacity will increase by more than 500 Bcf, or 15 percent.

For a copy of *New Pipeline Construction: Status Report 1993-94* (#F00103), call A.G.A. at (703) 841-8490. Price per copy is \$6 for employees of member companies and associates and \$12 for other customers.

¹Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679 (1922) and Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 519 (1944).

²Charles F. Phillips Jr., *The Regulation of Public Utilities: Theory and Practice*, Public Utilities Reports Inc. 1988, p. 379.

³James C. Bonbright, Albert L. Danielsen and David R. Kamerschen, *Principles of Public Utilities Rates*, 2nd edition, Public Utilities Reports Inc. 1988, p. 329.

⁴Jack Clark Francis, *Investments: Analysis and Management*, 3rd edition, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1980, p. 363.

⁵Id., p. 548.

⁶Returns on net worth must be used when relying on Value Line data because returns on book common equity for non-utility firms are not available from Value Line.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Calculation of Common Equity and Long-Term Debt Ratios for Operating Companies
within Dr. Woolridge's Electric Proxy Group

Company	Parent	Total Proprietary Capital (\$000) 2019	Preferred Stock Issued (\$000) 2019	Total Long-term Debt (\$000) 2019	Common Equity % 2019	Long-Term Debt % 2019
Minnesota Power Enterprises, Inc	ALLETE, Inc	2,231,645	0	1,513,405	59.59%	40.41%
Superior Water, Light and Power Company	ALLETE, Inc	54,732	0	39,500	58.08%	41.92%
Interstate Power and Light Company	Alliant Energy Corporation	3,471,773	200,000	3,241,249	50.23%	49.77%
Wisconsin Power and Light Company	Alliant Energy Corporation	2,383,598	0	2,048,849	53.78%	46.22%
Ameren Illinois Company	Ameren Corporation	4,131,138	61,632	3,608,745	53.00%	47.00%
Union Electric Company	Ameren Corporation	4,349,486	80,760	3,956,959	51.90%	48.10%
AEP Texas Inc	American Electric Power Company, Inc	2,961,138	0	3,804,767	43.77%	56.23%
Appalachian Power Company	American Electric Power Company, Inc	4,172,535	0	4,388,913	48.74%	51.26%
Indiana Michigan Power Company	American Electric Power Company, Inc	2,544,376	0	2,899,757	46.74%	53.26%
Kentucky Power Company	American Electric Power Company, Inc	782,180	0	870,000	47.34%	52.66%
Kingsport Power Company	American Electric Power Company, Inc	71,026	0	59,000	54.62%	45.38%
Ohio Power Company	American Electric Power Company, Inc	2,508,480	0	2,094,308	54.50%	45.50%
Public Service Company of Oklahoma	American Electric Power Company, Inc	1,373,407	0	1,390,401	49.69%	50.31%
Southwestern Electric Power Company	American Electric Power Company, Inc	2,440,486	0	2,560,456	48.80%	51.20%
Wheeling Power Company	American Electric Power Company, Inc	402,888	0	350,000	53.51%	46.49%
Avista Corporation		1,934,255	0	1,871,259	50.83%	49.17%
Alaska Electric Light and Power Company	Avista Corporation	110,720	0	75,000	59.62%	40.38%
Consumers Energy Company	CMS Energy Corporation	7,738,169	37,315	7,263,181	51.46%	48.54%
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc	Consolidated Edison, Inc	14,147,359	0	15,078,952	48.41%	51.59%
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc	Consolidated Edison, Inc	762,222	0	824,232	48.05%	51.95%
Rockland Electric Company	Consolidated Edison, Inc	308,412	0	0	NA	NA
Dominion Energy South Carolina, Inc	Dominion Energy, Inc	3,717,553	100	3,347,736	52.58%	47.42%
SCANA Corporation	Dominion Energy, Inc	3,886,003	100	3,611,001	51.83%	48.17%
Virginia Electric and Power Company	Dominion Energy, Inc	13,988,734	0	12,406,935	53.00%	47.00%
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	Duke Energy Corporation	12,813,247	0	11,776,476	52.11%	47.89%
Duke Energy Florida, LLC	Duke Energy Corporation	6,789,687	0	6,814,476	49.91%	50.09%
Duke Energy Indiana, LLC	Duke Energy Corporation	4,558,286	0	4,067,521	52.84%	47.16%
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc	Duke Energy Corporation	645,094	0	661,521	49.37%	50.63%
Duke Energy Ohio, Inc	Duke Energy Corporation	3,693,838	0	1,970,170	65.22%	34.78%
Duke Energy Progress, LLC	Duke Energy Corporation	9,245,384	0	8,781,885	51.29%	48.71%
Southern California Edison Company	Edison International	17,827,270	2,245,055	15,316,326	50.43%	49.57%
Entergy Arkansas, LLC	Entergy Corporation	3,175,938	0	3,399,790	47.90%	52.10%
Entergy Louisiana, LLC	Entergy Corporation	6,396,720	0	7,078,967	47.47%	52.53%
Entergy Mississippi, LLC	Entergy Corporation	1,542,151	0	1,631,127	48.60%	51.40%
Entergy New Orleans, LLC	Entergy Corporation	497,579	0	512,441	49.26%	50.74%
Entergy Texas, Inc	Entergy Corporation	1,799,407	35,000	1,734,259	50.43%	49.57%
Entergy Kansas South, Inc	Entergy, Inc	3,048,823	0	670,923	81.96%	18.04%
Entergy Metro, Inc	Entergy, Inc	2,574,219	0	2,542,812	50.31%	49.69%
Entergy Missouri West, Inc	Entergy, Inc	1,088,654	0	1,073,989	50.34%	49.66%
Great Plains Energy Incorporated	Entergy, Inc	3,662,873	0	3,616,801	50.32%	49.68%
Westar Energy (KPL)	Entergy, Inc	4,197,866	0	3,043,720	57.97%	42.03%
NSTAR Electric Company	Eversource Energy	4,202,883	43,000	3,360,946	55.31%	44.69%
Public Service Company of New Hampshire	Eversource Energy	1,391,733	0	1,521,662	47.77%	52.23%
The Connecticut Light and Power Company	Eversource Energy	4,504,025	116,200	3,543,166	55.33%	44.67%
Hawaiian Electric Light Company, Inc	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc	2,081,645	34,293	1,497,667	57.75%	42.25%
Maui Electric Company, Limited	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Idaho Power Company	IDACORP, Inc	2,275,558	0	1,851,044	55.14%	44.86%
Madison Gas and Electric Company	MGE Energy, Inc	777,672	0	547,724	58.67%	41.33%
Florida Power & Light Company	NextEra Energy, Inc	21,405,094	0	14,130,807	60.24%	39.76%
Gulf Power Company	NextEra Energy, Inc	1,715,532	0	1,694,975	50.30%	49.70%
NorthWestern Corporation		2,039,093	0	2,245,637	47.59%	52.41%
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company	OGE Energy Corp	3,958,233	0	3,219,404	55.15%	44.85%
Otter Tail Power Company	Otter Tail Corporation	640,166	0	612,000	51.12%	48.88%
Arizona Public Service Company	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	5,876,763	0	5,254,071	52.80%	47.20%
Portland General Electric Company		2,591,260	0	2,607,358	49.85%	50.15%
Kentucky Utilities Company	PPL Corporation	2,967,162	0	2,639,741	52.92%	47.08%
Louisville Gas and Electric Company	PPL Corporation	7,373,814	0	2,019,898	54.03%	45.97%
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation	PPL Corporation	4,832,811	0	4,015,201	54.62%	45.38%
Alabama Power Company	The Southern Company	9,245,667	297,512	8,567,817	51.09%	48.91%
Georgia Power Company	The Southern Company	15,065,452	0	11,777,273	56.12%	43.88%
Mississippi Power Company	The Southern Company	1,651,630	0	1,596,856	50.84%	49.16%
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC	Sempra Energy	10,137,397	0	7,152,453	58.63%	41.37%
San Diego Gas & Electric Company	Sempra Energy	7,099,081	0	5,128,386	58.06%	41.94%
Upper Michigan Energy Resources Corporation	WEC Energy Group, Inc	199,165	0	160,000	55.45%	44.55%
Wisconsin Electric Power Company	WEC Energy Group, Inc	3,591,497	30,450	2,767,219	56.27%	43.73%
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	WEC Energy Group, Inc	1,953,803	0	1,624,093	54.61%	45.39%
Northern States Power Company	Xcel Energy Inc	6,081,828	0	5,569,033	52.20%	47.80%
Northern States Power Company	Xcel Energy Inc	966,559	0	815,849	54.23%	45.77%
Public Service Company of Colorado	Xcel Energy Inc	6,996,196	0	5,426,223	56.32%	43.68%
Southwestern Public Service Company	Xcel Energy Inc	2,884,448	0	2,442,933	54.14%	45.86%
Average					53.12%	46.88%
Median					52.39%	47.61%

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Demonstration of the Inadequacy of
a DCF Return Rate Related to Book Value
When Market Value is Greater than Book Value

Line No.		Based on Dr. Woolridge's Electric Proxy Group	
		[A]	[B]
		Market Value	Book Value
1.	Per Share	\$ 66.86 (1)	\$ 36.56 (2)
2.	DCF Cost Rate (3)	9.00%	9.00%
3.	Return in Dollars (4)	\$ 6,017	\$ 3,290
4.	Dividends (5)	\$ 2,541	\$ 2,541
5.	Growth in Dollars (6)	\$ 3,476	\$ 0.749
6.	Return on Market Value (7)	9.00%	4.92%
7.	Rate of Growth on Market Value (8)	5.20%	1.12%

Notes.

- (1) Average market price calculated using the 90 day dividend yield and annual dividend as shown on page 2 of Exhibit JRW-7
- (2) Average book value dividing total common equity at year-end 2019 by common shares outstanding at year-end 2019 for each proxy group
- (3) Dr. Woolridge's Recommended DCF cost rate
- (4) Line 1 x Line 2.
- (5) Dividends are based on a 3.8% dividend yield from Exhibit JRW-7
- (6) Line 3 - Line 4.
- (7) Line 3 / Line 1.
- (8) Line 5 / Line 1.

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Calculation of Indicated DCF Applied to Book Value Capital Structure
of Dr. Woolridge's Electric Proxy Group

Un-lever Indicated Market Capital Structure DCF

$$\begin{aligned}
 K_u &= K_e - \left(\left(K_u - i \right) \frac{1 - t}{D/E} \right) - \left(K_u - d \right) \frac{P}{E} \\
 K_u &= 9.00\% - \left(\left(K_u - 4.14\% \right) \frac{1 - 21\%}{36.36\% / 63.20\%} \right) - \left(K_u - 5.33\% \right) \frac{0.44\%}{63.20\%} \\
 K_u &= 9.00\% - \left(\left(K_u - 4.14\% \right) \frac{79.00\%}{57.53\%} \right) - \left(K_u - 5.33\% \right) \frac{0.69\%}{0.69\%} \\
 K_u &= 9.00\% - \left(\left(79.00\% * K_u - 3.2671\% \right) \frac{57.53\%}{0.69\% * K_u - 0.04\%} \right) \\
 K_u &= 9.00\% - \left(45.45\% * K_u - 1.88\% \right) \frac{-0.69\%}{K_u + 0.04\%} \\
 K_u &= 9.00\% - 45.45\% * K_u + 1.88\% \frac{-0.69\%}{K_u + 0.04\%} \\
 K_u &= 10.92\% - 46.14\% * K_u \\
 146.14\% * K_u &= 10.92\% \\
 K_u &= \mathbf{7.47\%}
 \end{aligned}$$

Re-lever to Indicated Book Value Capital Structure DCF

$$\begin{aligned}
 K_e &= K_u + \left(\left(K_u - i \right) \frac{1 - t}{D/E} \right) + \left(K_u - d \right) \frac{P}{E} \\
 K_e &= 7.47\% + \left(\left(7.47\% - 4.14\% \right) \frac{1 - 21\%}{53.32\% / 46.01\%} \right) + \left(7.47\% - 5.33\% \right) \frac{0.67\%}{46.01\%} \\
 K_e &= 7.47\% + \left(\left(3.33\% \right) \frac{79\%}{115.88\%} \right) + \left(2.14\% \right) \frac{1.46\%}{1.46\%} \\
 K_e &= 7.47\% + \left(2.63\% \right) \frac{115.88\%}{0.03\%} \\
 K_e &= 7.47\% + \left(3.05\% \right) + 0.03\% \\
 K_e &= \mathbf{10.55\%}
 \end{aligned}$$

Where

- K_u = Un-levered (i.e., 100% equity) cost of common equity
- K_e = Market determined cost of common equity
- i = Cost of debt
- t = Income tax rate
- D = Debt ratio
- E = Equity ratio
- d = Cost of preferred stock
- P = Preferred equity ratio

Southwestern Electric Power Company
Correction to Dr. Woolridge's DCF Study

Panel A
Electric Proxy Group

Dividend Yield*	3.80%
Adjustment Factor	<u>1.0281</u>
Adjusted Dividend Yield	3.91%
Growth Rate**	<u>5.6%</u>
Equity Cost Rate	9.53%

* Page 2 of Exhibit JRW-7

** Based on projected EPS growth rates from Value Line, Yahoo!, Zacks, and S&P Capital IQ from pages 4 of 5 of Exhibit JRW-7

Panel B
D'Ascendis Proxy Group

Dividend Yield*	3.90%
Adjustment Factor	<u>1.0268</u>
Adjusted Dividend Yield	4.00%
Growth Rate**	<u>5.4%</u>
Equity Cost Rate	9.37%

* Page 2 of Exhibit JRW-7

** Based on projected EPS growth rates from Value Line, Yahoo!, Zacks, and S&P Capital IQ from pages 4 of 5 of Exhibit JRW-7

Southwestern Electric Power Company
DCF Equity Cost Growth Rate Measures
Dr. Woolridge's Value Line and Analysts Projected EPS Growth Rate Estimates Combined

Panel A
Electric Proxy Group

Company	Yahoo	Zacks	S&P	Value Line
ALLETE, Inc. (NYSE-ALE)	7.0%	N/A	6.0%	6.0%
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	5.7%	5.8%	5.8%	5.5%
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	6.6%	6.6%	6.8%	6.0%
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	6.0%	5.8%	6.2%	6.0%
Avista Corp (NYSE-AVA)	6.0%	6.9%	5.3%	1.0%
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	7.3%	7.0%	6.9%	7.5%
Consolidated Edison, Inc. (NYSE-ED)	3.0%	2.0%	3.0%	2.5%
Dominion Energy Inc. (NYSE-D)	2.8%	6.7%	6.6%	7.0%
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	5.0%	5.2%	5.2%	5.0%
Edison International (NYSE-EIX)	NA	3.1%	4.0%	12.0%
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	5.2%	5.2%	5.6%	3.0%
Eversource Energy (NYSE-ES)	5.7%	5.9%	6.4%	8.0%
Eversource Energy (NYSE-ES)	7.1%	6.8%	6.9%	6.5%
Hawaiian Electric Industries (NYSE-HE)	1.3%	2.5%	3.6%	1.5%
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	2.6%	2.6%	3.0%	4.5%
MGE Energy, Inc. (NYSE-MGEE)	4.7%	4.7%	4.7%	4.5%
Nextera Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	8.5%	7.8%	9.2%	10.5%
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	4.7%	5.3%	4.8%	2.5%
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	2.1%	3.6%	2.3%	4.0%
Otter Tail Corporation (NDQ-OTTR)	9.0%	N/A	5.4%	7.0%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	3.5%	3.8%	3.6%	4.5%
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	13.4%	13.4%	4.7%	4.0%
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	N/A	N/A	3.2%	2.5%
Sempra Energy (NYSE-SRE)	8.5%	6.0%	5.4%	11.0%
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	6.5%	5.0%	5.7%	3.5%
WEC Energy Group (NYSE-WEC)	6.1%	6.1%	5.8%	6.5%
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	6.3%	6.2%	5.5%	6.0%
Mean	5.8%	5.6%	5.2%	5.5%
Median	6.0%	5.8%	5.4%	5.5%

Panel B
D'Ascendis Proxy Group

Company	Yahoo	Zacks	S&P	Value Line
ALLETE, Inc. (NYSE-ALE)	7.0%	N/A	6.0%	6.0%
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	5.7%	5.8%	5.8%	5.5%
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	6.6%	6.6%	6.8%	6.0%
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	5.0%	5.2%	5.2%	5.0%
Edison International (NYSE-EIX)	NA	3.1%	4.0%	12.0%
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	5.2%	5.2%	5.6%	3.0%
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	2.6%	2.6%	3.0%	4.5%
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	4.7%	5.3%	4.8%	2.5%
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	2.1%	3.6%	2.3%	4.0%
Otter Tail Corporation (NDQ-OTTR)	9.0%	N/A	5.4%	7.0%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	3.5%	3.8%	3.6%	4.5%
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	13.4%	13.4%	4.7%	4.0%
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	6.3%	6.2%	5.5%	6.0%
Mean	5.9%	5.5%	4.8%	5.4%
Median	5.4%	5.2%	5.2%	5.0%

Notes:

Yahoo, Zacks and S&P growth rates from Exhibit JRW-7, page 5. Value Lines reflects projected earnings growth from Exhibit JRW-7, page 4.